TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
1	Mr. Ramsay ... ... (Athens) **No. 120. Tel.**	1930 June 28	Græco-Turkish relations ... ... Refers to Part XIX, No. 92. Agreement passed Senate and will be complete on publication in gazette	1
2	Sir G. Clerk ... ... (Constantinople) **Nos. 43 and 44. Tel.**	„ 30	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to Part XIX, No. 78. Press reports of Turkish attacks on Kurdish "brigands" in Ararat region	1
3	Mr. Ramsay ... ... **No. 124. Tel.**	July 5	Græco-Turkish relations ... ... Agreement published in "Official Gazette" of 3rd July	1
4	Mr. Ramsay ... ... **No. 352**	June 28	Græco-Turkish relations ... ... Refers to No. 1. Reports on debate on agreement in Senate	2
5	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 248**	„ 28	Pre-war claims against Turkey ... ... Transmits copy of note to Minister for Foreign Affairs agreeing to settlement of claims against lump sum payment of £30,000	2
6	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 251**	July 2	Turkish match monopoly ... ... Refers to Part XIX, No. 88. Transmits copy of contract regarding grant of monopoly to American-Turkish Investment Corporation. Analyses terms of contract	4
7	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 254**	„ 3	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to No. 2. Initial efforts of Turkish press to belittle Kurdish trouble and attacks on Persia. Government apparently decided to liquidate the Kurdish question	4
8	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 258. Very Conf.**	„ 1	Turkish financial and economic situation ... ... Departure of M. Rist. Reports conversation with him and gives outline of suggestions which he proposes to submit to Turkish Government	5
9	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 45. Tel.**	„ 7	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to No. 7. Fresh action reported. Military attaché's estimate of forces involved and of casualties suffered	7
10	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 46. Tel.**	„ 7	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to No. 9. Turkish press insinuating that Great Britain may be behind Ararat movement. Is taking up matter with Minister for Foreign Affairs	7
11	Sir R. Clive ... ... (Tehran) **No. 298. Secret and Confidential**	June 30	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Transmits military attaché's report of conversation with Reuben Pasha and despatch from Tabriz on Kurdish revolt. Reuben Pasha endeavouring to collect arms for Kurds. Minister for Foreign Affairs makes light of Kurdish difficulty with Turks	7
12	Mr. Ramsay ... ... **No. 125. Tel.**	July 11	Greek navy ... ... Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding order of two more destroyers in Italy. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated it was important that destroyers should be on same lines as those already ordered	9
13	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 262**	1930 July 10	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to No. 7. Transmits report from military attaché on earlier phases of Turkish action against Kurds. Now realised that movement is on a large scale. Reports growing anti-Persian feeling and campaign	10
14	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 265**	„ 10	Pre-war claims against Turkey ... ... Refers to No. 5. Transmits copy of note from Minister for Foreign Affairs agreeing to pay £30,000 in settlement of claims	11
15	To Mr. Ramsay ... **No. 70. Tel.**	„ 17	Greek navy ... ... Refers to No. 12. Requests tentative enquiry of M. Veniselos whether he intends to pursue idea of naval agreement with Turkey	12
16	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 266**	„ 12	Turkish State Bank ... ... Refers to Part XIX, No. 89. Summarises and transmits translation of law providing for institution of bank	12
17	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 273. Conf.**	„ 15	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to No. 13. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. Latter's satisfaction at defeat of Kurds. His complaints against Persian attitude towards revolt	13
18	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 274**	„ 16	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to No. 17. Transmits report by military attaché on recent operations. Though fighting still continues, Turks rejoice over complete victory	14
19	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 275**	„ 16	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to Nos. 17 and 18. Reports information given by Mrs. McGrath, who spent eleven days on the Turco-Persian frontier	16
20	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 276**	„ 17	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to Nos. 17, 18 and 19. Analyses the situation in the light of the information available. Difficulty of arriving at a definite conclusion as to the origin of the trouble	17
21	Sir R. Clive ... ... **No. 328**	„ 14	Situation in Kurdistan ... ... Refers to No. 11. Transmits article from "Iran" rebutting report that Persians were helping Kurds. Minister for Foreign Affairs of opinion that Soviet Government were trying to make trouble between Persia and Turkey	18
22	Mr. Newton ... ... (Berlin) **No. 579**	„ 15	Railway material for Turkey ... ... Reports that negotiations for supply of material from Germany are nearing a conclusion. Value of contract said to be about 80 million marks	20
23	Colonial Office ...	„ 23	Iraqi-Turkish relations ... ... Bagdad telegram of 21st July. Turkish protest to Iraqi Minister at Angora against Iraqi Government's conciliatory policy towards Kurds. Proposes making clear during tour that His Majesty's Government are in no sense encouraging Kurdish nationalism, which would embarrass neighbouring Governments	20
24	Sir G. Clerk ... ... **No. 52. Tel.**	„ 23	Iraqi-Turkish relations ... ... Refers to No. 23. Suggests that Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke in a moment of irritation and attaches little importance to his alleged statements to Iraqi Minister	21

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
25	Mr. Harvey ... (Athens) No. 133. Tel. Conf.	1930 July 23	Greek navy Refers to No. 15. Reports conversation with M. Venizelos regarding possibility of naval holiday with Turkey. His desire to reach a comprehensive settlement. Turkey afraid of Russia and Italy	21
26	Mr. Harvey ... No. 134. Conf.	„ 24	Greco-Turkish relations Refers to No. 3. Reports exchange of ratifications of Greco-Turkish Agreement	22
27	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 53. Tel.	„ 26	Iraq-Turkish frontier Reports receipt from Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora of special message regarding aggression by members of Barzan tribe on post at Oramar and requests information	22
28	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 54. Tel.	„ 26	Iraq-Turkish frontier Refers to No. 27. According to press, incident took place on night of 21st–22nd July	22
29	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 267	„ 24	Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Affairs' decision to settle Ararat question with Persia. His enquiry regarding situation in Egypt. His opposition to Pan-European scheme	22
30	Sir R. Clive ... No. 174	„ 28	Situation in Kurdistan Tabriz telegram No. 18. Lorries being sent to Maku as Turks have threatened to cross frontier in pursuit of Kurds	23
31	Mr. Harvey ... No. 418. Conf.	„ 23	Greco-Turkish relations Refers to No. 15. Reports conversation with M. Venizelos regarding possibility of a naval agreement with Turkey, and his desire for a general settlement	23
32	Sir P. Oray ... (Moscow) No. 432	„ 29	Russo-Turkish relations Refers to Part XIX No. 30. Reports exchange of ratifications of Russo-Turkish protocol prolonging 1925 treaty	25
33	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 288	„ 29	Turkish Ambassador at Tehran Reports resignation of Mymduh Seyket Bey and appointment of Hussey Bey. Statement of President of Republic regarding necessity of solidifying Perso-Turkish collaboration	25
34	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 291	„ 30	Turkish financial situation Refers to No. 8. Reports speech by Prime Minister, who said that foreign debt question must be settled, but that Turkey could not contemplate any system of increasing payments	25
35	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 292	„ 31	Situation in Kurdistan Refers to No. 17. Analyses situation. Reports speech of Prime Minister in which he stated that Turkey must be free to take measures for the defence of her frontier. Perso-Turkish relations strained	26
36	Mr. Helm ... (Constantinople) No. 63. Tel.	Aug. 5	Iraq-Turkish frontier Telegram No. 5 to Baghdad. Proposes to say nothing to Minister for Foreign Affairs, but enquires whether any, and if so, what, reply has been sent to Turkish Minister	27
37	Colonial Office ...	„ 6	Iraq-Turkish frontier Telegram of 5th August to Baghdad. Refers to No. 27. Enquires facts regarding alleged incursion. Baghdad telegram of 4th August reporting that Sheikh Barzan's followers are arresting Kurds	27

No.	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
38	To Mr. Ramsay ... (Athens) No. 76. Tel.	1930 Aug. 7	Greco-Turkish relations Refers to No. 25. Requests information regarding report that naval negotiations have reached an advanced state	28
39	Colonial Office ...	„ 8	Iraq-Turkish frontier Baghdad telegram of 6th August. Refers to No. 36. Substance of reply being returned to Turkish Minister regarding frontier incursion. Disavows any assistance by Iraqi Government to Kurds	28
40	Mr. Ramsay ... No. 136. Tel.	„ 8	Greco-Turkish relations Refers to No. 38. Considers report is premature and that Turks had merely been sounded as to whether they would accept parity in principle	28
41	Colonial Office ...	„ 9	Iraq-Turkish frontier Baghdad telegram of 8th August. Reports of fight on 21st July between Oramar and Turkish troops. Sheikh Barzan sent assistance to Oramar	29
42	Mr. Helm ... No. 67. Tel.	„ 9	Greco-Turkish relations Refers to No. 40. Greek Minister states that he has made no naval proposal to Turks. Agreed in principle that naval question should be discussed after other difficulties had been got out of the way	29
43	Mr. Helm ... No. 69. Tel.	„ 10	Turkish political situation Reports foundation of Liberal Republican party by Fethi Bey. Outline of probable programme. Ismet Pasha Cabinet cross-bullied	29
44	Mr. Helm ... No. 70. Tel.	„ 10	Turkish political situation Refers to No. 43. Learns that foundation of new party has the Gazi's support and that its object is the elimination of Ismet Pasha	30
45	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 295	„ 9	Turkish naval visit to Malta Transmits note from Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding possibility of Turkish fleet to visit Malta before the autumn of 1931	30
46	Mr. Helm ... No. 298	„ 6	Situation in Kurdistan Refers to No. 35. Reports despatch of note to Persian Government. Anti-Persian press campaign has abated somewhat and there are signs of difference between the Gazi and Ismet Pasha regarding Kurdish policy	31
47	Mr. Helm ... No. 301	„ 6	Railway material for Turkey Refers to No. 22. Reports conclusion of agreement between Turkish Government and German group for supply of material to value of 20 million lires	32
48	Mr. Helm ... No. 305	„ 7	Bulgaro-Turkish relations Reports declarations to Gazi regarding Bulgaro-Turkish brotherhood. Treatment of Bulgarians in Turkey is not however in accord with these professions of friendship	32
49	Mr. Watelow ... (Sofia) No. 260	„ 7	Bulgaro-Turkish relations Reports satisfaction of Bulgarian press at declarations of Turkish President regarding Bulgaro-Turkish brotherhood	33
50	Turkish Ambassador	„ 13	Lausanne Residence Convention Reports denunciation by Turkish Government	33

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
51 Mr. Campbell (Paris) No. 939	1930 Aug. 14	Situation in Kurdistan Reports conversation with Persian Minister who desired to call attention to Turkish violation of Persian frontier. Person might appeal to the League of Nations.	34
52 Mr. Strang (Moscow) No. 461	„ 11	Russo-Turkish commercial relations Refers to Part XIX, No. 23. Turkish Ambassador stated that negotiations were now making good progress.	34
53 Mr. Henderson No. 310	„ 12	Greco-Turkish relations Refers to No. 42. Reports conversation with Greek Minister regarding possibility of naval pact. Discussions had not proceeded beyond preliminary stage and it was doubtful if figures of tonnage would be discussed at all.	34
54 Mr. Henderson No. 312	„ 12	Turkish political situation Refers to No. 40. Reports circumstances of formation of Liberal party and estimates probable developments.	35
55 Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin) No. 664	„ 13	German railway material for Turkey Refers to No. 22. Information regarding contract signed between German group and Turkish Government.	38
56 Mr. Henderson No. 317	„ 14	Turkish political situation Refers to No. 54. Reports constitution of Liberal party and transmits copy of its programme. Reports on feeling at Angora regarding the new development.	39
57 Mr. Henderson No. 318	„ 14	Iraq-Turkish relations Refers to No. 27. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed satisfaction at Iraqi attitude in Kurdish situation. His satisfaction at Anglo-Iraq treaty and criticism of French policy.	41
58 Mr. Henderson No. 320	„ 14	Turkish army Transmits report from military attaché on tactical methods and state of training of Turkish army.	44
59 Sir R. Clive No. 194. Tel.	„ 18	Situation in Kurdistan Reports of Turkish crossing of Persian frontier are unfounded. Turks have suffered another reverse and may be compelled to take measures against Persia.	48
60 To Turkish Ambassador	„ 22	Lausanne Residence Convention Acknowledges receipt of No. 50.	49
61 Colonial Office	„ 25	Iraq-Turkish frontier Refers to No. 30. Reports further incident between Sheikh Barzan's followers and Turkish troops.	41
62 Mr. Henderson No. 328	„ 29	Situation in Kurdistan Refers to No. 16. Reports that situation is quiet and that moment for strong measures against Persia has passed.	44
63 Mr. Waterlow No. 276	„ 21	Bulgaro-Turkish relations Refers to No. 49. Reports on visit of Turkish journalists to Bulgaria, which appears to be of considerable significance and importance.	45
64 Mr. Strang No. 469	„ 1s	Situation in Kurdistan Refers to No. 21. Reports press publications attributing to Soviet Government desire to see trouble settled in Persia and Turkey.	46

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
65 Mr. Harvey No. 453	1930 Aug. 21	Greco-Turkish relations Refers to No. 34. Reports that agreement has been reached regarding terms of Part of Friendship and Arbitration. Final negotiations will now take place for commercial treaty.	47
66 Mr. Strang No. 493	„ 25	Russo-Turkish relations Refers to Nos. 52 and 64. Reports press articles dealing with Turkish affairs and emphasising friendliness of Russo-Turkish relations.	47
67 Sir H. Rumbold No. 712	„ 27	German railway material for Turkey Refers to No. 55. Reports manner in which order will be financed.	49
68 Mr. Henderson No. 335	„ 27	Situation in Kurdistan Refers to No. 62. Reports conversation with Persian Chargé d'Affaires, who stated that discussions were continuing between the two countries. Turks would shortly be able to liquidate the Kurdish trouble.	49
69 Mr. Henderson No. 336	„ 27	Naval visits to Constantinople Reports visits of Italian, Argentine, Soviet and United States vessels and acquiesces.	50
70 Sir G. Clerk No. 337	„ 28	Turkish navy Refers to Part XIX, No. 48. Reports conclusion of refit of "Yavuz".	51
71 Sir R. Clive No. 415	„ 26	Situation in Kurdistan Refers to No. 59. Transmits report by military attaché on situation and comments on Tehran press publications. Actual situation is obscure.	51
72 Sir R. Clive No. 421. Conf.	„ 26	Situation in Kurdistan Transmits despatches from Tabriz, Nos. 146, 147, 149 and 151 reporting on.	54
73 Sir G. Clerk No. 341	Sept. 4	Anglo-Turkish Commercial Treaty Reports exchange of ratifications on 3rd September.	57
74 Sir G. Clerk No. 343	„ 4	Italo-Turkish commercial *modus vivendi* Reports exchange of notes on 3rd September and transmits copies.	58
75 Sir G. Clerk No. 347	„ 4	Turkish political situation Refers to No. 56. Transmits summary of Ismet Pasha's speech at opening of Sivas Railway. Otherwise there have been no developments of importance.	60
76 Sir G. Clerk No. 349	„ 4	Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he had rejected proposal for Russo-Italo-Turkish naval pact. His criticisms of M. Briand's report.	62
77 Sir G. Clerk No. 350	„ 4	Iraq-Turkish relations Reports on visit of Iraqi Prime Minister to Turkey. His statement regarding discussions on naval oil-fields, frontier affairs and commercial treaty.	63
78 Sir G. Clerk No. 354	„ 10	Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty Refers to No. 73. Transmits certified copies of notes exchanged with Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding application of treaty to colonies and protectorates.	64
79 Sir G. Clerk No. 355	„ 8	Turkish political situation Refers to No. 75. Transmits summary of Fethi Bey's speech at Smyrna and reports on reception accorded to him there.	66

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
81	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 356	1930 Sept. 10	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 79. Analyses meaning and importance of foundation of Liberal party. Discusses probable developments.	67
81	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 357	„ 10	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 80. Transmits open letter to Gazi and his reply defining his attitude towards the Liberal party. Possibility of the Gazi taking government of country into his own hands.	69
82	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 88. Tel.	„ 14	Turkish political situation ... Reports that Assembly has been summoned to meet in special session on 22nd September. Reason is given as the currency problem.	71
83	Acting Consul Meade (Aleppo) No. 68. Conf.	Aug. 29	Situation in Kurdistan ... Reports on attitude of Syrian Kurds towards revolt of Turkish Kurds.	71
84	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 90. Tel.	Sept. 17	Situation in Kurdistan ... Refers to No. 68. States that press reports concerning suppression of Kurds in Ararat region.	72
85	Sir R. Clive ... No. 431	„ 3	Situation in Kurdistan ... Conversing with retiring Persian Ambassador and with Minister of Court regarding situation. Reasons for Persian tension much exaggerated. Both stated that attitude of Soviet Government had been correct.	72
86	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 364	„ 18	Situation in Kurdistan ... Refers to No. 84. Transmits two reports by military attaché containing history of revolt and dealing with final operations. Considers it improbable that Kurdish organisation has been stamped out.	74
87	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 92. Tel.	„ 21	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 86. Learns that Ismet Pasha will resign on 22nd September, but will be called upon to form new Government. Cabinet will be strengthened.	77
88	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 93. Tel.	„ 22	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 87. Indicates probable Cabinet changes.	77
89	To Sir G. Clerk ... No. 583	„ 22	Turkey and the League of Nations ... Refers to statement of leader of Liberal party that he would favour Turkey's joining the League if she were assured of an elected seat on the Council. Instructions as to attitude he should adopt if the Turks raise the question.	77
90	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 100. Tel.	„ 26	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 88. Reports Ismet Pasha's resignation. Expected that new Cabinet will be formed at once.	78
91	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 101. Tel.	„ 28	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 90. New Cabinet again formed by Ismet Pasha. There are changes of four Ministries.	78
92	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 369	„ 24	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 81. Transmits memorandum by Mr. Helm giving account of and impressions gained during his recent visit to Angora. Indicates probable developments.	78

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
93	Sir R. Clive ... No. 461	1930 Sept. 23	Situation in Kurdistan ... Refers to No. 85. Reports presentation of credentials by new Turkish Ambassador. Latter's statement to press regarding need of frontier rectification. Transmits latest report on situation from Tabriz.	80
94	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 374	Oct. 1	Turkish currency ... Transmits copy of law of 27th September authorising Government to take measures for temporary stabilisation of exchange. Comments on law, which is necessitated by temporary surplus of exports.	82
95	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 378	„ 1	Turkish political situation ... Refers to Nos. 91 and 94. Gives list of new [illegible] appointed. Government has no intention to [illegible] changes.	83
96	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 379	„ 1	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 95. Reports statements affecting their [illegible] Ministers of Finance and Economy. Law [illegible] of monopolies and of the Central Bank.	85
97	Mr. Strang ... No. 577	Sept. 29	Russo-Turkish relations ... Reports on Turkish Russia Boy's visit to Moscow, the reception and [illegible] statement to the press. Comments on [illegible] received.	85
98	Mr. Strang ... No. 578	„ 30	Russo-Turkish relations ... Refers to No. 97. Reports on conversations with Turkish Russia Boy, who expressed great satisfaction at visit. Further [illegible] Russo-Turkish friendship.	87
99	Mr. Strang ... No. 580	„ 30	[illegible] ... Refers to Nos. 97 and 98. Reports on special pains taken by Soviet Government to entertain Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and his party.	88
100	Mr. Strang ... No. 593	Oct. 6	Russo-Turkish relations ... Refers to No. 97. Reports details of latter part of Turkish Russia Boy's visit. Gives text of official communiqué issued and discusses significance and results of visit.	89
101	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 388	„ 8	Turkish political situation ... Transmits communication by Mr. Morgan on extraordinary session of Assembly. Considers that discussion has been beneficial.	91
102	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 387	„ 8	Iraq-Turkish relations ... Reports on successful visit to Turkey of High Commissioner for Iraq and his conversations with Turkish leaders. Results should be very beneficial.	92
103	Mr. Ramsay ... (Athens) No. 537. Conf.	„ 13	Greco-Turkish relations ... Refers to No. 31. Reports conversations with M. Venizelos and Turkish Minister regarding probable nature of naval agreement which it is proposed to conclude at Angora.	93
104	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 397	„ 14	Trebizond-Mosul consular district ... Reports that Turkish Government maintain exclusion of "forbidden zones" from jurisdiction of consulate. Defines forbidden areas.	93
105	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 273	„ 14	Russian naval visit to Constantinople ... Refers to No. 99. Reports on visit of Soviet [illegible] of two destroyers. Visit passed off peaceably and attracted little attention.	94

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
108	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 389	1930 Oct. 14	Russo-Turkish relations ... ... Reports Minister for Foreign Affairs' return from Moscow. Transmits copy of communiqué issued in connexion with visit.	94
107	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 400	„ 14	Turkish municipal elections ... Reports on elections, chief feature of which has been appearance of Opposition party. Government's party overwhelmed, confident of a sweeping victory.	94
108	Mr Ramsay ... No. 159. Tel.	„ 24	Greco-Turkish relations ... Learns that M. Venizelos will visit Ecumenical Patriarch and announce that Greece has abandoned all designs on Constantinople. Turkish Government expressed satisfaction at visit.	95
109	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 411	„ 25	Turkish subscription loans ... Refers to No. 107. Reports on results of elections and on opposition to Government party. Liberal party protest to be satisfied with the results.	95
110	To Sir R. Graham (Rome) No. 1187	„ 27	Turkey and the League of Nations ... Conversation with Italian Ambassador who suggested that the Governments should take steps to induce Turkey to join the League. Ambassador was informed that it was doubtful if any purpose would be served by taking suggested action.	96
111	Sir R. Graham ... No. 794	„ 31	Turkey and the League of Nations ... Minister for Foreign Affairs stated he was receiving reports of Ambassador to suggest that steps should be taken to induce Turkey to join the League. He was anxious to draw Turkey away from Russia.	96
112	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 39. Tel.	„ 31	Greco-Turkish conference ... Reports agreements signed at Angora on 30th October. Visit passed off in atmosphere of cordiality.	97
113	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 40. Tel.	„ 31	Greco-Turkish relations ... Refers to No. 112. Reports that M. Venizelos will call on Ecumenical Patriarch with full consent of Turkish Government. Visit is being given as private a character as possible.	97
114	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 413	„ 24	Situation in Kurdistan ... Refers to No. 89. Transmits despatch No. 11 from military attaché containing summary of recent reports regarding situation. Reference to recent disturbances are apparently being suppressed.	97
115	Mr Ramsay ... No. 359	„ 29	Greco-Turkish relations ... Reports on attitude of Greek press towards visit of M. Venizelos to Angora.	98
116	The Italian Ambassador	Nov. 7	Turkey and the League of Nations ... Confirms view already expressed (No. 110) that nothing would be gained by taking action suggested by Italian Government. Attitude of His Majesty's Government is known to Turkish Government.	99
117	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 416	„ 1	Greco-Turkish relations ... Reports details of visit of M. Venizelos to Turkey and transmits text of naval protocol.	99
118	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 421	„ 4	Greco-Turkish relations ... Refers to No. 117. Discusses significance of visit of M. Venizelos and of agreements concluded.	101

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
119	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 422	1930 Nov. 4	Turkish Assembly ... ... Refers to Part XVIII, No. 74. Reports opening of new session. Transmits copy of President's speech and comments on certain points.	103
120	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 423	„ 4	Republic Day ... Refers to Part XVIII, No. 72. Reports on celebrations.	103
121	Sir R. Graham ... No. 509	„ 4	Greco-Turkish affairs ... Reports telegram sent to Italian Prime Minister by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on occasion of signature of Greco-Turkish treaty.	104
122	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 424	„ 4	Turkish finances (1929) ... Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding Turco-Italian relations and questions connected with Balkans of Greco-Turkish frontier.	104
123	Mr Ramsay ... No. 373	„ 4	Anglo-Turkish relations ... Reports that recent press attitude towards Greco-Turkish agreements has been generally favourable.	105
124	Mr [illegible] (Tehran) No. 532	„ 8	Perso-Turkish frontier ... Refers to No. 87. Reports statement of new Persian Ambassador to Turkey on Kurdish question and question of frontier rectification.	105
125	Mr Ramsay ... No. 377. Conf.	„ 5	General Political situation ... Reports conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, who gave their impressions of visit to Turkey. Visit has been generally approved but it is too early to assess its full effects.	107
126	Mr Ramsay ... No. 381	„ 6	Greco-Turkish relations ... Refers to No. 125. Reports conversation with Turkish colleague, who was full of appreciation regarding recent visit. Minister for Foreign Affairs asserted that Greece was in Italy's pocket and is seeking employment as she [illegible].	109
127	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 435	„ 13	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 101. Reports general signs of anxiety to deal with Turkish Government. Ismet was shortly made a leader of enquête at provinces.	111
128	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 120. Tel.	„ 17	Foreign political situation ... Refers to No. 125. Reports defeat of Ismet by a motion of want of confidence and dissolution of Liberal party.	112
129	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 435	„ 17	Visits of Gyula Bethlen and M. Venizelos to Angora ... Refers to Nos. 125 and 126. Views at Budapest and Athens despatches. Things one object of M. Venizelos was to end Greco-Turkish feud.	112
130	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 437	„ 19	Turkish budget ... Refers to Part XIX, No. 70. Transmits and comments on estimates for financial year 1931-32.	113
131	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 439	„ 19	Turkish political situation ... Refers to No. 128. Reports on Assembly debate and on dissolution of Liberal party. Disappearance of a further set back in political evolution of Turkey.	114

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
132	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 440	1930 Nov. 19	Tour of President of Republic	115
133	[illegible] No. 444	„ 20	Turkish political situation	116
134	[illegible] No. 928	„ 21	[illegible] in Turkey	117
135	[illegible] No. 603	„ 21	[illegible]	117
136	[illegible] No. 210. Tel.	„ 27	[illegible]	119
137	[illegible] No. 445	„ 28	[illegible]	119
138	[illegible] No. 886	„ 28	[illegible]	120
139	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 453	Dec. 3	Greco-Turkish relations	120
140	Mr. Waterlow No. 371	„ 4	Bulgar [illegible]	121
141	[illegible]	„ 12	Iraq-Turkish relations	122
142	[illegible] No. 456	„ 9	Greco-Turkish relations	124
143	[illegible] No. 460	„ 8	Turkish foreign policy	129
144	Mr. Wood to Sir F. Butler	„ 16	[illegible]	131

	No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
145	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 484	1930 Dec. 23	Turkish Cabinet Refers to No. 62. Reports resignation of Şükrü Bey as Minister of Finance and appointment of Abdul Halik Bey	132
146	Sir G. Clerk ... No. 487	„ 24	Turkish railway construction Refers to No. 134. Reports information in possession of commercial secretary, which do not altogether tally with German press announcements	132

Subject Index.

[The figures refer to serial numbers of documents.]

Army, Turkish —58
Assembly, Turkish —139
Bank, Turkish State —10
Bathurst, Count, Visit to Angora —120
Budget, Turkish —130
Bulgaro-Turkish Relations —48, 49, 63, 140
Cabinet, Turkish —145.
Claims, British Pre-War —5, 14.
Consular District, Trebizond-Mersin —104
Currency, Turkish.—94
Debt, Ottoman Public —144
Elections, Turkish Municipal —107, 108
Finances, Turkish —8, 54.
Foreign Relations, Turkey —20, 70, 122, 148
Greco-Turkish Relations —1, 3, 4, 26, 31, 38, 40, 42, 53, 65, 105, 108, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 124, 128, 125, 126, 135, 142
Irako-Turkish "Modus Vivendi"—74
Irako-Turkish Frontier —27, 28, 36, 37, 39, 41, 61
Irako-Turkish Relations —23, 24, 57, 77, 103, 141
Italo-Turkish Relations —126, 138.
Kurdistan, Situation in —2, 7, 9-11, 13, 17-21, 30, 35, 46, 51, 59, 82, 64, 68, 71, 72, 83-86, 93, 111, 137
Lausanne Residence Convention —50, 60.
League of Nations, Turkey and —89, 110, 111, 116.
Mavi Mosoula, Turkish —9.
Navy, Greek —12, 15, 25.
Navy, Turkish —45, 70
Perso-Turkish Relations —124, 139.
Political Situation, Turkish —43, 44, 54, 55, 75, 79-82, 87, 88, 93-92, 95, 96, 101, 127, 128, 131, 136
President of Republic, Tour —132.
Railway Construction in Turkey —134, 140.
Railway Material for Turkey —22, 47, 55, 67
Republic Day —120.
Russo-Turkish Relations —32, 52, 60, 97-100, 109
Teheran, Turkish Ambassador at —33.
Treaty, Anglo-Turkish Commercial —73, 78.
Vessellos, M., Visit to Angora —120
Visits, Naval, to Constantinople —60, 105.

Errata.

Page 29, No. 42 (heading): for "Sir G. Clerk" read "Mr. Helm."
Page 39, No. 56, line 5: for "and" read "as."
Page 78, No. 91, penultimate line: for "No. 368" read "No. 389."

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

PART XX.

[E 3466/463/44] No. 1

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Athens, June 28, 1930*

MY telegram No. 119

Græco-Turkish agreement was passed by the Senate last night, and ratification will be complete on publication in "Government Gazette."

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 3490/1511/44] No. 2

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 30.)

(Nos. 43 and 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June 30, 1930.*

(R.) MR. EDMONDS'S despatch No. 166.

Reports have been current recently of organised Turkish attack on Kurds in Ararat region.

Press now reports that on 10th June and following days attack on "brigands" from Persia took place at Ararat. Brigands were driven into Persia, where they are said to have been organised. Second attack took place near Hanik on 19th June, and further punitive measures are apparently contemplated somewhere west of Lake Urumia and south of Hanik. (End of R.)

"Brigands" are, of course, Kurds, but authorities are probably reluctant to admit any failure of policy of "peaceful penetration."

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[E 3583/463/44] No. 3

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Athens, July 5, 1930.*

GRÆCO-TURKISH Agreement published in "Official Gazette" dated 3rd July.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 3596/463/44] No. 4.

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 352.)

Sir, *Athens, June 28, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 357 of the 26th June, I have the honour to report that the Bill for the ratification of the Graeco-Turkish Agreement was laid before the Senate yesterday.

2. After various Senators representing the refugees had spoken in favour of the agreement, M. Venizelos made a short speech in which he referred to his acknowledgement at Lausanne of Greece's obligations to pay for war damages on the one hand and Ismet Pasha's recognition on the other that Greece was not in a position to pay.

3. The Prime Minister then stated that though he did not agree with the contentions of some of the members of the Grand Committee of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the agreement should not be signed at present, he, nevertheless, telegraphed to M. Polychronadis on the subject, who replied that any delay would cause bad feelings with Turkey. On receipt of this information he had again summoned the committee and declared that he would take the responsibility of an immediate signature, and that he was sure the other agreements, including the Pact of Friendship and Limitation of Armaments would be signed under as good conditions.

4. As regards the Treaty of Commerce and the Establishment Convention, they had, he said, the declaration of the Turkish Government that they would recognise the "most-favoured-nation" clause. The agreement in which they might anticipate some difficulties was that in connexion with armaments, not because of any bad feeling on the part of the Turks, but because Greece wished for parity and not for large ships.

5. He had never boasted of what he accomplished at Lausanne, he only considered he had fulfilled a bitter duty in agreeing to represent Greece there; as a result of his efforts there, when he was called to power in 1924, he had to abstain from remaining in office because of his health. In that treaty, however, he had managed to keep 300,000 Turks out of Greece and had obtained a renunciation on the part of Ismet Pasha of his claim to £200,000. No one then realised it might take fifty or a hundred years to settle the value of the property of exchangeables.

6. He declared that M. Kaphandaris's plea for delay on the ground that there was no reason to hasten the agreement would only have caused more bitter feelings between the countries than before, and they might have been obliged to increase their land and sea forces in order to be in a position to negotiate later.

7. Finally, in asking the Senate to ratify the agreement, he expressed his gratitude to the refugee population for not listening to those who were making capital out of their misfortune.

8. The Senate then passed the Bill ratifying the agreement.

9. The Turkish Minister informs me that the negotiations for the Commercial Convention will be negotiated at Angora, but that he will undertake the negotiations here for a Consular Convention with regard to which he does not anticipate very great difficulties, as they will be based on the generally established precedents for such conventions.

10. I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
PATRICK RAMSAY.

[E 3612/325/44] No. 5.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 248.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herein, with reference to your telegram No. 39 of the 26th instant, a copy of the note which I have to-day addressed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of pre-war claims.

2. It will be observed that this note is textually the same as the draft note already in the possession of your department except for the substitution, at the request of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 2 of the words "le Gouvernement turc" for "le Gouvernement de la République turque."

3. I weighed carefully your desire to secure the omission of the words "au nom des ayantsdroit" in paragraph 3, but since this phrase is, from the Turkish point of view, one of the two essential points in the discharge which is to become operative when payment is completed, and as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had insisted on its inclusion, I considered that any attempt to make even a minor modification at this moment might endanger the whole settlement, which has only been arrived at after delicate unofficial negotiations. I was further influenced by the fact that on the 26th instant I had been informed in writing by the Acting Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that the draft was acceptable to the Turkish Government and that, on the receipt of the signed note, the Minister would immediately confirm in writing the terms of the agreement. I trust, therefore, that in these circumstances you may approve my decision. The balance is so manifestly, I might almost say beyond expectation, to the real advantage of British claimants, that I have had no hesitation in making it.

4. I shall not fail to forward to you a copy of the Turkish note as soon as I shall have received it.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Sir G. Clerk to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre, *Le 28 juin* 1930.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir en son temps la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser à la date du 13 janvier 1930, au sujet des réclamations britanniques d'avant-guerre réservées par l'article 71 du Traité de Lausanne. Cependant, grâce à la bonne volonté déployée par votre Excellence et par le Gouvernement de la République, cette question est entrée, comme votre Excellence le sait, dans une nouvelle phase depuis la date de la note précitée, ce qui me dispense d'y répondre en détail.

2. Bref, à la suite des discussions verbales autorisées par votre Excellence, qui ont eu lieu pendant ces derniers mois entre le directeur général du 1er département du Ministère, Mehmet Esat Bey, et le personnel de cette Ambassade, on est tombé d'accord sur une solution globale de cette question, à établir de gré à gré entre les deux Gouvernements. Au nom du Gouvernement de la République turque, Mehmet Esat Bey a proposé officiellement la liquidation de toutes les réclamations britanniques d'avant-guerre susmentionnées (dont une liste détaillée avait été transmise par Mr. Hoare à son Excellence Nusret Bey dans sa note No. 212 du 24 août 1928), contre le versement par le Gouvernement turc au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de la somme globale de £30,000. Ce versement se fera par cinq annuités égales de £6,000, la première annuité devant être acquittée au mois de décembre 1930 et les annuités suivantes au mois de décembre de chaque année jusqu'en 1934.

3. D'ordre du Secrétaire d'État principal de Sa Majesté britannique aux Affaires étrangères, auquel je n'ai pas manqué de soumettre la proposition énoncée ci-haut, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en accepte intégralement les dispositions, contre l'exécution intégrale desquelles il déclare, en son nom et au nom des ayants droit, libérer entièrement le Gouvernement de la République turque des réclamations dont il s'agit. En même temps, je prie votre Excellence de bien vouloir me confirmer, au nom du Gouvernement de la République turque, les termes de l'arrangement sur lequel nous venons de nous entendre.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3615/2622/44] No. 6.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 251.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 2, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 235 of the 18th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the contract relative to the grant of the Turkish Match Monopoly to the American-Turkish Investment Corporation.*

2. The general provisions of this contract were stated in my despatch under reference. The concessionary company has obtained, for a period of twenty-five years, a monopoly of the manufacture, importation, exportation and sale of matches and mechanical lighters in Turkey, and has undertaken to construct, within two years of signing the contract, a match factory in the vilayet of Stamboul with an output adequate to meet the needs of the country.

3. In return for the concession, the American-Turkish Investment Corporation has undertaken to make an immediate loan of 10 million dollars to the Turkish Government, redeemable in twenty-five years and bearing interest at the annual rate of 6½ per cent. 500,000 dollars of this loan were to be paid to the Turkish Government immediately after the ratification of the contract by the Grand National Assembly and the remainder is to be paid two months after such ratification. The former payment has already been made.

4. The redemption of the loan and the payment of interest are covered by the issue of fifty Turkish Treasury bonds, each to the value of 407,302·80 dollars, to be presented for payment on the 1st January and 1st July each year, the first bond maturing on the 1st January, 1931.

5. The payments to be made by the Turkish Government are, in practice, more than offset by the annuity amounting to £T. 1,750,000, to be paid by the concessionary company from the proceeds of the monopoly, and the company further undertakes to pay £T. 50,000 per annum in return for exemption from internal taxation. Should the annual sales of matches in Turkey exceed 25,000 cases, the Turkish Government will receive a royalty of £T. 30 per case on such excess sales.

6. The company is free to choose its own employees, with the qualification, however, that not more than ten foreigners are to be employed.

7. As stated in my despatch of the 18th June, the question of arbitration in case of dispute has been resolved by detaching the stipulations as to the loan from the rest of the contract. Any contention as to the loan, as laid down in article 2 of the contract, is to be referred in the last resort to the president of the Swiss Federal courts, but all other disputes are to be dealt with by the Turkish courts.

8. A clause in the contract, which is of importance to the concessionary group, prescribes that the basis of exchange to be adopted in all cases where payments in Turkish pounds are indicated, is 47 cents to the Turkish pound. The company has in this way secured, as far as its contract is concerned, a virtual stabilisation of the Turkish pound, and has thus removed one of the principal objections entertained by foreign enterprise to entering into any long-term undertaking in this country.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3616/1511/44] No. 7.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 254.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 3, 1930.*

IN my telegram No. 43 of the 30th ultimo I had the honour to inform you of the reports issued by the Anatolian Agency regarding military action against Kurdish brigands near the Turco-Persian frontier.

2. It is significant that the issue of these reports was delayed until several days after the distribution here of European newspapers containing information regarding the operations on the frontier, and that, even when issued, it was obvious that their object was to minimise the extent of the fighting. Aeroplane bombardment on the slopes of Ararat was mentioned, it is true, but the general impression created by the

* Not printed

communiqué was that a small body of troops had been used to deal with an unimportant frontier raid. A later telegram from Van stating that a large body of raiders formed at Yekmelen in Persia had crossed the frontier at Gevirisamyan, had joined the Haydaranli tribe, had attacked gendarmerie posts, and were trying to raise rebellion near Zilan showed that something more serious was on foot. The telegram laconically added that measures had been taken to prevent the return of the raiders to Persia.

3. During the last three days no further communiqué has been issued, but the frontier situation has been the subject of much comment in the press, and it is now fairly clear that operations are taking place on a considerable scale both west of Lake Urmia and near Ararat, where the strong Celali (Kurdish) tribe has apparently risen against the Government. According to this morning's semi-official "Milliyet" the rebels have been surrounded and their complete repression is only a question of a few days.

4. As was only to be expected, the Government subventioned press is whole-heartedly with the Government in its endeavour to liquidate "the eastern frontier question" for good and all, for only in the inaccessible Ararat region has the strong arm of the republic not so far been felt. Pacification by forceful methods is the order of the day in these parts, the widely separated villages are being razed to the ground, and only later when the work of destruction is complete will the civil authorities come in to face the overwhelming task of reconstruction.

5. It is hardly surprising that, with these events taking place so close to the frontier, the Persian Government is held largely responsible. The leaders of the revolt, if it can be so termed, are stated to have come with a few followers from Persian territory, where they had collected an adequate supply of arms and ammunition. No effort was made by the Persian authorities to stop the incursion, and the press enquires whether such an attitude is the correct one for a neighbouring State with which Turkey has a treaty of friendship. The Persian consul here has made a rejoinder to the effect that Persia suffers as much from the raiders as does Turkey, but Tehran remains silent, and the Turkish Government is obviously not averse from allowing the press, and not improbably has instructed it, to have a tilt at Persia which will do no harm and which they perhaps hope may divert attention from the chief object of the operations, which is to complete the liquidation of the Kurdish revolt of 1925.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3617/282/44] No. 8.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 255. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 1, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Rist has now concluded his enquiry into the Turkish financial and economic situation and has left the country to-day.

2. M. Rist was good enough to pay me a long visit yesterday in order to explain in broad outline the general recommendations which he intends to embody in the report he will shortly submit to the Turkish Government.

3. M. Rist began by saying that his second visit to Angora had a little lessened the pessimism aroused from his first contact with the Turkish Government there, but, even so, he did not look forward either to the future or to his own particular prescription for dealing with it with any great enthusiasm. At best, what he had to suggest would give a breathing-space which, if the Turkish Government and people were genuinely sincere in their efforts to set their house in order, might put them on the way to doing so with a reasonable hope of success.

4. Very briefly, the suggestions which M. Rist proposes to submit to the Turkish Government are as follows:—

It must be recognised that, for a time, Turkey must find some relief from her obligations abroad, first, by giving out fewer Government orders for war material, &c., but also by a temporary diminution of her payments to the bondholders and to

creditors, such as the Julius Berger or the Swedish railway groups. The amount of this relief M. Rist puts provisionally at £1,500,000 a year for two years; this diminution to be taken at an equal percentage from all Turkey's foreign creditors.

At the same time, a group of foreign banks, as yet unspecified, but in which the Ottoman Bank must inevitably play a leading part, must be found to give Turkey a credit of £1,500,000 a year for two years. The principal object of this credit will be to satisfy the Berger and Swedish and other foreign creditors, who are unlikely to accept any *échelonnement* of the payments due to them under contract.

During these two years, the amounts due to foreign creditors represented by the £1,500,000 relief will be collected from the revenue in Turkish liras and earmarked as due to the creditors, but will be lent to banks.

At the end of two years Turkey would, M. Rist hopes, be in a position to apply for an international loan of £12 million, of which £6 million will be used for the bank of issue and £6 million to repay the £3 million credit from foreign banks for the two preceding years and to provide another £3 million for foreign payments for the two following years.

At the same time, the question of the bondholders would be finally determined.

5. There were many subsidiary points on which M. Rist spoke to me, but I need not repeat them here, as they depend upon the main features of his plan, which I have outlined above, being accepted, though I should mention that M. Rist thought the creation of a State bank premature, but realised that the Turks were set on it. He therefore hoped to extract what advantage he could from this by insisting that for at least a year it should do nothing but learn its business, and that a foreign technical collaborator must be appointed to it. He also attached importance to the creation of a strong advisory "committee of exchange," on which this foreign collaborator, a representative of the foreign creditor banks, and a representative of the bondholders would serve. He had already mentioned these points to the President of the Council and the Minister of Finance, who had not rejected them.

6. As M. Rist observed, there was nothing very brilliant in his suggestions, and nothing very encouraging for Turkey's creditors, but the alternative, so far as he could see, was to admit that Turkey was bankrupt and that nothing could be done to stop her swift descent to economic ruin.

7. I said that I had no doubt that, in view of his great experience and technical knowledge, M. Rist had probably chosen the line which offered most hope of something like stability in Turkish economies, but it all depended on the frail factor of Turkish determination to make good. M. Rist agreed as to the risk, but said that it was one that must be taken, if anything was to be done at all, a point on which I think he is right.

8. The other comment I made was that, as I had all along expected, the bondholders seemed to me to come out of it worst of all. M. Rist again agreed, but said that here the alternative was between giving the bondholders a hope of something in final settlement, or telling them bluntly that Turkey was in fact incapable of paying them anything at all.

9. I should also explain that M. Rist's suggestions are based upon the fact that the four years from 1931 to 1934 are those during which Turkey has to make her heaviest payments under contracts for railways, &c., abroad. After 1934 these payments grow progressively easier, while the revenue should increase, and, with decent administration, Turkey should, M. Rist feels, be able to meet her obligations.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

P.S.—M. Rist asked that these ideas of his, which were still in a provisional stage, might be kept entirely confidential until he had drawn up his report and submitted it to the Turkish Government. Further reflection might lead him to modify or change his suggestions, while a good deal would depend on the result of soundings he intended to take in Paris.

G. R. C.

[E 3622/1511/44] No. 9.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 7, 1930.*

MY despatch No. 254.

Fresh action is now reported near Chiglikeuy, raiders numbering 100. More definite accusations are also made against the Persian Government, and it is reported that representations have been made to Tehran.

Military attaché learns that Turks have about 10,000 troops engaged, and that they have suffered 100 casualties and lost three aeroplanes.

He regards losses as underestimated.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

[E 3623/1511/44] No. 10.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July 7, 1930.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Turkish press is beginning to insinuate that Great Britain, who has always wished to create independent Kurdish nation in Northern Iraq, may be connected with movement near Mount Ararat.

As Minister for Foreign Affairs recently hinted at a similar feeling to Iraq Minister, I am letting his Excellency know exactly what our attitude is on lines of enclosure in your despatch No. 367.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 3687/1511/44] No. 11.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 208. Secret and Confidential.)
Sir, *Gulhek, June 30, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a despatch from the military attaché recording a conversation on the subject of the present troubles in Turkish Kurdistan with an Armenian calling himself Reuben Pasha, and claiming to have been a Minister of War in Armenia in 1914. I also enclose copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz on the same subject.

2. The avowed object of Reuben Pasha's visit to Tehran is to obtain arms for the Turkish Kurds. While he estimates the numbers of the Turkish forces at about 6,500, the Persian general at Tabriz informed Mr. Palmer that the Turkish forces were estimated at 15,000 men, with airplanes and artillery.

3. As regards the statement in paragraph 8 of Mr. Palmer's despatch that it was the Persian policy, according to Amir Alam, to assist the rebel Kurds with food and ammunition against the Turks, this is undoubtedly an exaggeration. Teymourtache, it is true, claims that all Kurds should properly be Persian subjects. Their historical and religious affinity is to Persia, he maintains, and not to Turkey, and consequently Persian policy towards the Kurds has always been based on conciliation and understanding. At the same time, the idea of a united Kurdistan is anathema to the Persian Government, and for this reason the Wilsonian theory of self-determination with special rights for minorities, with which His Majesty's Government are vaguely supposed to be in sympathy, is held in the greatest suspicion.

4. I enquired last week of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the present unrest in Turkish Kurdistan was causing anxiety to the Persian Government. His Highness, who until a few months ago had been Persian Ambassador at Angora, made light of the matter, and said the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission were due to restart their work of delimitation on the 10th July, and he looked forward to a settlement before the end of the summer.

5. Copies of this despatch, with its enclosures, have been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's consul at Tabriz.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11

Lieutenant-Colonel Dodd to Sir R. Clive

Sir, *Gulhek, June 28, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a report on an interview I had with one Reuben Pasha on the 26th June, 1930.

Copies are being sent direct to the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, War Office, and to Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India.

I have, &c.
P. C. R. DODD,
Military Attaché.

Report of an Interview with Reuben Pasha on June 26.

I MET by appointment on the 26th June one Reuben Pasha who, as [illegible] he was Minister of War in Armenia in 1914, and is at present [illegible] Persian Kurds. He wishes for support from the British and Persian Governments for the Persian Kurds of Ararat.

I was given to understand that the latter have for the past [illegible] hour very hard after getting to throw off the Turkish yoke. They were actually at present more or less independent but were fighting for the Turks to subdue them.

A pointed reference was received by the Turks against the Ararat Kurds about the 19th June. Reuben Pasha estimates the Turkish forces [illegible] about 7,000 regular troops, [illegible] irregulars, which is less than opposed from other sources. The Kurds control two spheres, one to the north of Erivan and the other [illegible] Mount Ararat [illegible] between these two spheres and raise the whole into one revolutionary area. The Turkish forces are divided into two groups, one operating from south of Erivan towards the Ararats and the second from north west on the Nakhichevan, Julfa and Bayazid. The area of operations is very difficult [illegible] but the Turks have much difficulty in maintaining forces in this area. The Soviet are allowing supplies for the Turkish army to be forwarded over Soviet railways and through the U.S.S.R. The Persian Kurds are sufficiently [illegible] their own [illegible]. This is their only requirement to enable them to fight against the Turks. Reuben Pasha's only request is that the Ararat Kurds should be supplied with ammunition.

When he suggested to me that, if the British Government agreed, [illegible] ammunition were secretly from Iraq to the Kurds, I had to inform him that this proposal was ridiculous, and I would not even consider mentioning the matter to His Majesty's Minister. I gathered that he had reasons to hope that he would be successful with the Persian Government.

Reuben Pasha's line of argument is that the Soviet consider the Turkish [illegible] as [illegible]. They will [illegible] to smash the Kurds, with the object of eventually themselves absorbing this area by peaceful penetration, the Soviet would then be in a position to extend their influence eastwards to the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, and southwards and into Iraq. This is Reuben Pasha's threat by means of which he hopes to obtain the object of his present mission to Tehran.

PERCY C. R. DODD, *Lieutenant-Colonel*
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11

Consul Palmer to Sir R. Clive

(No. 103. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tabriz, June 18, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that [illegible] that on the [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Turkish [illegible] bringing three days' [illegible] attack [illegible] Ararat [illegible] Turkish

The attack started from the direction of Igdir, and made progress towards the south-east towards the half-ruined blockhouse of Serdar Bulak, which is situated between Little and Big Ararat.

2. This point may have been occupied already, but the general considers the Turkish efforts as doomed to failure. This blockhouse would become untenable in winter.

3. The Kurds will [illegible] Mount Ararat could, of course, be burnt, but the rebels are reported to have enough food to last them for a long time.

They will probably send, or have sent already, their families to the Persian Kurds.

4. The [illegible] declares he will do his best to disarm any refugees, but he had asked the Persian Government for [illegible] four months' notice of any projected attack.

As they only have [illegible] a few days (and the Russian raid occurred), he has not [illegible] declines all responsibility for this lack of energy.

5. He considers the Turks would do better if they split their forces into [illegible] masses of not less than 4,000 men each who attack Mount Ararat [illegible] different quarters and maintain [illegible] touch with each other.

6. It was only in this way that the Turks achieved their successes in the Rebellion in 1927 and 1928, but the latter cannot be compared as difficult with Mount Ararat.

7. It is difficult to form an estimate of the [illegible] of the rebel Kurds. Last year they were said to be 2,000, while it is believed that [illegible] have been reinforced by about 1,500 Mussulmans from Russia.

8. On the 15th the director of the Banca Milli asked me to dinner to meet the Amir Alam, who was to leave for Tehran on the 17th.

His brother Sardar Intisar, Ras Sizam and Governor General of Tabriz about [illegible] ago, and until now Governor General of South Persia, has been appointed [illegible] Persian Minister at Ankara, and due to arrive there shortly on his way [illegible].

9. The Amir Alam [illegible] to Mrs. McGrath who saw him on the 19th that it was the Persian policy to stir [illegible] help the rebel Kurds with food and ammunition against the Turks. This is to prevent any settlement of the boundary question.

10. This agrees with my own view already put forward, which I had not discussed with Mrs. McGrath at all, and which I had arrived at from other indirect sources.

11. Copy has been sent to His Majesty's Embassy, Angora.

I have, &c.
STANHOPE PALMER.

E 3924/483/44 No. 12

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson (Received July 12.)

No. 125.
Telegraphic. P. *Athens, July 11, 1930.*

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs today regarding the announcement [illegible] Government [illegible] order from Italy two more destroyers. I asked whether these were [illegible] Greek [illegible] tenders to be invited for orders of this sort. Minister replied that there was no such regulation, but that he personally was [illegible] Powers concerned should not [illegible] supplied. He added that it was essential that destroyers in question [illegible] as Italian destroyers already ordered [illegible] as concerned internal [illegible] &c. (Head of Naval Mission has been in the dark but confirms technical importance of repeating previous order.) I suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as the Turco-Greek agreement had now been concluded, those two further destroyers were not now necessary. His reply was that Turkey had just ordered two more destroyers and Greece must not be behind.

E 3768, 1511, 44] No. 13.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 262.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 10, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herein, with reference to my despatch No. 254 of the 3rd instant, a copy of a [illegible] which I have received from the military attaché of His Majesty's Embassy regarding the earlier phases of Turkish military action against the Kurdish insurgents in the neighbourhood of Mount Ararat.

2. During the past week the Press has been put in possession at great length on the events in Northern Kurdistan, which are now seen to be of much greater importance and on a larger scale than was at first generally realised. Considerable armed forces are being utilised, and bands which at first were stated to consist of at most 100 Kurds are now reported to have suffered hundreds of casualties. Turkish frontier posts, for example that at Balak Bazi, have been attacked, and the Turkish press publishes reports of aeroplane bombardment as daily reported. Moreover, it is stated that the insurgents have established [illegible] Ararat to Khoshab, just east of Van. Mention is now openly made of [illegible] and rebellion and of plans for a very extensive movement. Agitators have been arrested as far afield as Erzeroum, Mush and El Aziz, and the press reports the deaths of a number of Kurdish chiefs as the result of an encagement near Erzis [illegible]. The Van [illegible] that the [illegible] complete and that their final annihilation, for nothing less is apparently contemplated, is only a matter of a few days.

3. Apart from the scraps of [illegible] regarding the military operations, the most interesting feature of the past week has been the steady development of a campaign of hostility [illegible] against Persia. No attempt with regard to accusing the Persian Government of [illegible] the rebels to cross the frontier, the press now openly states that the rebels [illegible] and fed from Persia, whence they receive reinforcements, and that the Persian Government is privy to the whole movement. When it is realised that as the Director of the Press informed me yesterday, all news regarding the revolt is controlled, the bitterness of these accusations, even in the present state of relations between Turkey and Persia, is a matter for surprise. Energetic protests are said to have been made at Tehran and the Minister for Foreign Affairs has himself stated to a press correspondent that since the outbreak of the "events," the two Governments have been in close contact, [illegible] communiqués published in the Persian press to the effect that no [illegible] Turkish territory [illegible].

4. There is no doubt about the determination of the Turkish Government to stamp out the Kurdish trouble but it may be that there is some further motive behind the violent anti-Persian campaign. It has been repeatedly stated that the Turkish Government has any intention of pursuing the rebels into Persian territory, though His Majesty's consul at Trebizond learns that such a step is contemplated on the ground that one violation more or less will not make much difference. The newspaper "Vakit" goes a step further and says that if Persia cannot deal with insurgents on its own side of the frontier its Government must either allow the Turkish troops to pursue them into Persia or else agree to such rectifications of the frontier [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Turkey must [illegible] the [illegible] measure which her country demands. The article concludes by stating that the Turkish Government is prepared to take the [illegible] of the present situation to establish for itself a *de facto* frontier more favourable than the present one which has been the subject of much [illegible] in recent years.

5. I may perhaps explain that the [illegible] from the Turkish press [illegible] are lacking. Turkey [illegible] all its actions, and it is probable that little more information can be got from Angora. I am however going to the capital at the end of the present week and may find the Minister for Foreign Affairs inclined to be communicative.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 1

Major O'Leary to Sir G. Clerk

(No. 5)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 4, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a short account of the recent disturbances on the Persian frontier which were mentioned by my colleague [illegible] Greek service.

(a) The Turkish Government began [illegible] preparations for a campaign against Kurdish rebels in the region [illegible].

(b) Two special army corps were formed, the first, in the north, from units of the IXth Corps [illegible] the latter consisting of the VIth and VIIth Corps. Each corps [illegible] strength of [illegible] men. A number of [illegible] attached to the forces [illegible] were also sent to Erzerum and Kars.

(c) Besides [illegible] some mountain artillery and four squadrons of aeroplanes were employed.

(d) Operations took place in May and June and were partially successful. The losses were about 100 men. Three [illegible] the rebels [illegible] southwards towards Lake Van, where they destroyed several villages.

(e) Subsequent pressure by Turkish troops has forced them over the border towards Lake Urmia.

(f) It is considered that the [illegible] is capable of dealing with this remnant.

[illegible] account can, on the whole, be reconciled with information [illegible] on this subject. It confirms the estimate of 10,000 for the [illegible] forces engaged and explains why the centre of disturbance should have moved south from the Mount Ararat area.

3. Not the least interesting aspect of these operations is the fact that the [illegible] staff is apparently not prepared to take the field with the VIIIth or IXth Corps as normally constituted, but has to bring up composite formations from a large area.

4. I consider that the number of casualties is probably much [illegible] estimated. [illegible] stated to me that [illegible] would have to [illegible] also said a private soldier's report was recently received of a train, carrying 500 wounded, which was seen to pass westward through Erzerum.

I have &c.

O'LEARY.

E 3770/325/44] No. 14.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 263.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 10, 1930.*

With reference to my despatch No. [illegible] of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note which I have received from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of prewar debts.

2. As you will observe, Tevfik Rüstü Bey confirms textually and accepts on behalf of the Turkish Government the arrangement which was embodied in the note which I addressed to him on the 28th ultimo. This thorny question, which is the last survival of pre-war days, is now therefore settled and it only remains for His Majesty's Government to press upon the Turkish Government the five [illegible] payments. The first may not prove a very easy one, but at the worst something will have been achieved, for the Turkish Government has now officially recognised its liability for a very considerable sum and that within a few months of the receipt of an offhand note in which such liability was almost entirely disclaimed.

I have, &c.

(For) G. R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 14

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir G. Clerk

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 7 juillet* 1930.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser, le 28 juin dernier, pour me faire part de l'acceptation par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de l'arrangement intervenu relativement au règlement définitif de la question des réclamations d'avant guerre britanniques.

Je prends acte, avec plaisir, de votre aimable communication, d'après laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique

1. Accepte la liquidation de toutes les réclamations britanniques présentées (dont une liste a été transmise par le Ministre de Turquie à Londres, en date du 24 août 1926) contre le Gouvernement ottoman, par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, au moyen d'une globale de £500,000 payable en cinq annuités égales de £100,000 chacune devant être acquittées au mois de décembre de chaque année, la première le 31 décembre 1930 et les suivantes au mois de décembre, de chaque année jusqu'à 1934;

2. Renonce, contre l'exécution intégrale [illegible] en son nom et au nom [illegible] Majesté, à toutes les réclamations dont il s'agit.

En même temps j'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre Excellence [illegible] Gouvernement de la République turque, en termes de l'arrangement [illegible] je me fais un agréable devoir de relever ici la bonne volonté et [illegible] avec lesquels votre Excellence et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté [illegible] voudront accepter notre proposition tendant à assurer [illegible] cette question pour un nombre d'années [illegible]

[illegible]

E 3924 463 44 No. 15

Mr. Henderson to Mr. Ramsay (Athens)

(No. 70)
Telegraphic [illegible] *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1930.

YOUR telegram of the 11th July. Destroyers for Greek navy.

You should make an opportunity to [illegible] tentatively of M. Venizelos whether now that Greco-Turkish negotiations regarding properties have been satisfactorily concluded, he intends to put [illegible] naval agreement with Turkey (see Sir P. Lorraine's telegram of the 17th January, 1929, and your despatch of the 26th February this year).

E 3892 282 44 No. 16

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Henderson.—(Received July 21.)

No. 296.
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 12, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation in French of the text of the laws governing the institution of a Turkish State Bank to which reference was made in my despatch No. 236 of the 18th ultimo.

2. The capital of the State Bank is to be 15 million liras and not [illegible] reported, 25 million. The bank may, if necessary, and with the [illegible] the Government, increase the capital to 30 million liras. The initial capital will be obtained by the issue of 150,000 shares each of the nominal value of 100 Turkish liras and will consist of four series, A, B, C and D.

3. The "A" shares are reserved to Government Departments and their value is payable in gold at the rate of exchange ruling at the time the shares are taken up. The total value of these shares must not exceed 15 per cent. of the bank's capital.

4. The "B" shares are reserved to national banks operating in Turkey, but the number of such shares is not specified. This omission is perhaps due to the fact that the Turkish Government envisages the possibility that the Turkish public and Turkish companies may not take up all the "D" shares which are reserved for them by the law.

5. The "C" series of shares, which must not exceed 15,000, is reserved to [illegible] banks, and [illegible] companies. Thus, at least 90 per cent. of the State Bank's capital must be entirely Turkish.

6. Forty per cent. of the nominal value of the shares is to be subscribed within a period of one month from the date of the ratification by the Turkish Government of the organic statutes of the bank and the State Bank will then be considered [illegible] duly constituted.

7. The State Bank, one of the main objectives of which is the stabilisation of Turkish [illegible] is granted the sole right to issue notes and is to take over the [illegible] paper currency, which totals 158,748,503 liras. This liability will be covered [illegible] transfer to the State Bank of Treasury bonds for that amount. The bonds will [illegible] interest at 1 per cent.

8. [illegible] securities which serve to cover the paper currency which the State Bank takes over the Turkish Government will transfer to the bank:

(a) Its [illegible]
(b) Shares and bonds to the nominal value of 110,497,925 fr. A list of these [illegible]

9. [illegible] as this transfer [illegible] bonds to an equal nominal value will [illegible] and provision for [illegible] redemption is made in the following [illegible]:

(a) By the payment to the bank of 1 per cent. of the State revenues;
(b) By any surplus which may accrue at the end of any financial year;
(c) By the allocation of any future funds in gold or in stable currency which [illegible] available to use for purposes [illegible]

10. The State [illegible] operations, fix the rate of discount [illegible] certain annuities such as post [illegible] profits tax.

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 3894 1511 44 No. 17

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Henderson.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 271. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 15, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. [illegible] of the 10th July, I have the honour to report that the Turkish papers of the 13th instant officially announced the suppression of the Kurdish rising.

2. When I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Angora on the evening of the 12th, his Excellency told me that this news had just been received from Salih Pasha, general commanding [illegible] and would be published forthwith. He expressed great satisfaction, not only at the successful suppression of these troublesome disturbers of Turkish peace, but also because they had been suppressed 25 miles within the Turkish borders. The situation had become intolerable. Bands had poured in from Persia, not only without any effort of the Persian Government to check them but with the direct connivance of the Persian authorities on the spot, if [illegible] Persian Government itself. Protests to Tehran had been in vain and left [illegible] and the Turkish general had therefore received orders to put down the [illegible] all costs, even if it meant pressing the [illegible] across the invisible frontier line and, in anticipation of consequent Persian protests against frontier violation, Tevfik Rushdi had a week ago prepared drafts to Moscow and Washington, invoking the Litvinov and Kellogg Pacts, for [illegible] as usual, here if ever, was a case of [illegible] Kurdish [illegible] [illegible]

Heaven that it was now unnecessary to send the troops for the Ararat guards had been strengthened and suppressed 20 miles inside Turkish territory. After His Excellency was still [illegible] with the prospect of settling with the Persian Government. As soon [illegible] interview was ended he was going to the Council of Ministers where his colleagues were awaiting to harass him with questions as to what he proposed to do. He [illegible] that he had no very clear notion of [illegible] His general idea was, not to bother about [illegible] protests, to say to Persia that entry [illegible] suggested for the purposes which in effect meant stationing troops all along [illegible] to watch the Persian frontier, and to prevent [illegible] forthwith [illegible] of Turkey [illegible] some compensation to Persia further south. [illegible] His Excellency took the occasion to repeat that the Government of the day had [illegible] never admitted, and would never admit, the validity of the frontier settlement of 1913, which had never been ratified by the Turkish Parliament. His attitude was that, while the rising was not fomented in order to have a case for rectification, it had provided an admirable opportunity for insisting upon this now being done.

5. When [illegible] Foreign Affairs insisted so strongly upon the seeking [illegible] by the Persian Government, I asked His Excellency if he could explain [illegible] to me a singularly futile policy [illegible] no advantage [illegible] arming Turks [illegible] and so was, [illegible] have [illegible] considerable difficulties with the Soviet Government with regard to refusing [illegible] power it to Persia from the Caucasus, and I could not see what she could gain by the gratuitous [illegible] increasing her difficulties. Tevfik Rustu replied [illegible] reports of [illegible] troops on the Russian border. He had no [illegible] there was nothing of the sort too, and possibly some quite insignificant frontier incident. But Persia intended to trade on her weakness with her three neighbours, Russia, Turkey and Iraq, and play them off one against each other. This explanation left me little wiser than before, particularly as I had just been reading copies of two reports from His Majesty's Consul at [illegible] early (a) that the Persians have reason to be nervous of Russian aggression [illegible] north west (this proving Tevfik Rustu's [illegible] Persians have been to [illegible] justifying Tevfik Rustu's accusations). The [illegible] that [illegible] Kurdish rising would make it difficult [illegible] Persian territory in the Ararat district.

6. His Excellency also mentioned Iraq. I took occasion to speak to him in regard to the [illegible] question in Iraq on the lines indicated in my telegram to you No. 46 of the 7th instant. His Excellency at once replied by acknowledging our complete loyalty in this matter, even though officially speaking Turkey only recognises Iraq and not Great Britain in Iraq [illegible] the sense [illegible] with his colleagues and with the Turkish press.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Acting High Commissioner at Baghdad.

I have &c.
GEORGE CLERK.

E 3895 1511 44

No. 4

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (Received July 21.)

(No. 274.)

Sir,

Constantinople, July 16, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 273 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, a copy of a despatch from Major B. of O. Leary to the Military Attaché to this Embassy giving an account of the recent operations against the Kurds.

2. The Turkish press continues to chant the complete victory of Turkish arms, but it is clear that fighting still continues, especially in the region of Mount Ararat, and though the Turks will no doubt eventually pacify Kurdistan [illegible] a matter of time.

3. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Acting High Commissioner at Baghdad.

I have &c.
GEORGE CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Major O'Leary to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Constantinople, July 16, 1930.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 5 dated the 4th July, 1930, I have the honour to submit the following account of operations north of Lake Van during the last fortnight.

2. This account is based on reports in the press, which unnecessarily interpret facts in a light favourable to the Turkish forces, but any information that has been received from other sources tends to show that in its main lines the elimination accords with the actual facts.

3. It would appear that the recent attempt on the part of the insurgents was [illegible] and had more ambitious objectives than earlier fighting round Agri Dagh. It consisted, in brief, of an incursion across the Persian frontier, [illegible] with the [illegible] elements in the [illegible] of marching on Diadekir. The [illegible] were [illegible] Turkish force, and in a battle which lasted [illegible] were defeated. A remnant of their forces [illegible] Van.

4. It is [illegible] but [illegible] the local inhabitants mostly Kurds [illegible] with the [illegible] and between [illegible] have helped the Kurds [illegible] the loyalty of the [illegible] enlisted voluntarily in the [illegible].

5. The forces for this invasion were concentrated over the Persian frontier and [illegible] that they were aided and supplied with material by the Persian authorities. They were, apparently, organised in two formations, the first commanded by a certain Resul, the other led by the son of Kor Huseyn and the son of Jamil Pasa.

A renegade Turkish officer Major Mahmut Bey has also been named as a leader of the bands.

6. These bands crossed the frontier at Gevrs Hamam and Aybigran towards the middle of June and advanced on Erciş, enrolling some of the local Kurds in their forces, and destroying the villages of those who opposed them. They attacked without success Muradie, Erciş and Patnos. North of Erciş they were met by a force of gendarmerie and Yuzbashi Bey who inflicted a reverse on them.

7. On the 5th July [illegible] troops referred to in my despatch No. 5 met the rebels [illegible] north of Erciş, and with the help of several squadrons of aeroplanes [illegible] engagement lasted until the 9th July when the surviving Kurds in this area were [illegible]. Many had scattered including the son of Kor Huseyn, who was wounded, and those killed are estimated at 1,500. Another detachment has been surrounded on the heights of Suphan Dagh and is in a desperate condition.

8. During this action the airmen are said to have shown great courage and [illegible] in bombing and firing machine guns from a low altitude. The effect on the tribesmen is claimed to have been very great. On the other hand at least three aeroplanes were brought down by rifle and machine gun fire. The airmen were killed and mutilated by the Kurds.

9. The [illegible] of these survivors of these troops is expected but it is known [illegible] that in the Agri Dagh [illegible] at least 1,500 [illegible] and Persia [illegible] operations [illegible].

10. It seems [illegible] was very [illegible] that it was decided [illegible] circumstances throughout [illegible] districts at [illegible] have had better chances of success if it could have been used [illegible] revolt in Kerdistan broke out prematurely.

11. It is [illegible] that the Persian Government [illegible] definite settlement of the Kurdish danger. The [illegible] were organised several months ago and the action of the two corps was to have been simultaneous and to have combined with that of the cavalry. The fact that the northern corps came into action before the southern corps had arrived in the area of operations has, however resulted favourably for the Government, as it has allowed large Kurdish forces to collect near Lake Van, and their defeat has therefore been more complete.

In warfare against guerillas the chief difficulty is to bring the enemy to a decisive action.

2. No reliable information is available as to the Turkish casualties.

3. I have been informed that the 28th Regiment at Erzerum refused to fight against the Kurds and [illegible] which would seem to require confirmation.

4. [illegible] Turkish commanders in these operations were Salih Pasha and Feiz Pasha, but I have not been able to ascertain the exact function of each of them. Fahreddin Bey, late chief of the Constantinople police, is the Chief of Staff.

I have &c.
R. P. O'LEARY.

E 3897/1511/44. No. 19.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received July 21.*)

(No. 275.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 16, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 273 and 274 of yesterday and to-day, I have the following information given to me by Mrs. McGrath, better known perhaps as Rosita Forbes, who passed through here on Friday last on her way from Aleppo to London, is of some interest, when read in connexion with Tevfik Rustu's statements [illegible] 12th instant.

2. Mrs. McGrath had come practically direct from the Turco-Persian frontier, where she had spent the eleven days before the 23rd June. She had left Kotur in Persia and also hoped to cross over into Russia, and for this purpose had received a letter from the Minister of Court to Zaferad Dowleh, the Persian general commanding the troops in Azerbaijan. When she got to Tabriz she found that, contrary to what Tevfik Rustu told me, the Persians were, in fact having great trouble with the Soviet authorities on the Caucasian frontier. She herself saw numbers of refugees, who were pouring in daily, including the wounded survivors, some eleven in number, of the 100 (200) who, as reported in the press, had tried to swim the river and had been shot down in the water by Soviet troops. Any question of her crossing into Russia was thus at an end, but, hearing of the trouble on the Turkish frontier and of an opportunity to go there, her journalistic instincts led her to make the attempt.

3. Through an intermediary she was put into touch with Kurdish [illegible] who however was only free to proceed after a conference which he was having with Zaferad Dowleh. Mrs. McGrath, with her Kurd friend left Tabriz, and travelled via Khoi to a point south of Maku where the car was left behind. Thereafter she went on horseback and was among the Kurds for eleven days. So far as could be made out from [illegible] inadequate map Mrs. McGrath had with her, and from such place-names as she had heard, she crossed the Turkish frontier but to no great distance, [illegible] Mrs. McGrath spent three days at villages on Ararat, where she photographed some of the wrecked Turkish aeroplanes. She did not see the unfortunate occupants, whom the Kurds had killed and then stretched on poles with a placard announcing that that was the treatment awaiting every Turkish aviator. She also found there a captured Turkish mountain battery. The Kurds, not knowing how to work the guns, had sent to Zaferad Dowleh for experts. The general either from some [illegible] disinclination to [illegible] Persian [illegible] sent a Persian officer and a few Persian soldiers. These short-sighted Armenians who, rather than be killed by the Turks, had gone over to the Kurds or by the Kurds for not doing so implored Mrs. McGrath to [illegible] but she left them [illegible] a number of wounded, whom she left together with a very little food and medicine. The Kurds, whose women seemed all to carry babies on their backs and rifles in their hands, appeared to regard the fighting more as a [illegible] than anything else. Their leader at Ararat was a full Kurd [illegible].

4. Mrs. McGrath then turned [illegible] to the frontier and thought on the Turkish side, hoped [illegible] through Bitlis. When she and her guide got down to the [illegible] Lake Van [illegible] throughout [illegible] good of Archag they heard that serious fighting was in progress at Bitlis, Mush, Sasun and Norsun, and it was considered impossible to proceed. They therefore turned eastwards towards the frontier which they followed as far as Zumdola and thence entered Iraq through Dohuk, where they found a detachment of Assyrian levies, to Rowanduz.

5. Throughout her journey on the frontier Mrs. McGrath saw no signs of any Turkish officials or soldiers and heard very little of fighting. She was quite definite on the subject of Persian assistance to the rebels, as witness her Kurdish guide's meeting with the general at Tabriz, and she knew for a fact that ammunition and supplies were regularly crossing the frontier from Persia.

6. I imagine that Mrs. McGrath's guide took good care to keep well clear of any Turkish troops. Still, she certainly risked both her personal safety in that wild country and the chance of an "incident" between Turkey and ourselves, though I [illegible] that her confidence will be respected, for otherwise the intermediaries who [illegible] not only for cash but also in good faith, arranged her journey, will pay a heavy penalty. For this reason she told me that she would be unable to make use of her experiences in the English press.

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Acting High Commissioner at Baghdad.

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 3898/1511/44. No. 20.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received July 21.*)

No. 276.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 17, 1930.*

IN my despatches Nos. 273, 274 and 275 I have tried to furnish some account of recent events in Kurdistan, as [illegible] the complete lack of any information beyond contour and the doctored reports of Turkish press correspondents makes anything like accuracy impossible.

2. It is [illegible] definite conclusion as to the origin of the whole business, which [illegible] started from the Kurdish attacks on Turkish outposts reported by His Majesty's consul at Tabriz as having occurred in April last, or whether those attacks were due to repressive measures begun or intended by the Turks against the Kurds beyond Lake Van.

3. After the suppression of the Kurdish rising of 1925, a shrewd observer [illegible] in touch with Kurds, said they would never submit, but would rise again in [illegible] years, when they had recovered from their losses. On the other hand, it had been growing clear that Ibrahim Tahsin (the Inspector-General of the Eastern Vilayets) policy of "peaceful penetration" was making no headway east of [illegible] Easterner measures may have been decided upon, the more so as, reading between the lines of the Turkish press, there was clearly a fear that growing unrest [illegible] and that [illegible] spread to other areas and encourage latent [illegible] elsewhere.

4. It may be [illegible] that the Turkish Government decided to liquidate the Kurdish question for good and all this year, and, though the process has cost more than was expected, on the whole luck has been with the Turks. In the first place, as Major O'Leary points out (see my despatch No. 274), the fact that fighting started round Mount Ararat before it began at Erzis was all in favour of the Turks when the support given by Persia has afforded a legitimate pretext to the Turks to [illegible] the frontier rectification they demand. And, lastly, the "rebellion" gives the needed excuse for the laying waste of Kurdistan and its inhabitants—Tevfik Rustu said to me that it would be necessary [illegible] to people the district with [illegible] elsewhere—while its effective suppression will extinguish all [illegible] elders of discontent in other districts.

5. All the same, the Government has undoubtedly passed through some anxious [illegible] and the final balance of the account may be in Turkey's favour, [illegible] and its present Government will be able to count among their [illegible] adherents those Kurds who escape the savage retribution that is now being put in force.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Acting High Commissioner at Baghdad.

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 3932 1511 44

No 21

Sir R Crosthwaite Mr A Henderson (Received July 22)

No 328

Gulmarg July 14 1930

WITH reference to my despatch No 238 of the 30th June last I have the honour to forward herewith the translation of a letter which appeared in the Kurdish newspaper Hawar and which contains a report that a clash occurred between Persian Government troops and Kurds at the village of Kanibrash

2 The Hawar is a newspaper edited by Celadet Bedir Khan and published in Damascus It is the only Kurdish paper which is allowed to enter Persia and is the organ of the Kurdish Nationalist Party

3 I have not had time to verify the report but I am inclined to think that there is some foundation for it as I have received information from other sources that there has been considerable unrest among the Kurds of Persian Kurdistan during the last few months

4 I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter from the Governor General of Kurdistan to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs dated the 5th June 1930 in which he complains of the activities of Kurdish refugees in Iraq and requests that steps may be taken to prevent them from crossing the frontier into Persia

5 I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Persian Legation at Baghdad dated the 12th June 1930 in which he requests that steps may be taken to prevent Kurdish refugees from crossing the frontier into Persia

6 I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter from the Persian Legation at Baghdad to the Iraq Government dated the 16th June 1930 in which the Persian Minister requests that steps may be taken to prevent Kurdish refugees from crossing the frontier into Persia

7 I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter from the Iraq Government to the Persian Legation at Baghdad dated the 19th June 1930 in which the Iraq Government state that they have taken steps to prevent Kurdish refugees from crossing the frontier into Persia

8 Copies of the above letters have been communicated to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran

I have &c
R H CLIVE

Enclosure No 1

Extract from the Hawar Newspaper dated the 15th June 1930

DISTURBANCES IN PERSIAN KURDISTAN

A Persian gendarmerie post at Kanibrash on the Persian side of the frontier between Persian Kurdistan and Iraq was attacked by Kurds on the night of the 5th June and the gendarmerie were compelled to withdraw to Sardasht

2 The Persian Government have sent troops to the district and fighting is reported to be in progress between the Persian troops and the Kurds

3 The Persian Consul at Suleimania has left for Persian Kurdistan

4 The Persian Government have demanded the extradition of Ismail Agha Simko who is now living in Iraq

5 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Jaffar Sultan who is living in Iraq

6 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Kadir Khan who is living in Iraq

7 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Abdul Razak who is living in Iraq

8 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Mahmud Khan who is living in Iraq

9 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha who is living in Iraq

10 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Shikak who is living in Iraq

11 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Mangur who is living in Iraq

12 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Mangur who is living in Iraq

13 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Mangur who is living in Iraq

14 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Mangur who is living in Iraq

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18 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Mangur who is living in Iraq

19 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Mangur who is living in Iraq

20 The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ali Agha Mangur who is living in Iraq

About one week ago we published a brief account translated from foreign papers of the Kurdish disturbances in Turkey In the interval we have received reports of the repetition of which is unnecessary Here is the Arabic Agora's account published in this connection which has been referred to the various papers of Tehran and which we have translated as follows

Kadi Agha with 100 men went to Persian Kurdistan to the tribe called Dukri Jurri Yesterday reports were received that the Persian Government troops under the command of Jaffar Sultan and Ismail Simko have attacked the Dukri Jurri tribe and after a fierce battle in which both sides suffered heavy losses the Persian troops were defeated and retreated to Sardasht

The Persian Government have now sent a large force to the district and it is reported that a battle is now in progress between the Persian troops and the Kurds

The Persian Government have demanded the extradition of Ismail Simko Jaffar Sultan Kadir Khan Abdul Razak Mahmud Khan Ali Agha Shikak Ali Agha Mangur and Ali Agha Mangur who are living in Iraq

The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ismail Simko Jaffar Sultan Kadir Khan Abdul Razak Mahmud Khan Ali Agha Shikak Ali Agha Mangur and Ali Agha Mangur who are living in Iraq

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The Persian Government have also demanded the extradition of Ismail Simko Jaffar Sultan Kadir Khan Abdul Razak Mahmud Khan Ali Agha Shikak Ali Agha Mangur and Ali Agha Mangur who are living in Iraq

In short the Persian Government have demanded the extradition of all the Kurdish leaders who are living in Iraq

Apart from [illegible] Athens, such an action is in principle contrary to the clear policy and attitude which our Government has adopted. The policy of the Persian Government is a [illegible] rable policy which has never been departed by such acts

The report published by the Anatolia Agency is therefore unfounded, and we hope that the said agency will correct this news in the Turkish press and cease to create misunderstandings without reason

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E 3912 2085 44] No. 22

Mr Norton to Mr A Henderson (Received July 22)

No. 579)

Sir, *Berlin, July 15, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report that negotiations have been proceeding for some time between the Turkish Government and a syndicate of German [illegible] for the delivery of railway material. It is stated in the press that the [illegible] to [illegible].

2. The orders are in connexion with the contract for railway construction between the Turkish Government and the Julius Berger Tiefbau A.G. which was [illegible] and it is being financed by a group of banks under the leadership of the Darmstadter and Nationalbank. The German Government guaranteed payment under the provisions of one of the export credit insurance schemes in the event of default. It was provided that at least some of the material required for the construction of the railway would be supplied by German firms.

3. Up to the present orders have been placed in Germany for rails, steel, apparatus and similar equipment, but the supply of rolling-stock is only now being considered. The orders for the latter, which form the subject of the present discussions, will amount to between 30 and 40 million marks, and among the firms concerned are Krupp, Henschel and the group of wagon-builders concentrated in the firm of Linke Hofmann Busch.

4. The financing of this new [illegible] is to be carried out by the Darmstadter and National Bank syndicate [illegible] but it is probable that credit will be arranged [illegible] the time of delivery. It is not proposed to grant a loan.

5. It is anticipated that the German Government will [illegible] also [illegible] for a portion of the sum involved. The fact that the Turkish Government has made [illegible] some of its old obligations have apparently [illegible] and orders have been given, and orders have been placed, as the payments due to the Julius Berger consortium have always been punctually met.

I have, &c.
H. C. NEWTON

E 3951 2553 93] No. 23

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Received July 23)

[illegible]

Baghdad, July 21, 1930

I HAVE [illegible] Angora has reported to his Government that Turkish Foreign Minister has protested violently to him [illegible] Government's policy towards Kurds. It was suggested by [illegible] Government were acting under pressure from British Government [illegible] to send milk-van to them very meeting interest [illegible]. His Excellency [illegible] the only encouragement offered to Kurdish national aspirations by Iraq Government would be regarded by Turkey as an unfriendly act. Should proposed loan [illegible] and provide, I shall put to your approval, to let it be known that it was idea that His Majesty's Government are encouraging, or would even [illegible] to Turkish mind, in order to embarrass [illegible] Turkey and Persia is entirely [illegible].

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

E 3979, 2558, 93] No. 24

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Henderson (Received July 24)

(No. 52)
(Telegraphic) P. *Constantinople, July 23, 1930*

BAGDAD telegram of the 21st July to the Colonial Office.

My own view is that either the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke as [illegible] or that [illegible] was [illegible] Minister took [illegible] to see [illegible] Russia [illegible] Turkey [illegible] Turkish press, and refrain from [illegible] with.

Although the [illegible] Turkish press continue to publish [illegible] may not [illegible] Excellency's [illegible] much great importance to [illegible] Minister.

E 3976 463 44] No. 25

[illegible] Minister [illegible] (Received July 24)

No. 142 (Confidential)
(Telegraphic) P. *Athens, July 23, 1930*

YOUR telegram of the 17th July.

M. Venizelos informed me to-day that some time ago he had instructed the [illegible] experiments to draw up the basis of a naval parity agreement in the form [illegible], which could be communicated to the Turkish Government. His experts [illegible] obtained a demand for twelve extra Greek destroyers [illegible] the Greeks parity with the Turks. He realised at once that the Turks would [illegible] such demand, and was therefore working out a scheme on different lines [illegible] which, his Excellency explained, was still confidential and very [illegible]. The latter was as follows. He [illegible] between [illegible] Turkey which would [illegible] each party. His idea, [illegible] general declaration recognising principle of parity between the two [illegible] to assess the actual state of affairs, but to provide that each party must notify the other six months in advance of any proposed order for new construction, so as to enable the one to seek explanations of the other if desired, and in the last resort to order similar [illegible]. The [illegible] was very modest, but he would be content with this to be said [illegible] later.

I mentioned possibility that Turkey's preoccupations with Russia might complicate matters. His Excellency said Turkey was very much afraid both of Russia and of Italy, and he was convinced that she was not arming against Greece; and if Turkey started a big building programme, he had no intention of doing likewise, though he was not going to tell the Turks so. The only thing he must insist on was an adequate supply of small craft, destroyers, &c., and also aeroplanes, which were [illegible] Greece [illegible]. His Excellency [illegible] think over this scheme in his own mind whilst he was abroad, and implied that it would have taken shape by the end of September when he returned. He said he was going to Angora in October for signature of pact of friendship, which was practically concluded.

M. Venizelos explained that he desired a complete all round settlement with Turkey. He wished to make it clear that Greece was anxious for friendly relations with all her neighbours, and was determined to accept the peace treaties fully and absolutely. His aim was, he said, to play in a modest way the part of pacificator in his corner of the world.

His Excellency, who leaves for Beirut on Friday, was in excellent spirits and [illegible] most frankly.

[illegible]

E 3980 463 44 No 26

Mr Harvey to Mr A Henderson (Received July 24)

No 134)
Telegraphic) R *Athens, July 24, 1930*
Mr RAMSAY's telegram No 124
Ratifications of [illegible] Turk [illegible] exchanged here yesterday
(Repeated to Constantinople)

E 4011 1511 44 No 27

Sir G Clerk to Mr A Henderson (Received July 26)

No 4
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, July 26, 1930*
MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has sent special message to me from Angora to report that aggression by 300 or 400 members of Barzan tribe on Turkish frontier post of Ormar in Vilayet of Hakkiari
Frontier incident is merely collision between tribes seeking summer pasture and Turkish post but Turkish Government is in state of [illegible] over anything to do with the Kurds
I have assured Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is of course [illegible] that either His Majesty's Government or Iraq Government had any [illegible] connection with incident which I have hinted to him I [illegible] with Iraq Minister rather than with me but in view of general Kurdish situation and tendency to see our machinations in background I should be grateful for earliest possible report of what actually occurred
Repeated to Bagdad)

E 4012 1511 44 No 28

Sir G Clerk to Mr A Henderson (Received July 26)

No 4
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, July 26 1930*
MY immediately preceding telegram
Press reports that the incident took place on night of 21st 22nd July
(Repeated to Bagdad)

E 4036 1933 44 No 29

Sir G Clerk to Mr A Henderson.—(Received July 28.)

(No 287)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 24, 1930.*
I HAVE the honour to report that I took the occasion of a flying visit from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the Republic at Yalova to have an interview with his Excellency before his return to the capital to-night
2. Our conversation was mainly taken up with current business, and the only points of any importance, apart from the treatment of ex-King Amanullah and Tevfik Rustu's alleged irritation at Iraq's support of the Kurdish movement, as to which I have already telegraphed to you, raised by his Excellency were the following:—
3. Tevfik Rustu said that, now that the Kurdish question was to all intents and purposes liquidated, and that remained to be done being the mopping up of Kurds on Mount Ararat, a slow but inevitable process, he intended to insist on the Persian [illegible]

4. His Excellency also showed great eagerness to know what was the real situation in Egypt and what were the intentions of His Majesty's Government. I said that I could tell him no more than he himself had seen in the press, for that was all that I myself knew, but I could assure him that His Majesty's Government intended to maintain complete neutrality in the internal affairs of Egypt, and that any action on their part would be strictly directed to fulfilling their international responsibilities, including the protection of foreign lives and property, if the Egyptian Government failed in their duty in this respect. Tevfik Rustu asked me whether this meant all foreigners, and I replied that I could not imagine His Majesty's Government making any distinction between the various nationalities. He seemed relieved to hear this, as he had some apprehension as to the possible safety of Italians [illegible]
5. Lastly, Tevfik Rustu came out as definitely opposed to Pan-Europa. In his words great [illegible] in the scheme were possibly [illegible] amounted to a [illegible] United States of Europe directed against America on the one hand and Russia and Turkey on the other, a policy to which he could never agree. Nevertheless that he would prefer to see Italy and Russia brought closer together with the help of Turkey. Nor could he imagine how Great Britain could fit herself into Pan-Europa. As his Excellency's time was very limited and my American colleague was already waiting to see him, he was unable to develop his interesting theses further, but it is clear that M. Briand's proposal will get little support from Angora
I have &c.
(J.) [illegible] CLERK

E 4041 1511,44 No 30

Sir R Clive to Mr A Henderson (Received July 28)

No 174)
Telegraphic) R *Tehran, July 28 1930*
FOLLOWING received from Tabriz No 18

"All the lorries here are being taken for transportation of troops towards Maku, as Turks, following repeated complaints that Persian Kurds are aiding those of Ararat, have threatened to cross the frontier."

E 4176 463 44 No 31

Mr. Harvey to Mr A Henderson.—(Received August 5)

(No. 418 Confidential)
Sir, *Athens, July 2[illegible]*
WITH reference to your telegram No. 70 of the 17th July, I have the honour to inform you that M Venizelos received to-day His Excellency is leaving Athens on the 25th July and will not return till the end of September. In consequence, his whole time is being occupied by a series of last minute conferences upon pending questions of every kind. Nonetheless, his Excellency appeared to me to be in a calmer and less excitable state than he was two months ago. He was in very good spirits and spoke most frankly
2. I said that His Majesty's Government were naturally much interested in the question of [illegible] and I should be very grateful if he would give me his views as to the possibility of coming to an agreement with the Turkish Government to [illegible] Greek [illegible] which might be forwarned, [illegible] consecration to the Turks [illegible] Would however, the scheme, as worked out by the experts [illegible] be regarded by Angora by the Italians [illegible] bring the forces Bolshevist at the Soviets [illegible] be [illegible] Bolshevist [illegible]

some other means of reaching a naval agreement. He was convinced that, if once embarked upon discussions with the Turks as to the relative tonnages of the different units in the respective fleets, there would never be any termination to the negotiations.

3. The scheme which M. Venizelos explained, he now had in mind, but which had not yet taken concrete shape and was still confidential, was on the following lines. He was proposing to endeavour to conclude with the Turkish Government an agreement in general terms recognising the principle of parity between the two navies, but he did not propose to go into the question of the numerical strength of the two fleets, but, having obtained a recognition of the principle of parity, to be content to provide in the agreement that, after a certain period, before any orders for new ships which was contemplated the other party would then have the right to ask for explanations as to the grounds for the proposed addition and would be free in the last resort to order similar ships for themselves. M. Venizelos said that this proposal was extremely modest and would not give Greece very much, but he would be content with an arrangement on some such lines as these if he could get nothing better.

4. I enquired whether he thought that the Turkish Government would be willing to negotiate on such a basis, and whether Turkey's preoccupation with Russia might not complicate its working. He said that he believed Turkey would be quite willing to conclude such an agreement with Greece, owing to her financial embarrassment, and he was quite convinced, as he had told the Chamber, that Turkey was not arming against this country. On the other hand, Turkey was undoubtedly very much afraid not only of Russia but also of Italy. Even if, however, Turkey were to embark on a big building programme, he had no intention of allowing himself to do the same. There was, however, one thing, upon which he must insist, and that was that Greece must not be allowed to fall into an inferiority in respect of small craft, destroyers, &c., as well as aeroplanes, which were necessitated by the maritime [illegible] of Greece.

5. His Excellency then went on to say that he was now considering [illegible]. He would continue to think about it whilst he was abroad, as he did not wish to rush matters, but he would be returning to Greece at the end of September [illegible] Entente, the negotiation of which was now practically concluded.

6. Speaking on more general lines, M. Venizelos went on to say that it was his aim, in a modest way, that Greece should play a pacific role in this part of the world, and it had been his policy to make it clear to all parties that Greece fully and absolutely accepted the [illegible] and wished to place her relations with [illegible] on a friendly basis. He wished to liquidate with Turkey [illegible] before undertaking any comprehensive settlement with her. He had already done the same with Yugoslavia, and he wished to do the same with Bulgaria, though the Bulgars were not being very helpful at the moment, but, nonetheless, he had no doubt that a settlement with her, too, would be reached eventually.

7. I have since been informed by M. Venizelos's private secretary that this was the first occasion on which M. Venizelos had [illegible] for the naval agreement with Turkey, and that the Council of Ministers and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had first heard it from the record of his conversation with me.

8. I have also learned that the Press [illegible] M. Venizelos with Turkey [illegible] quite complete with [illegible] the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne [illegible] the Pact of Paris [illegible] model [illegible] the League of Nations [illegible] the independence of the Turkish Government in regard to their sovereign independence and not permit them to find themselves to the extent implied by the latter.

9. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
OLIVER HARVEY

[E 4164/324/44] No. 32

Sir E. Grey to Mr. Henderson (*Received August 5*)

(No. 432)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 29, 1930*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 392 of the 6th May last regarding the Turco-Soviet protocol prolonging the terms of the 1925 Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, I have the honour to report that the [illegible] Minister at Moscow, in the absence on leave, ratified same by the General Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. took place on the 26th July last.

2. [illegible] the Egyptian Minister, Hussein Raghib Bey, and M. Karakhan, Acting Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
ESMOND OVEY

[E 4147/190/34] No. 33

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Henderson (*Received August 5*)

(No. 288)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 29, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to the press, Monsieur Sevket Bey, Turkish Ambassador at Tehran, has resigned nominally on grounds of ill-health.

2. Monsieur Sevket Bey is to be succeeded by Hussey Bey, who, since 1926, has represented Turkey at Sofia and until a few days ago was generally regarded as [illegible]. He is a man of [illegible] looking to the [illegible] inclined to be [illegible]. A soldier by profession, he was military attaché at Athens in 1914, and, during the war, served with the Caucasus [illegible].

3. Hussey Bey was one of the earliest and closest friends of Mustafa Kemal [illegible] and in 1924 was rewarded by being made Minister at Budapest, where he remained later to Sofia. He has throughout maintained his friendship with the Ghazi [illegible].

4. There seems little doubt that the removal of Monsieur Sevket Bey is a direct result of recent events on the Turco-Persian frontier. Perhaps it is possible that Sir R. Clive may be able to throw some light on this point. The choice of Hussey Bey as his successor seems to show that the Turkish Government [illegible] to secure for Turkey a substantial location of the 1913 frontier.

5. In receiving Hussey Bey at Yalova, the President of the Republic is reported as having said to him that his mission would be to solidify Turco-Persian collaboration on the basis of existing friendship. The Turks wished to see their Persian brothers living in a strong country where security was complete. He was sure that Riza Shah shared these sentiments and that His Majesty would [illegible] in settling [illegible] a delicate one, and for that reason he had chosen one of his earliest colleagues in office, who enjoyed the fullest confidence. He would, so [illegible], find Hussey Bey [illegible] and helpful and [illegible] to co-operate across.

6. I have [illegible] of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister [illegible] at Tehran.

I have, &c.
CLERK

E 4148/282/44 No. 34

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Henderson (*Received August 5*)

No. 291

Sir, *Constantinople, July 30, 1930*

SINCE the despatch of [illegible] the 1st July of Mr. Rist (my despatch No. 2 [illegible]) I have [illegible] points of note in connexion with [illegible] and have [illegible] with [illegible] Persia with respect to [illegible] Yezidis.

2 His Excellency confined himself almost exclusively to the eastern frontier question and the financial situation In dealing with the latter, the Prime Minister stated that necessity had imposed strict economy on the Government Expenditure had had to be reduced for the extreme limit of existing credit had been reached and although Turkey must respect her engagements, it was only natural that, pending the execution of the plan, some relief should be afforded from the burden of the foreign debt Ismet Pasha made no direct reference to the debt agreement, but went on to say that the problem of the foreign debt could not be postponed by a temporary agreement It must be definitely settled "To apply in Turkey the system of increased foreign debt in proportion to development would be to deny the country's right to future development" The question must be settled in accordance with present circumstances and necessities, so that the people may be aware of their liabilities and may know that the fruits of their labours will be their own prosperity No settlement would be accepted which did not [illegible] this principle

3 The manner in which this speech was advertised to foreground makes me believe that Ismet Pasha carefully weighed his words, and if that is so, the prospects of a satisfactory issue to the negotiations with the Council of the Debt must be regarded as poor If the Pasha's speech means anything, it seems to me that Turkey will only agree to make such debt payments as she can afford in her present very straitened circumstances, and that she will refuse to contemplate a system of increased annuities to be paid when her financial house is in order and the production of the country increases Taken at its face value, in fact, Turkey in this question of the foreign debt appears to be very much where she was three or four years ago

4 But the speech must I think be recorded only as the Turks' first word They have sought as is clear from the telegrams exchanged between the Minister of Finance and the President of the Debt Council to extricate themselves from the commitments of the 1928 agreement which they now obviously regret having signed Their financial situation thanks largely to the prolonged mild European winter, is probably worse than it was even two months ago and their intention is apparently to exploit their present poverty to the utmost

5 Meanwhile the Minister of Finance has arrived here *en route* for Ankara whether he proceeds to-morrow He has stated to the press that his visit is purely private one, but that it is possible that he may go to Paris and that he may interview certain personages in connexion with matters falling within the competence of his department

I have &c.
GEORGE R CLERK

E 4149 1511 44 No. 35.

Mr Clerk to Mr A Henderson. (Received August 5.)

No 222

Sir *Constantinople, July 31, 1930.*

DURING the past fortnight little positive information has been published in the press regarding the Kurdish rising in the Persian frontier area The Turkish Government changed of course, as I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 273 of the 15th instant, that the rebels had been exterminated at Bresk and that it only remained to tackle the Kurds who had taken refuge on the upper slopes of Ararat

2 While it is clear that the rebels did in fact suffer a severe reverse at Erdjich where many of them were killed, occasional press reports have shown that the clearing up process is not yet complete, though the Government has the situation well in hand At Ararat operations have for some time been suspended, it being believed that a cordon has been drawn round the rebels, who from lack of supplies and owing to the approach of winter will shortly be forced to descend from their fastnesses, when adequate punishment can be meted out to them without loss to the Turkish troops engaged Such tactics are in the circumstances quite sound, but it remains to be seen whether the Turkish encirclement is really complete or whether many will not escape to their villages in the surrounding country The theory that the "brigands" had come from Persia has now been exploded, and it is generally accepted that the rising was one among the Turkish Kurds who were joined by a few

sympathisers from Persia, whence they almost certainly received their munitions and supplies.

3 But [illegible] the exception of the raid on the Great Ararat on the Turkish frontier post of Orahi [illegible] No. 5 of the 7th instant) which has been the subject of singularly little comment the gross lack of information in the world's press regarding incidents, it was feared [illegible] space to ignorance of matters of external politics and tract nations to create trouble for Turkey Such comment as has been made has been entirely hostile against Persia against which country a campaign is gradually [illegible] worked up, and there is little doubt that at the moment relations are passing through a period of strain. Whatever be the immediate object of the Turks, Ismet Pasha, in a speech which he delivered at Angora on the 28th instant, went out of his way to point out that normal relations between two countries were impossible without frontier security. Turkey did not have that security, and, though he did not wish to hurt anybody's *amour-propre*, Turkey must take measures for her legitimate defence, and he must make it clear that before such a necessity the Turkish people would not flinch

4 That the Prime Minister's words were not vain has since been shown, for it is announced that the Turkish Government is about to address to the Persian Government a note in very severe terms, the text of which will be published in a few days According to the official newspaper the note will reply to one recently received from Tehran, will refute the plea that the Persian Government is ignorant of the arming of brigands" on Persian territory and is doing its utmost [illegible] frontier, and will point out that paper assurances of goodwill are valueless. Finally it will according to the same source, contain a threat that if assurances of goodwill are not translated into action the Turkish Government will hold itself [illegible] measures necessary for the defence and protection of [illegible]

It is the despatch of a note in such terms may arouse a Persian protest and its real purpose is probably to justify in advance an occupation, if necessary temporary [illegible] of a part of the 1913 frontier

I have &c.
GEORGE R CLERK

(E 4216 1511 44) No. 36

Mr Helm to Mr A Henderson. (Received August 5.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, August 5, 1930*

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad No. 5

"Your telegram No. 362 to Colonial Office

"In the [illegible] I propose to make statement to Minister for Foreign Affairs unless and until he raises the question again I should, however, be glad to learn, for my guidance, whether any reply has been returned to representations by Turkish Minister at Bagdad and, if so, its nature

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(E 4215 1511 44) No. 37

Telegrams communicated by the Colonial Office (Received August 6.)

(1.)

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq

(Telegraphic) *August 5, 1930*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram to Foreign Office No. 53, repeated to you. Alleged Kurdish incursion What are the [illegible]

(21)

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

(Telegraphic) *Baghdad, August 4, 1930*

REFERENCE to telegram No. 53 of 26th July from Constantinople to the Foreign Office.

Iraq Government are unable to verify report in detail but evidence received indicates that followers of Sheikh Barzan have been assisting Kurdish Ortmar regarding Sheikh B[illegible] is not under effective control of the Iraq Government. It must be that this is a poor augury for relations with Turkish Government but the fact that Sheikh has been able to maintain freedom from [illegible] is proof that no support of importance has been received from Turkey in the past (see [illegible] reported minutes of Sixth Permanent Frontier Commission Meeting).

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

E 4188 463 44 No. 38

Mr. H. Henderson to Mr. Ramsay (Athens)

(No. 78.)

[illegible] *August 7, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 52 of the 23rd July.

Please telegraph any information you [illegible] English newspapers to the effect that [illegible] tions between Greece and [illegible].

Repeated to Constantinople.

E 4240 1511 44 No. 40

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Received in Foreign Office August 11)

(Telegraphic) *Baghdad, August 6, 1930*

FOLLOWING [illegible] to Constantinople.

Yesterday's No. 436 to Foreign Office.

His Majesty's Foreign Affairs is replying to the Soviet Minister that the Iraq Government [illegible] given any support [illegible] Kurdish movements against the Turkish Government but every effort is made to control tribes on frontier but, as the Turkish Government are aware, it is not always easy to do this. The Iraq Government may rest assured that any tendency towards separate nationalism [illegible] Kurdish tribes in Iraq is being actively discouraged and it is the policy of the Iraq Government to see that they should settle down as good Iraqis and not embarrass either their own or neighbouring Governments."

E 4254 463 44 No. 10

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received August 8.)

No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, August 8, 1930*

YOUR telegram No. 78 of the 7th August.

Before he talked to me on the 23rd [illegible] M. Venizelos had not decided in anybody what kind of a [illegible] contemplated for [illegible]. He had, however, gathered distinctly that there would be no negotiations [illegible] spirit. M. Venizelos made it clear that he had no desire to be precise for the 23rd. He intended to see if he had still to develop his ideas, but [illegible] that he would [illegible] them while away [illegible] Newspaper "Elentheron Vima" which is in close touch with Government, characterises reports

a premature in recent articles. A Greek deputation is reported to be going shortly to Turkish capital in order to negotiate [illegible] treaty. Negotiations are also in progress for a pact of friendship and conciliation and establishment of connexion. It seems possible that reports in the English press arose from the fact of these negotiations.

The Greek Government may have made soundings to find out whether Turkish Government were ready to accept parity as a principle on which new treaties could be based. I think this is all that is likely to have happened.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

E 4264, 1511 44 No. 41

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. (Received in Foreign Office, August 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Baghdad, August 6, 1930.*

[illegible] between Ormar and the Turkish troops about 21st July. Sheikh Barzan sent 100 men to assist Ormar, but it is not clear whether they started from Iraq or Turkish territory probably the latter.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

E 4285 463 44 No. 42

G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received August 10.)

No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 9, 1930*

With reference to my No. 436 of the 8th August.

Foreign Minister told me he has so far not made any proposal to the Soviet Government. He confirms that there has been no discussion of details of [illegible] but at some months ago it was agreed in principle between the two governments that [illegible] agreement should be concluded after the negotiations for the settlement of the question of the exchange of populations had been got out of the way.

(Repeated to Athens.)

E 4287, 3478 44 No. 43

Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received August 10.)

No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) R[illegible] *Constantinople, August 10, 1930*

FETHI BEY, Turkish Ambassador at Paris, who is now here, has resigned in order to found a new political party. It will be known as the Free or Liberal Republican party, and already has amongst its members some of the Ghazi's closest friends.

Programme has not yet been completed but will include suppression of [illegible] press, [illegible] members to be allowed to attend [illegible] foreign capital and support for idea of Balkan League. Outlook [illegible] likely to be more Western in sympathy than that of existing party.

Development has been rapid and follows publication of Vakit [illegible] reports on financial situation. It is not unexpected in view of increasing divergencies of opinion between the Ghazi and Ismet.

Organisation of party of which the Turkish Ambassador in London is [illegible] is possible but I think improbable. Secretary-general, will necessarily be [illegible]. Fethi Bey is not yet a Deputy and the moment seems unlikely for [illegible] Assembly.

News of the formation of new party has been received with extreme satisfaction by business [illegible] and Bourse closed [illegible] rose 13 points on the bourse yesterday.

Despatch by bag.

E 4304 3476 44 No. 44

Mr Helm to Mr A Henderson —(Received August 10.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic) P *Stamboul, August 10, 1930*

MY earlier telegram of [illegible] date

I understand that the formation of the new party has as its object the elimination of Ismet Pasha with most of his Ministers and the grant to Fethi Bey complete freedom to choose his principal collaborators, and also that the new party has the Gazi's entire approval. Some forty or fifty of the members of the People's party will probably be instructed to join the new party at once and others will follow when the time is ripe. This information comes from a very reliable source. The whole business has of course been arranged both Ismet Pasha and the Gazi having been present at a meeting at Yalova on the 7th August, when the final decision was [illegible]

E 4321 307 44 No. 45

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Hall (Received August 11.)

(No. 293.)
S *Constantinople, August 2, 1930.*

WITH reference [illegible] I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy [illegible] from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs declining the invitation for the Turkish fleet to visit Malta which I had conveyed to Tevfik Rustu Bey in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 300 of the 30th June last.

2. Tevfik Rustu Bey states that the Turkish fleet is not in a state to make the visit this year and from the cordial terms of the note and the undoubted satisfaction originally given at Angora by the invitation I have no reason to believe that the cause for refusal is anything but genuine or that any motive beyond that given need be looked for.

3. The Turkish [illegible] at present in a state to make a prolonged cruise [illegible] but it is hoped that by 1931 it will be able to send to Malta a squadron which will not altogether unworthily represent the republic.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 4

Tevfik Rustu Bey to Sir G. Clerk.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 27 juillet 1930.*

J'AI [illegible] votre lettre du [illegible] Votre Excellence a bien voulu [illegible] pour [illegible] aimable geste par lequel le Gouvernement britannique a tenu à marquer [illegible] sa sympathie à votre Flotte et à Malte.

Le Gouvernement de la République a été très sensible à cette délicate attention et serait heureux de mettre à profit l'occasion qui s'est ainsi offerte et qui répond à l'ardent désir qu'il nourrissait depuis déjà quelque temps d'envoyer une flotte turque dans les eaux britanniques. Malheureusement l'état actuel de votre flotte nous réstreint à nous priver, du moins pour l'[illegible] de la véritable joie qu'est appelée à nous procurer cette visite à laquelle nous tenons particulièrement, et dont la réalisation paraît devoir être reservée pour l'automne 1931.

Je ne manquerai pas d'informer votre Excellence, en dû temps, de la date à laquelle il sera donné à la marine turque de rendre la visite courtoise que l'escadre britannique lui a faite l'an dernier et dont elle garde le meilleur souvenir.

Veuillez, &c.
DR. RUSTU.

E 4322 1511/44 No. 46.

Mr Helm to Mr A Henderson —(Received August 11.)

No. 295.)
Sir *Constantinople, August 6, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that [illegible] Majesty's Ambassador anticipated in paragraph 4 of his despatch No. 292 [illegible] Turkish Government on the 1st August [illegible] the Turkish Ambassador [illegible] a further note to the Persian Government [illegible] the [illegible] on the Turco-Persian frontier.

2. Contrary to expectations, the text of the correspondence so far exchanged has not been published and it is therefore impossible to estimate the exact state of relations between the two countries. According to the press, the latest Turkish note was "severe but friendly," while I learn from a well informed source that, while the note is quite friendly in tone, the Turkish Government has given the Persian Government the choice between two rather unpalatable alternatives—an immediate [illegible] which would place the eastern as well as the western slopes of Mount Ararat in Turkey, and permission for the Turkish troops to pursue Kurdish fugitives into Persian territory and deal with them there.

3. Pending the receipt of a reply to the Turkish proposals, operations in the frontier area and in particular against the Kurds on Ararat, are apparently suspended. There is, nevertheless considerable activity in Turkish Government circles, and this, as well as the difference in language employed by the President of the Republic (Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 288 of the 26th July, paragraph 5) and the Prime Minister (Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 292 of the 31st July paragraph 3), [illegible] to the belief that the two [illegible] Ismet Pasha, [illegible] the Gazi as [illegible] under negotiation. Whether or no, it is to be noted that the note to Persia was not [illegible] than had been originally contemplated while it is significant that during the past week press comments have considerably diminished in volume and become much more moderate and reasonable in tone. Further, Ibrahim Tali Bey, the inspector-general for Kurdistan, who is regarded as the apostle of pacification in Kurdistan by persuasion road making and education, suddenly arrived in Angora when the anti-Persian press campaign was at its height, at least one newspaper attacked both him and his policy and for a day or two his transfer to another post [illegible] his replacement by General Cevat Pasha, of Iraq frontier relations, were freely discussed. Further evidence is afforded by the visit of the Gazi to Erzerum while the General Staff [illegible] Bey is being dispatched with all haste to take over the duties of Ambassador at Teheran. Such evidence as is available, therefore, points to the fact that the policy of moderation is winning, at least for the moment, and that, as Sir R. Clive (Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested to Sir R. Clive (Tehran despatch No. 328 of the 14th July), the Soviet Government has been trying to sow discord between Persia and Turkey, these efforts have so far only had a limited success. Future developments must however largely depend on the nature of the Persian reply to the latest Turkish note.

4. But, if from the point of view of relations with Persia there has not the last ten days been an improvement, it is more than doubtful whether there has been any corresponding improvement in the situation in Turkish Kurdistan as regards which the press has been ominously silent. Local movements are being regularly despatched to the Kurdish areas where the insurrection is said by His Majesty's Embassy learns that some credit to ten Turkish aeroplanes have so far been lost and where scattered [illegible] of fugitives are probably still at large. It has also been published recently that the Kurdish chiefs of the Ruzki Kurds, Ormanli and so far as I am aware, no [illegible] has been made either by the Persian or British [illegible] but it is clear that in the vicinity of the Iraq frontier the Turkish forces are [illegible] trouble. Further as if disturbances on two frontiers were not enough, it is to-day reported that a band of sixty men, under the leadership of Hajo, an old enemy of the Turks, has crossed the Syrian frontier near Nisibin cutting the telegraph wires on the way [illegible] has [illegible] to deal with this new invasion, which was apparently [illegible] the frontier guards had been largely withdrawn in order to deal with the situation further north. Hajo is at present established at Habad, of which he is a native and is said to have issued a manifesto announcing that he is working

[illegible] to assure their [illegible]

[illegible] Minister at Tehran [illegible]

I have &c.
[illegible]

E 4324 2085 44

[illegible]

[illegible] 1900

[illegible] Herr [illegible]

[illegible]

I have &c.
[illegible]

E 4325 71 44

[illegible]

[illegible] 1900

[illegible]

[illegible] Bulgarians [illegible] have never been restored [illegible] to practise their religion [illegible] general the details [illegible] Bulgarians [illegible] treaty [illegible] suggested [illegible] Nothing [illegible] representative [illegible] proposals [illegible] As regards [illegible] Bulgarian [illegible] approved.

3. [illegible]

I have &c.
[illegible]

E 4328 71 44

[illegible]

[illegible]

2. [illegible] Bulgaria [illegible] Zname [illegible] M. Mihailoff's paper [illegible] never before [illegible]

3. [illegible] Majesty's Ambassador [illegible] Constantinople.

I have &c.
S. P. WATERLOW

E 4405 4405 44

[illegible]

[illegible] 1900

[illegible] Ministre [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

E 4404 1511 44 No 51.

Mr R H Campbell to Mr A Henderson—(*Received August 15*)

(No 339)

Sir *Paris August 14, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Persian Minister called at His Majesty's Embassy this morning He said that he was not acting on instructions but that speaking personally he wished to call my attention to the question of the Persian frontier by Turkish troops in pursuit of Kurd elements The Turkish troops had entered Persian territory He did not know when they would leave or even whether they did not intend to stay indefinitely He thought that the Soviet Government was behind the Turkish action There had already been a cross-frontier on the frontier between Persia and Soviet Russia He said that the Turkish action would probably cause difficulties there He sent a telegram to the Kurd elements in Persia

2 He said that he had telegraphed to his Government to know what action they intended to take and he understood the latter had written strongly to solicit the sympathy of the other Powers in these circumstances with a view to the early reference of the question to the League of Nations He informed me that he had yesterday brought these facts to the notice of the French Government, also, I gathered, without any specific instructions He would presumably have reported them to us as he stated that at the moment the Persian Minister was consulting London, and that yesterday the Persian Chargé d'Affaires there had seemed somewhat in doubt as to what action he ought to take

I have &c

R H CAMPBELL

E 4452 324 44 No

Mr Strang to Mr A Henderson (*Received August 18*)

(No 361)

Sir

IN his despatch No 105 of the 14th instant Sir [illegible] referred to the negotiations which are in progress for the revision of the Soviet Turkish Trade Agreement of 1927 I have the honour to report that the Turkish Ambassador told me to-day that these negotiations, which had been interrupted during the sittings of the recent congress of the Communist party, were now well under way again and were making quite satisfactory progress He hoped that they would be brought to a conclusion before long

2 A sanitary convention is also to be negotiated

I have &c

WILLIAM STRANG

E 4441 403 44 No

Mr Helm to Mr A Henderson (*Received August 18*)

(No 310 Secret)

Sir *Constantinople, August 12 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my telegram No 67 of the 9th instant, that on the 8th August I had a long conversation with the Greek Minister to Turkey To my enquiry as to whether Turco-Greek naval negotiations had made such progress as was reported in the British press, M Theotokis said categorically that they had not Discussions had, in fact not proceeded beyond the first stage and remained where they had been for some months The Greek point of view had been accepted by both sides [illegible] whether the figures of tonnage would be discussed at all [illegible] hoped would be negotiated and signed when M Venizelos visited Angora in October would probably consist of little more than an undertaking that the two countries would not enter upon a competition in naval armaments

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M N [illegible] HELM

E 4443/3476 44 No 54

Mr Helm to Mr A Henderson—(*Received August 18*)

(No 312)

Sir *Constantinople, August 12, 1930*

EXCEPT to those in close touch with the Turkish political situation, the news that Fethi Bey Turkish Ambassador in Paris for the past five years, had as I had occasion to report in my telegram No 69 of the 10th instant, resigned his post in order to create a new political party came as a complete surprise It was announced in the press on the 8th August through an evening paper which stated briefly that the President of the Republic, imbued as he was by democratic ideals and decided that an Opposition party based on lay and republican ideas would be for the general good, and that such a party, whose policy would be more liberal than that of the present Government, would at once be constituted under the leadership of Fethi Bey

2 This report was seized upon with avidity by the entire press and journalists and Deputies not in the know flocked to Yalova, where the Gazi and Ismet Pasha and Fethi Bey were all in residence, while such a strong [illegible] of diverse opinions, letters and so-called programmes has appeared in the press that the observer has been left somewhat aghast In the political life of few countries in the world to-day can it be possible for an ambassador to write to the head of the State a letter severely criticising nearly every action of the Government for the head of State to reply approving the measures which the ambassador proposes to take and then for him to invite the latter and the Prime Minister to stay with him at his country house, where the three agree to found a new political party to oppose another which [illegible] party (the last mentioned) is presidential and a second (Ismet Pasha) is vice president Yet this is what actually happened It may be well while completing the picture by adding that the decisive meeting took place in a bathroom during a bath and that on the following day, when Ismet Pasha left Yalova he granted an interview in which he wished success to the new party [illegible] with Fethi Bey, and then was seen off by the latter at Yalova

3 It has for some time been known, and His Majesty's Ambassador has on [illegible] reported that all was not well with the present Government Fethi Bey Sekia Kaya Bey the present Minister of the Interior, were regarded as Ismet Pasha's most likely successors Matters apparently came to a head rather more than a month [illegible] Bey addressed to the Gazi from Paris the letter, of which a copy is enclosed [illegible] criticising the financial, economic and general policy of the Government which had brought the country to such a parlous state But, while blaming the Government, Fethi Bey ascribed most of the blame to the single party system, which silenced criticism and killed initiative He announced his intention of forming a new party which, while completely lay and republican, should in the fields of finance, economy, internal and external affairs, pursue a different policy from that of the People's party The reply of the Gazi, of which a copy is also enclosed, dealt largely with his own position and with his functions, pointed out that, as President of the Republic he was above party and closed by welcoming Fethi Bey's proposal The Gazi at the same time assured his friend and former chief that the latter could count on his complete impartiality between the two parties

4 The two letters, and especially that of the President of the Republic, were obviously prepared solely for publication, for they by no means represent the true [illegible] views They will however as a Turkish friend told me, doubtless secure a [illegible] of reality to proceedings which have been largely [illegible] Fethi Bey has only arrived here some three weeks ago and at once joined the Gazi at Yalova [illegible] Gazi had, it appears, been in a [illegible] of the views of President with the Administration A trial of strength arose [illegible] my despatch No 298 of the 6th instant, over the Government's Kurdish policy, but Fethi Bey concentrated his attack on the Ministers of Finance and Justice and on their policy True to his principles, for my informant, who is in very close touch with the whole [illegible] tion, tells me his force and discipline are such that he cannot [illegible] opposing vote in the Assembly Ismet Pasha vigorously defended his two [illegible] In support of his case Fethi Bey produced Dr Schacht and Muller Reports which the Gazi had never properly studied and the decision was

[illegible] As Ismet Pasha remained obdurate, the Gazi apparently [illegible] that [illegible] and, with the double [illegible] ground of leaving Fethi Bey free from the [illegible] of the present Ministers, for whom he has little use, the very complicated scheme of founding a new party took shape. But though Ismet Pasha was fully aware of all that was going on, it is most improbable that he will calmly surrender, for he announced on his return to Angora that he would defend himself and his policy in the Assembly, and the nation would be left to judge.

5. The scales are, however, heavily weighted against him, for, although the Gazi [illegible] of Ismet Pasha's party and though he may talk of impartiality, no [illegible] that the President's sympathies are with Fethi Bey. Some of his closest friends are publicly collaborating with the latter and will doubtless [illegible]. A Deputy friend tells me that Deputies will do exactly as they are told, for the Gazi's control over them is complete. He himself confessed that he was only waiting to learn whether he should join the new party now or later.

6. Pending the publication of the new party's programme it would be prema[ture] to offer any comment on what, according to the press, will be its principal [illegible]. The name "Liberal Republican" may be taken as [illegible] tendency, and Fethi Bey has already announced that it will include [illegible] of the judicial and financial systems, freedom of the press and of commerce, modifi[ca]tion of the unreasonable railway construction programme, and one degree elections.

7. Nor do I think that it is yet the moment to endeavour to forecast future developments in any detail. I am informed that [illegible] the holding of the elections next year, but consider it improbable that, unless [illegible] the Gazi changes his mind and decides not to throw Ismet Pasha overboard, he [illegible] survive the late autumn. His health is bad, the Treasury is empty and [illegible] is unpopular. All indications point to the fact that, no matter how [illegible]ingly, the Gazi will, for the time being at least, part with his old [illegible].

8. Recent events prove that, if the Gazi has provided the ideas, the force of character and stern control of Ismet Pasha have been necessary to bring Turkey [illegible]. But the strain appears to have become too great and the control must be loosened before the breaking point is reached. A [illegible] letting off steam is desirable for the Turkish body politic. In such circumstances Fethi Bey will, when the time comes, probably make a good Prime Minister [illegible] the point of view of Turkey and of foreign interests. The change will be popular and the raising of restrictions will be welcomed. But, whatever happens, Fethi Bey will have a hard row to hoe, and some of the Prime Minister's followers will certainly stand by their chief. Ismet Pasha may be wanted again, for it would be rash to say that Turkey is ready for democratic government, that the Gazi would tolerate all that the words imply, or that a prolonged period of really liberal Government would [be] for the ultimate good of the country.

I have, &c.

ALEX. K. HELM.

Enclosure in No. [illegible]

Extract from the "Republique" of August 12, 1930.

FETHI BEY TO MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

AU cours des cinq ans et demi [illegible] Paris, j'ai suivi et étudié de l'extérieur les événements de notre pays. Pendant les [illegible] périodes que je passais chaque année en congé dans ma patrie, je n'[illegible] approfondir cette étude par les impressions [illegible] et la conviction que je me suis formées.

[illegible] qui frappe à première vue et qu'on sent partout, et qui [illegible] la crise que traverse notre situation économique et financière. En effet, la [illegible] dans toutes les parties du monde dans le prix des matières premières a [illegible] un arrêt général de l'activité économique de tous les pays.

Mais, cette gêne économique, que l'on sent dans notre pays plus grande que dans [illegible] est [illegible] aussi bien par les causes [illegible]

[illegible] par la politique [illegible] que le Gouvernement [illegible] depuis [illegible].

Le Gouvernement a entrepris des dépenses disproportionnées avec notre capacité [illegible] et improductives pour la génération actuelle et, pour assurer ces dépenses, [illegible] des impôts dépassant la capacité de la population. En raison du fait que notre industrie et nos produits n'ont pas été suffisamment protégés, nos exportations ont baissé d'année en année. Une grande partie des sacrifices consentis par le [illegible] fort lourds et l'autre partie aux importations étrangères et, conséquemment [illegible] de devises. Des mesures d'ordre essentiel n'ont pas été prises pour déterminer la valeur de notre monnaie jusqu'au jour où notre [illegible] couru le danger de baisser d'une façon inquiétante. Je ne veux pas prolonger mon exposé en y ajoutant des détails sur les [illegible] que présentent la justice et la politique intérieure et extérieure.

En résumé, je [illegible] gratitude de nos paysans, dans cette ère de paix que notre pays, affranchi de toutes les restrictions des Capitulations, traverse depuis le Traité de Lausanne, qui malgré l'effort dont on peut être fier de toutes les classes de la population pour élever le niveau de notre pays, le résultat obtenu est loin de donner satisfaction. [illegible] comment est survenu un résultat pareil en présence de la bonne volonté et de l'effort, qui sont au-dessus de toute espèce de doute, des membres du Gouvernement à l'égard de qui je témoigne un profond respect et une grande affection. [illegible] la réponse à cette question dans le fait que la grande Assemblée nationale est composée d'un seul parti. En effet, en raison du fait que les membres du parti [s'a]bstiennent de toute critique à l'endroit de leur propre Cabinet, la [illegible] discussion a disparu à la grande Assemblée nationale et le Gouvernement est devenu quasi non responsable. Votre Excellence a, avec une énergie et une per[sévérance sans pareilles] à l'étranger, défendu ce pays contre une terrible invasion ennemie [et vou]s avez donné à tous les enfants de la patrie l'indépendance et la liberté [qu'ils ne] connaissaient pas jusqu'ici. Vous avez aboli les vieilles institutions caduques qui empêchaient notre pays d'avancer dans la voie de la civilisation et vous avez instauré [illegible] de la sorte gagné la reconnaissance éternelle de la patrie [illegible] l'humanité entière.

[illegible] pas que pour que le régime républicain devienne perpétuel dans le pays votre Excellence soit, en sa qualité de fondateur de la république, plus que [illegible] un seul parti, d'assurer la possibilité de demander au Gouvernement des comptes [illegible] sur les affaires du peuple, de faire en sorte que s'il y a erreur dans la gestion [de]s affaires on s'efforce de les réparer à la suite de libres discussions se déroulant [sous] les yeux de tous.

En tant que citoyen épris de la république, j'ai l'intention, dans le désir très [illegible] de voir se réaliser ces vœux, d'entrer sur le terrain de la lutte politique avec un [parti] véritablement et complètement républicain, laïque au sens [illegible] plusieurs points de la politique financière, économique [illegible] et extérieure du Parti républicain du Peuple. Votre Excellence étant, en même temps que Président de la République, président général du Parti républicain du Peuple [illegible] jusqu'ici, j'éprouve le besoin de savoir de quelle façon mon [illegible] par votre Excellence.

D[ans l']attente d'une réponse de votre Excellence, je lui présente, avec l'expression [la] plus profonde de mon affection, l'expression de mon respect et l'hommage de mon [illegible].

FETHI.

Mustapha Kemal to Fethi Bey.

Mon cher Fethi Bey,

[J'ai reçu] votre lettre et je l'ai lue avec attention. Vos observations et vos [illegible] touchent en ma double qualité de chef de l'État et de président général [du Parti] populaire. Vous n'ignorez pas que par suite de mes fonctions officielles je [n'exe]rce pas effectivement la charge de président général du Parti populaire, dont [illegible] par Ismet Pasha.

[illegible] naturel qu'au terme de mon mandat de Président de la République je [reprenne] la présidence effective du Parti populaire. Il appartiendra au Gouvernement de répondre en temps et lieu aux points de vue que vous exprimez au sujet de [se]s actes. Nul doute que de cette façon la vérité n'éclate avec une plus grande [illegible]

La libre discussion des affaires publiques à la Grande Assemblée nationale, en présence de la nation elle-même et les suggestions des intérêts supérieurs de celle-ci par des personnes de bonne volonté et de sentiments qui se confondent avec leurs principes constituent les garanties de notre système dont j'ai été le partisan le plus ardent.

Si je n'avais pas assumé la haute magistrature de l'État et si je n'étais que le président effectif du Parti populaire, j'aurais reçu avec attention et sympathie et j'aurais considéré comme profitables les observations et les critiques portant sur le programme et les actes du parti formulées par une personne comme vous, en qui j'ai la plus grande confiance.

Je constate à nouveau que nous sommes d'accord sur le principe essentiel de la république laïque. D'ailleurs, ce que je cherche et chercherai toujours impartialement dans la vie politique ce n'est autre chose que ce fondement.

Toutes les fois que des tendances contraires aux fondements de la république l'entrée en activité d'un nouveau parti en vue d'y discuter librement les affaires nationales.

Partant je réserve le meilleur accueil à votre entrée dans l'arène politique pour poursuivre la réalisation de vos points de vue. Vous pouvez être convaincu que, pendant toute la durée de ma présidence j'accomplirai la tâche dont je suis investi en raison de mes hautes fonctions, d'une façon impartiale et juste à l'égard de tous les partis, qu'ils soient ou non au pouvoir, et que l'activité politique de votre parti fondé sur la base des principes laïcs ne rencontrera aucune entrave.

GHAZI MOUSTAPHA KEMAL.

E 4448 2085 44] No. 55

Sir H. Rumbold to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 864.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 13, 1930.*

WITH reference to Mr. Newton's despatch No. 570 of the 15th July concerning a contract between the Turkish Government and certain German firms for the delivery of railway material, I have the honour to report that the "Berliner Tageblatt" of the 10th instant published a telegram from the Constantinople correspondent of the paper which deals with the same subject. The details do not in every case agree with those given in the despatch under reference, presumably alterations were made in the course of the negotiations.

2. The correspondent states that the German firms concerned are Fried. Krupp, Henschel, the East German group of wagon builders, the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the Gutehoffnungshuette, Schichau, the Machinery Works Augsburg-Nuremberg, the Deutz Motor Works, the Knorr Brake Factory, and a few others. The contract deals with orders amounting to about 45 million marks. One-third of the amount will be spent on permanent-way material, locomotives, rolling stock, bridging material, brakes and spare parts. The order for locomotives is to consist of thirty-six goods and express locomotives, 1,500 goods wagons and passenger coaches. The prices for locomotives are about 15 per cent. higher than those previously paid, and the wagons will also cost more.

3. The delivery of the rolling-stock and spare parts is to be completed by 1934. The other material for the railway and for the repair shops is to be supplied during 1931 and 1932.

4. The financial terms are that 10 per cent. shall be paid when the order is placed, 25 per cent. on delivery, while credit will be given for the remainder. The price has apparently been weighted in amounts, the total being put at 10,155,000 dollars. Of this amount, 3,177,000 dollars will be paid during the years 1930-33, while bills endorsed by the Agrarian Bank will be given for the balance, which will be paid, together with interest, during the years 1934-36. The payments during the period 1930-33 may be deferred for one year in order to avoid exchange or transfer difficulties, and one-third of the second group of payments may be

postponed to 1939 for the same reasons. Interest amounts to 6 per cent. and commissions to ¾ per cent. Two weeks after the signature of the contract, the German syndicate will deposit with the Turkish Government the sum of £T 500,000 as security.

5. The Reich furnishes a guarantee for 60 per cent. of the purchase price. The correspondent says that a special financial arrangement between the Turkish Government and a group of banks such as was arrived at in connexion with the Dubois-Berger agreement, will not now be made as the present contracts are for delivery of material only and not for the execution of work.

6. The paper concludes by saying that the introduction and use of German models on the Turkish railways will, no doubt, lead to further orders in years to come for renewals and replacements.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

E 4444 3476 44 No. 56

Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 18.)

No. 31.

Sir, *Constantinople, August 14, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 512 of the 12th instant, that the Free Republican party has now been constituted and that application has been made to the competent authorities for its registration. The secretary-general of the new party is Nuri Bey, Deputy for Kastamuni, a hold-over from the Ghazi and still one of the latter's closest friends. He has, indeed, repeatedly heard it said that he alone of all the President's entourage can say what he likes to the Ghazi, and that in the latter's wildest moments Nuri Bey does not fear any influence over him. The three members of the administrative council of the party are also friends of the President.

2. The programme of the party was published yesterday, and I have the honour to enclose a copy of it herewith. It is confined entirely to internal problems, and is on the lines indicated in my despatch under reference. It includes, as will be observed, a proposal to grant women's suffrage. From the point of view of foreign affairs the chief point in the programme is the 10th article, which suggests that, if and when the new party comes to power, Turkey will seek closer collaboration with the League of Nations.

3. When in Angora yesterday, I found that less was known there than here about the birth of the new party. For the first time in ten years an important Turkish political development has taken place outside Angora. But Angora is pleased, and, like Constantinople, is convinced that the Ghazi is behind the new organisation. Unlike Constantinople, it does not anticipate a change of Government before the elections next summer, and is already looking forward to lively proceedings in the Assembly during the winter.

4. Tevfik Rüstu Bey, whom I saw last evening, showed no disposition to discuss the formation of the new party, and I did not therefore raise the matter. The Soviet Ambassador has been seeing him daily, and is, I was informed in the capital, much exercised at the turn which events have taken. The ascendancy to power of Tevfik Bey would, it is supposed at Angora, be a greater blow to the influence of Italy than to that of Russia, whom Turkey could never afford to ignore, but it is thought that Italy will strive to gain most. It may be for this reason that during my interview with him, Tevfik Rüstu Bey let drop a number of very broad hints that he was very displeased with the French.

I have, &c.
A. K. HELM.

Enclosure in No 56

Extract from the "Milliett" of August 13, 1930

LE PROGRAMME DU PARTI REPUBLICAIN LIBERAL

Il y aura Reductions sur les Impots — Le Monopole des Affaires du Port sera supprime — La Production agricole et celle du Pays seront protegees. Des Débouchés seront trouves a nos Articles d Exportation. De l Importance sera donnee a l Encouragement a l Industrie — Une seule Generation n aura pas a supporter toutes les Charges — Les Elections se feront au Suffrage universel avec la Participation des Femmes

Article 1. — Le parti republicain liberal est fidele aux principes republicains, nationalistes et laics, et son ideal est de les consolider eternellement

Article 2. — Les impots seront établis de façon à ne pas ébranler la capacité de payement du contribuable et de ne pas dépasser la limite de ce que peut supporter la population.

Article 3. — Le parti veille à ce que les revenus de l Etat soient consacrés à des œuvres profitables et eviter que des dépenses consacrées à des œuvres d utilité publique soient supportées exclusivement par [illegible]

Article 4. — Le parti désire prendre des mesures pour relever sans retard la valeur de notre monnaie et d ouvrir ainsi la voie aux capitalistes étrangers qui veulent faire des affaires dans notre pays

Article 5. — Le parti n admet pas tout ce qui constitue une [illegible] contre la tranquillité mentale d ordre économique ou financier et qui porte entrave [illegible] commerciales et industrielles. Il est le protecteur de toutes les initiatives visant le développement du pays dans le domaine économique

Si l on remarque que dans les entreprises d ordre économique que l on est obligé d entreprendre dans l intérêt de la république l effort individuel ne suffit pas, le Gouvernement intervient d office

monopole des affaires du port sera supprimé.

Article 6. — Un des buts principaux visé par le parti est de veiller à ce que le paysan et le cultivateur trouvent de l argent a des intérêts modiques et grâce à une méthode simple et de le délivrer de l usure qui porte atteinte à la structure économique du pays. Il est établi comme principe de mettre la Banque agricole, créée par des [illegible] souscrits par les cultivateurs, à même d assurer les besoins du pays en ce qui concerne les crédits agricoles

Article 7. — La vitalité à donner aux industries du pays en lui assurant un prompt développement est un des buts principaux que le parti désire atteindre. La loi sur l encouragement à l industrie sera appliquée sans restriction. La protection et les facilités que ses dispositions octroient seront au besoin élargies. Les opérations de la Banque industrielle et minière seront développées et ses capacités financières [illegible]

Des mesures seront prises pour la protection de nos produits nationaux et pour leur assurer des débouchés à l étranger. Les tarifs des transports et du port seront établis en conséquence.

Article 8. — Dans les départements gouvernementaux on donnera avec la plus grande célérité et sans soulever des difficultés suite aux affaires des particuliers. Une lutte sans merci sera engagée contre les abus et les pots de vin.

Article 9. — Des inspections fréquentes et suivies seront faites pour assurer la prompte expédition des affaires des tribunaux. Les lacunes relevées dans l'appareil judiciaire seront comblées en conséquence.

Article 10. — Le parti dans sa politique étrangère veillera à ce que la République turque entretienne des relations d amitié et empreintes de sincérité avec les pays voisins et avec toutes les Puissances et à ce que la collaboration avec la Société des Nations soit plus étroite.

Article 11. — Le parti plaidera la cause de l'adoption du suffrage universel et de l'octroi à la femme turque ainsi du droit politique

E 4445/1511/44 No. 57

Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 318.)

SIR, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1930.

WHEN I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora yesterday, my conversation naturally turned to the incursion made by the Sheikh of Barzan into Turkey (Sir G. Clerk's telegram No. 53 of the 26th ultimo), and Tevfik Rustu Bey inquired whether I had had any [illegible] from Baghdad.

2. I proceeded to give him a summary of the reply returned by the [illegible] Government to the Turkish Minister [illegible] I had emphasised that he could [illegible] that His Majesty's Government would [illegible] Iraq Government would not [illegible] assist national sentiment or tolerate any movement [illegible] across the neighbouring Governments. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he had already received a lengthy report from Tahir Lutfi Bey [illegible] he was entirely satisfied with the assurances given by the Iraq Government [illegible] Turkey had to know [illegible] Iraq side. The real danger was elsewhere but whether [illegible] in Persia or within the borders of Turkey itself his Excellency did not say.

3. Knowing that it was the intention of the Iraq Acting Prime Minister and [illegible] Acting High Commissioner to proceed to Kurdistan about the 8th instant I thought it well to give his Excellency some outline of the speeches which it was proposed to deliver, and invited his particular attention to the clear statements which would be made in regard to Kurdish political activities. His Excellency surprised me when he said that he had already read the speeches, of which no mention has so far been made in the press, that he quite understood why they had been made, and that he welcomed the statements to which I had drawn his attention. Nevertheless, he concluded "on attache trop d importance aux Kurdes."

4. But he quickly turned the conversation to the recently concluded Anglo-Iraq treaty which, he said, was one of the best things that Great Britain had done for a long time. The treaty was good for Great Britain, it was good for Iraq, and the Turkish Government was delighted for it knew that peace and stability were secured on Turkey's south-eastern frontier. His satisfaction had, however, received a rude shock when he read the leading article of the "Temps" of the 1st August, which was, he said, thoroughly mischievous. It criticised the treaty, but its object, which would not be realised, was to create dissension between Turkey on the one side and Great Britain and Iraq on the other. He knew that behind it all loomed the question of the pipe-line and, if the article should be reproduced here, though he hoped it would not be, and gave rise to comment, he would have something to say. He would also welcome an opportunity of speaking about it to the French Ambassador and of telling M. de Chambrun exactly what he thought of such tactics. He might even suggest, the Minister added as he warmed to his subject, that if the treaty was such a wonderful thing for Great Britain as the "Temps" suggested France could not do better than conclude a similar treaty with Syria.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Acting High Commissioner at Baghdad.

I have, &c.
A. K. HELM.

E 4446/67/44 No. 58

Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 320.)

THE [illegible] Embassy at Constantinople presents its compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 7 from His Majesty's military attaché at this Embassy [illegible] the tactical methods and state of training of the Turkish army.

Constantinople, August 14, 1930.

Enclosure 1 in No. 58.

Major O'Leary to Mr. Helm

(No. 7)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 14, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your notice some observations on the tactical methods and the state of training of the Turkish army.

Owing to the secretive practice of the military authorities in this country, any description of their system of teaching must be largely based on surmise and deduction, and cannot pretend to accuracy of detail.

I have &c.,
R. J. O'LEARY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 58.

Tactics and Training of the Turkish Army.

THE Turkish General Staff, when announcing the principles on which the army of the republic was to be trained, decided to free themselves from a blind adherence to the teachings of any one foreign army, but to copy from each country in such details which seemed to them most successful and most applicable to Turkey's own conditions. In this way Italy and Austria were to be the models for the study of mountain warfare; the air force was to be copied from the French service; artillery matters were to contribute each their share to the new Turkish doctrine of war.

2. In practice this eclecticism has only been carried out in a very small measure, in spite of the friction and lack of sympathy which hindered the co-operation between German and Turkish personnel during the war, the majority of text-books in use to-day are of German origin and the text-books are largely, and in some cases entirely, translations from the corresponding German manuals.

3. The danger of a recurrence of position warfare with its inevitable drain on national resources and of man power, both at a very low ebb in this country, has determined the Turkish Staff to seek a war of movement. Hence they consider that the areas in which operations are likely to occur must be of sufficient extent to enable commander will be able to retain freedom of manœuvre. In this respect the great distances, low standard of living and admirable powers of resistance of the Turkish soldier must be considered. Any attempt to hold with a very extended front, after the manner of the Western Powers, would lay us open to defeat in detail, while a small and efficient Turkish army with efficient signal service would possess all the advantages of this freedom of manœuvre to his opponent.

4. A few inevitable exceptions to the general rule of a war of movement are recognised. The Chatalja lines are fortified and garrisoned, as are also the two fortresses of Sivas-Kars and Erzerum. The intention is to defend any of these positions, since it is necessary for Turkey to hold the ridges of the Taurus, which form the only serious natural barrier between the coast are also to be held as long as possible.

5. A serious obstacle to training the army is the low standard of education of the average recruit. Even the instruction in the three R's is regarded as one of the principal duties of the officer, and prizes are given to those who attain the best results in this subject. The new alphabet has made it possible to reach a much higher percentage of literacy than formerly. In this way the army can help to towards the civilisation of the more backward provinces.

6. The military schools and courses of instruction are efficient and the students generally are keen. Modern methods and foreign armies are studied and the programmes are ambitious, but it is doubtful whether the majority of the students are capable of applying the teaching, and a more modest theory would perhaps accord better with the possibilities of the Turkish army as it is.

7. The type of guerilla or small war, which is the most likely role of the Turkish force, demands a degree of individual training and of initiative by what is natural to the average Anatolian recruit. A high standard of efficiency in musketry would be particularly advantageous, and efforts are now being made to improve the teaching of this subject.

8. The more active minded officers contribute freely to the military magazines which abound in Turkey. About a third of the articles in general the remainder being taken from English, French, German and Italian periodicals. Tactical exercises are worked out in detail, and the action of even platoon and section commanders is explained in clear and simple language. These exercises are probably more useful, in training the smaller units, than the official handbooks, which are translated from the German and start with principles.

9. The Turkish language, when stripped of Arabic importations, is clear and logical, and the new alphabet, which allows a greater proportion of purely Turkish words to be used without ambiguity, enables officers to write orders more concisely than is possible in other languages.

10. The Turkish [illegible] generally speaking inadequate. In the junior ranks, he has little authority [illegible] the non-commissioned ranks with cadets rejected from the military colleges and [illegible] inspire the soldier with respect for his immediate superiors.

11. The relation between officers and men seems to approximate more nearly to the British ideal than to that of the (pre-war) German army. Officers are mostly [illegible] with a sense of responsibility and a liking for their profession. Under the present [illegible] and conditions the military career is among the most attractive to a Turkish youth with any [illegible].

12. There is reason to believe that the standard of training and efficiency varies [illegible] in different parts of the country, although the three inspectors of army districts each [illegible] visit their [illegible] in Constantinople, where most of the schools are [illegible] Kadikeui, Daricheker and perhaps in the neighbourhood of Smyrna. [illegible] were [illegible] from some of the smaller garrisons [illegible] by [illegible] of Ottoman days.

13. On the whole the Turkish army may be considered to be in a state of training. Western ideals of efficiency and of scientific organisation have converted [illegible] many of the young officers, but the [illegible] spreading the new [illegible] throughout the army will require many years to accomplish.

R. J. O'LEARY, *Major, G.S.*

Constantinople,
August 13, 1930.

E 4475/1511/44 No. 59

Sir R. Clive to Mr. Henderson (Received August 18.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August 18, 1930.*

BOTH His Majesty's consul, Tabriz, and Turkish ex-Ambassador confirm that recent Reuter telegrams from Angora reporting crossing of frontier by Turkish troops in neighbourhood of Lesser Ararat and Alvek high are unfounded.

Turks are reported from Tabriz to have entered another defeat near Arahk, and Ambassador, who is leaving for Angora shortly, admitted if adequate Persian co-operation in disarming and dispersing Kurdish refugees were not soon forthcoming Turkish troops would probably be compelled to occupy Lesser Ararat zone.

(Repeated to Constantinople, unnumbered.)

E 4405/4405/44 No. 60

Mr. A. Henderson to Ferit Bey.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August 22, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 19th instant, in which you were good enough to inform me of the decision taken by the Turkish Government of the Residence Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.

I have &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 4606 1511 44] No. 61

Telegram from the Acting High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—Communicated by Colonial Office, August 20.

August 15, 1930.

MY telegram of 6th August (see No. 59). Reports indicate that Sheikh Barzan's followers have been again in conflict with Turkish troops round about 8th August, and that sheikh is going to send further Zebar and Barzan to help Oramar.

E 4578 1511 44] No. —

Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 25.)

No. 298.

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 20, 1930.

IN spite of alarmist reports in the European press, there has been no development of importance in the situation in Turkish Kurdistan or in Turco-Persian relations since my despatch No. 298 of the 6th instant was drafted.

2. The Persian reply to the Turkish note of the 1st August was received at Angora some ten days ago. From the Turkish point of view, it was unsatisfactory to the extent that it rejected the two alternatives offered in the Turkish note—frontier rectification near Ararat or the grant to the Turkish forces of the right to pursue Kurdish fugitives into Persian territory. The refusal was, however, probably not unexpected, for it was apparently taken quite calmly by the Government and the press laid no emphasis on the fact that the Persian Government would henceforward take adequate measures to deal with the Kurds on their own territory and to prevent the Turkish Kurds from passing the frontier. Persian frontier forces were reported to have been reinforced. Appreciable reports that the Persian forces had, at a considerable loss, annihilated one of Kor Hamanler's raiding parties near the frontier, and it was stated that Persian officials were in consultation with a view to [illegible] the frontier. It was at this stage that [illegible] had been issued for the immediate [illegible] Turkish troops to [illegible] no reports of such a crossing in any [illegible] quarter here, and all official circles issued statements towards

3. During the last week the newspapers have been occupied with the birth of the new political party to devote much space to Kurdistan. Almost daily the situation is reported to be "all quiet," although this can hardly be taken as representing the true state of affairs. At least one attack has been made by the Ararat Kurds on the Turkish forces, minor incidents have been reported elsewhere, and the situation is not satisfactory. It may be that it is still hoped to starve the Kurds into [illegible] Persians seems also to be hoped for. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, as mentioned above, has gone to Yalova in order to obtain the advice of Ghazi Ismet Pasha as to the nature of a fresh note to be addressed to Persia. Late probabilities cannot therefore be gauged with any certainty. Strong measures against Persia are of course, still possible, but the moment for them seems to have passed, and everything now points to the conclusion that hopes of a satisfactory settlement will be based on diplomatic action. The press announces that the Frontier Delimitation Commission will resume its work at an early date, when the Turkish delegation will doubtless again endeavour to secure the desired frontier rectification, possibly in return for a cession of territory further south, and the new Ambassador to Tehran has stated in an interview that he hopes soon after his arrival in the Persian capital to be able to clear up the frontier situation.

4. In the meantime practically no news has been forthcoming regarding the situation in south-eastern Turkey. The raid of Hajo, which I had the honour to report in the last paragraph of my despatch under reference, has not been followed up. He failed to secure the support of the local Kurds, and when Turkish troops appeared, recrossed the frontier, was at once taken prisoner by the French forces in Syria and immediately removed from the vicinity of the frontier, a step which gave much satisfaction to the Turkish authorities.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ALEX. K. HELM.

[E 4581/71/44] No. 63

Mr. Waterlow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 270.)

Sir, *Sofia, August* 21, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the speech which I made on the occasion of the recent visit of Polish journalists to Bulgaria, which I mentioned in my despatch No. 269 of the 7th instant, have, I think, more substance and significance in them than is usual with these international joy rides. The Turkish party was on quite a small scale, Fahib Rifki Bey (a Deputy who I believe is editor of the Hakimiyet Milliye) appears to have consisted of serious and responsible persons, but it was evident that the declarations made by Rifat Bey as their spokesman reflected the views of the Gazi and were not mere platitudes. The proceedings were held under the auspices of the Association of Bulgarian Journalists, one at Sofia and one at Varna, and an agreement was signed providing for a programme of future activity, which, I am told, includes the regular exchange of information, articles and visits. The visit thus seems to have some political importance in connexion with the present honeymoon phase upon which Turco-Bulgarian relations have entered. And the question naturally arises whether the significance is all on the surface, whether, that is to say, there may not be some connexion between the despatch of the party from Turkey and the present tension between Turkey and Persia. May it not be that Turkey, with growing confidence in her position, has some idea of consolidating her position westwards, and having reached an agreement with Greece, is thinking of a further reinforcement of her position in Europe by coming to terms with Bulgaria, with whom she has no differences? At the same time it is worth noting that M. Bonnoff, who was at Varna during the visit, took no part in the visitors altogether. In the end he contented himself with receiving two out of the twelve Polish visitors.

2. The only blot on the festivities was a mistake which has been pointed out by M. Antonoff, the correspondent of the "Times" here, in an article which has got him into hot water with his colleagues. If journalists from any third country were to be invited to meet the Turks, it should have been Greeks, not Poles. The presence of Polish journalists was due to pressure brought by the Minister of Agriculture, a mischievous busybody. The result was not happy since the Poles are being orientated towards the Little *Entente* and away from Soviet Russia, and do not enter into any tripartite agreement, much less a tripartite journalistic federation, such as their Bulgarian colleagues had contemplated. An agreement was, indeed, signed between them and the Bulgarian journalists, but it is merely a pious expression of desire to promote closer collaboration. If Greeks had been invited instead, an agreement might have been reached which would have been useful from the point of view of Graeco-Bulgarian relations.

3. The statement issued by Rifki Bey on his return to Turkey contains the following passage, which has caused some small stir here: "We noticed only one thing to cause us concern: the exceptional position of the young Turkish generation in Bulgaria, who, under the pressure and suggestions of ignorant muftis, have remained outside the modern movement. The Grand Mufti of Sofia is totally devoid of all sense of responsibility, his sole idea, and that of his creatures, is to flutter away the revenues of the pious Turkish foundations, while striving to keep the masses in a state of neglected ignorance. He alone did not dare to come into contact with us. This interference in Bulgarian matters by Turkey is not resented. But it has called forth unfriendly articles in the press suggesting that Bulgaria is responsible, even indirectly, for the backwardness of her Turkish population, and pointing out that the Pomaks and Bulgarian Turks have not abandoned their traditional way of life for the modern ideas imposed upon them by the Kemalist regime; that is entirely their own affair, in which they will not tolerate any interference, and that any attempt to [illegible] would be contrary to Bulgarian traditions of tolerance."

4. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and Athens.

I have, &c.

H. G. WATERLOW.

E 4640 1511 44] No. 61

Mr. Strang to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 469.)

Sir, *Moscow, August 18, 1930.*

IN his despatch No. 428 of the 14th July, 1930 (a copy of which has reached me in print), Sir R. Clive reported that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was quite convinced that the Soviet Government were trying to stir up trouble between the Turkish and Persian Governments by falsely accusing the Persian Government to the Turks of aiding and abetting the Kurdish insurgents. I have the honour to report that there have been no articles on this question in the Soviet press which are in any way contrary to the Persian point of view. This, however, does not necessarily prove that he was wrong.

2. The "Izvestiya," on the 14th August, published a telegram from the Tass agency at Angora stating that the rumours regarding the strained relations between Turkey and Persia were absolutely groundless, and that the relations between the two countries were still of the friendly nature.

3. Commenting on this telegram the "Izvestiya" says:

> The foreign press has of late been circulating rumours to the effect that a conflict between Turkey and Persia is in the offing. The origin of these rumours was the rebellion of the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia against the Angora Government. These Kurdish bands were formed and lived as refugees on the territory of Persia where once the celebrated Lawrence stayed. [illegible] Turkish Government in their note pointed out to the [illegible] the irregularity of such a state of affairs. It must be assumed that the negotiations on this question between the Governments of Angora and Tehran have reached some sort of positive result which has enabled the Anatolian (Official) Agency to send the foregoing information. We, on our side, can only welcome the maintenance of friendly relations between two brother nations which have many similar aims in their national and external politics and stand before a common enemy. As was stated by a correspondent of one of the Berlin papers, the revolt of the Kurds was fomented by the imperialists with the object of disturbing the relations between Turkey and Persia. The information from the Anatolian Agency suggests that this attempt was unsuccessful.

4. The statement referred to above was, it [illegible] believed, a message from the correspondent in Berlin of the Kurdish Bureau in Turkey referred to in the "Izvestiya" of the 13th August, in which he alleged that the Kurdish bands were armed with English machine guns and revolvers of the latest type, and that they were [illegible] by an Englishman named Mahmud, described as the agent of a reactionary-religious association in Egypt. He goes on to state that in February Colonel Lawrence visited Bagdad in the guise of Hadji Mahmud and attended sick Kurds, proplaying that something was going to happen soon. Lawrence then turned up in the Persian town of Maku, not far from the Turkish frontier, where the headquarters of the rebels was situated.

> [illegible] rebellion—the independence of the Kurds—coincides with the interests of the English Imperialists, who dream of forming a strategic point in this region against the U.S.S.R. The suppression of this rebellion has cost the Turks very dear. It is intended by this means to weaken the Turkish economic situation in such a manner that she will be more dependent on the aid of England of financial assistance. By this means, thanks to the revolt of the Kurds, it was possible to kill two birds with one stone. The second advantage was the chance of disturbing [illegible] between Turkey and Persia.

The message concludes by saying that the conflict with Turkey is only a side issue, and that the principal object is the preparation for a war with the Soviet Union, for which [illegible] enemies are ensuring for themselves a suitable strategic position.

5. Sentiments as curiously akin to the "Izvestiya's" own were sure of a hearty welcome here.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM STRANG.

E 4664/463/44] No. 65.

Mr. O. Harvey to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 413.)

Sir, *Athens, August 21, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 418, Confidential, of the 23rd July regarding Greco-Turkish relations, I have the honour to inform you that, according to an official communiqué in the press, the Turkish Minister was received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 18th August, when the former conveyed to M. Michalakopoulos the acceptance by the Turkish Government of the views recently put forward by the Greek Government in regard to the Pact of Friendship and Arbitration which is about to be concluded between the two countries.

2. The draft of the pact, the communiqué proceeds, was originally prepared by the Greek Government, and the Turkish Government had requested a modification of Article 9 regarding the [illegible] of the Conciliation Commission. According to the Greek draft in the event of disagreement between the two parties as the selection of members of the Conciliation Commission, this task was to be entrusted to a third Power chosen by mutual agreement; in the event of agreement not being reached on this point, each of the parties was to select a foreign Power and the commission was to be chosen by common agreement between these two Powers; finally, if even the two Powers failed to agree, each of them was to propose a number of candidates equal to the number of members required for the commission and their appointment was to take place by drawing lots. The Turkish counter-draft omitted the last provision, so that it was to be feared that a complete *impasse* might be reached if the two Powers failed to agree. Greece urged the necessity of maintaining the original text, to which the Turkish Government have now consented.

3. Thus the agreement is now complete and the pact can be signed. The signature will take place at Angora on the occasion of the forthcoming visit of MM. Venizelos and Michalakopoulos to the Turkish capital.

4. In the [illegible] the communiqué concludes, the final negotiations for the [illegible] the [illegible] will be proceeded with at Angora. For this purpose a delegation consisting of M. Zaimis, former director of the State Chancellery; M. Diamantopoulos, head of the Commercial Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and M. Christidis, of the Athens Chamber of Commerce, will leave for Angora next week. It is not expected that the negotiations will prove lengthy.

It is also announced that according to the latest reports from Constantinople the application of the Greco-Turkish Agreement, which has already begun, is taking a normal course. Certain isolated cases regarding which difficulties have arisen, will be examined by the neutral members of the Mixed Exchange Commission who will act as arbitrators according to the terms of the agreement.

6. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
OLIVER HARVEY.

E 4715 324 44] No. 66

Mr. Strang to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 1.)

No. 493.)

Sir, *Moscow, August 25, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 461 and 469 of the 11th and 18th August, I have the honour to report that the Soviet press continues to give prominence to the affairs of Turkey. The "Izvestiya" of the 23rd August denies, on the authority of the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran, current reports that the Persian frontier has been crossed in places by Turkish troops, and that threatening notes have been addressed by Turkey to Persia. [illegible] relations between the two countries are strained. On the contrary, it says, the Persian Government gave the Turkish Government great assistance in this matter, and the relations between the two countries are still, as formerly, of a friendly character.

2. The "Izvestia" of the 21st August publishes an interview given by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to a Tass correspondent. A copy of this message is enclosed. Tevfik Rüstü Bey emphasises that Soviet-Turkish friendship rests on a firm foundation and announces his intention of visiting Moscow this autumn. He incidentally mentions Italy in the same breath with Turkey and Russia as a country whose policy is not ruled by ephemeral considerations. Italy, like Turkey, is in favour here, and both Italy and Turkey are from time to time the subject of quite friendly reference in the press. The only other country of whom this can be said is Lithuania.

3. The "Izvestia" of the 19th August has a long article on the situation in Turkey with special reference to the formation of Fethy Bey's new party. The writer's main object is to warn Turkey against [illegible] and "this may be the simplest, but it is certainly the most [illegible] way to keep growing internal difficulties." He refers to the Rist report, the terms of which are not known but which is believed to involve the reorganisation of Turkish finances under the management of foreign experts. He repeats the now familiar allegation that the Kurdish insurrection was fomented by the imperialists in order to worsen Turkey's financial position and increase her need of a loan. He adds that even in the case of the Kurdish revolt in 1925 the Nationalist elements in Turkey were convinced the 1930 rebellion is having an opposite effect and is causing a split in the Kemalist ranks. He then warns the Turkish people against the danger of accepting a loan from imperialist sources, and points out that the Kuomintang party in China caused a split in the ranks [illegible] by its vacillating policy in the course of action. He concludes by expressing the hope that the Turkish people will be warned in time and by saying that while Soviet Russia has no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries, the present situation is one which statesmen must keep a watchful eye.

I have &c.
WILLIAM STRANG

Enclosure in No. 65

Extract from the "Izvestia" of August 21, 1930

Constantinople.

IN an interview with a Tass correspondent, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs said:

"I am very satisfied with the statement of Fethy Bey (leader of the new Opposition party) that there is no need for any change in the foreign policy of Turkey. This once more proves that the foreign policy laid down by Kemal Pasha is a really national and fruitful policy. Turkey's foreign policy is open and clear to all. Our foreign policy is agreements with other countries. From these documents it can be plainly seen what are the lines of our policy and [illegible] Anyone who has in his hands a collection of our agreements can see immediately what the position of Turkey is, and what her conduct will be in the international arena. If our foreign policy is devoid of any change, then our policy with the U.S.S.R. needs no [illegible]. It is hardly possible that there is one [illegible] after our policy with the U.S.S.R. Any new friendship with another country loses its value if we lose an old friendship. Our friendship with the U.S.S.R. is founded on a firm basis. At the end of September I intend to go to the U.S.S.R. in order to meet the Soviet leaders, and particularly the head of the Government M. Litvinoff, who is an old friend of mine, for the purpose of [illegible] the U.S.S.R. Personal meeting [illegible] [illegible] and clearing up every kind of problem.

"Our relations with the U.S.S.R. have been subjected to every [illegible] test [illegible] friendship has endured these tests. These relations can only [illegible] in the event of a change in the Government of the U.S.S.R. and in the event of a change in international affairs. But this is impossible. The general line of foreign policy of such countries as Turkey, U.S.S.R. and Italy does not [illegible]."

In the near future, negotiations for a new Persian trade agreement will be concluded. This agreement will strengthen our relations with Persia still more. The negotiations regarding the extermination of the Kurdish bands are not yet completed, but are being carried on in a friendly atmosphere. The question of the Russo-Persian frontier is in no way connected with these negotiations. This question was raised quite lately, and we consider it necessary that this question should be settled on the basis of exchange and of compensation.

With regard to the Japanese proposal, I can only say that we were not invited to take part in that conference and did not participate. Therefore does not interest us at all.

Stamboul, August 20, 1930

E 4752/2085/44 No. 67.

Sir H. Rumbold to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 712.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 27, 1930*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 661 of the 13th August, [illegible] contract between the Turkish Government and certain German firms for the supply of railway material, I have the honour to report that, according to the press, the transaction will be financed by the Gold Discount Bank (Goldiskontbank), although this bank has not yet received statutory authority to function as a special export bank.

Ten per cent. of the total value of the contract will be paid at once in cash, a further 25 per cent. on delivery of the material. The Gold Discount Bank will provide credit at a relatively low rate of interest for the remaining 65 per cent., which will be paid in reichsmarks.

The Deutsche Orientbank (the Turkish clearing agent) will [illegible] and probably [illegible] to the Gold Discount Bank. As the German firms concerned also endorse the bills and the Turkish undertakes an export credit guarantee of 60 per cent., the Gold Discount Bank scarcely runs any risk on its first transaction.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD

E 4748/1511/44 No. 68

Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 435)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 27, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 325 of the 20th instant, that Husrev Bey, the new Turkish Ambassador to Tehran, left for his post on the 25th instant. In a press interview at the moment of his departure Husrev Bey insisted that Irano-Persian affairs were quite friendly. He expressed [illegible] regarding [illegible] which would soon be settled to the satisfaction of both countries.

2. I subsequently had conversation with the Persian Chargé d'Affaires, who seemed to be in the best of humour. Said Khan expressed himself as much [illegible] against reports which have recently been appearing in the [illegible] press [illegible], he said, have no relation to actual facts. The [illegible] discussions were now proceeding quite amicably, and he hoped to reach a friendly agreement with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the next few days. The Persian Government had, as I have previously reported, proposed a [illegible] boundary so as to include the whole of Mount Ararat in Turkey and at the same time had suggested joint operations against the Kurds. The

Persian Government had successfully avoided replying to the former proposal and no reference had recently been made to it. Saed Khan doubted whether his Government could agree to cede territory, but thought that Husrev Bey would arrive at Tehran with instructions to use every effort to secure the desired frontier modifications.

3. In reply to the second proposal the Persian Government had definitely expressed its inability to agree to Turkish troops passing into Persia or Persian troops passing into Turkey. It had, however, proposed close collaboration with simultaneous operations on the two sides of the frontier and agreement on these lines would, Saed Khan hoped, be reached with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of the next few days.

4. Saed Khan thought that some 3,000 or 4,000 Kurds were at present more or less surrounded on Ararat. Though they were cut off from supplies and therefore living in privation, the Turkish Government had recently taken no action against them. Such action would be costly and General Winter would shortly give complete victory to the Turks. The latter might, when arrangements for Turco-Persian operation were complete and before the coming of winter, offer an amnesty to such Kurds as surrendered within a definite period and then execute those who did not in fact surrender as they descended with their flocks from the safety of the heights. All passes would be held by the Turkish troops on one side and by Persian on the other, and the liquidation of this particular Kurdish movement would then be complete.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
ALEXANDER HELM

E 4749/4749/44 No. 69

Mr. Helm to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 330)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 27, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that several naval visits are being paid during this month and next at Constantinople.

2. The Italian cruiser "Pisa," commanded by Captain Castracane, employed [illegible] ships for naval cadets, arrived in the Bosphorus on the 20th August and remained for a week. The usual visits and hospitalities were exchanged with the Turkish authorities. On the naval side these were confined to the Chief of the Naval Staff, as all units of the Turkish fleet, except the "Yavuz," which was in the floating dock, were on a cruise in the Black Sea. Amongst the officers of the "Pisa" was Sub-Lieutenant H.R.H. Prince Eugenio di Savoia, Duca d'Ancona, a nephew of the King of Italy.

3. The Apostolic Delegate paid his first visit of ceremony to a foreign man-of-war on this occasion, and I was saluted on his departure from the "Pisa" with seventeen guns.

4. Though the Italian Embassy gave the usual hospitality proper to these occasions, no extraordinary attention has been paid by the press to the visit and no political capital seems to have been made out of it.

5. On the 28th August, the sea-going training ship, "President Sarmiento" of the Argentine navy, is due to arrive for a visit of five or six days.

6. The Soviet cruiser, "Chervonaya Ukraina," accompanied by one or two destroyers, is expected here in September and thence will probably visit the Piraeus and Messina.

7. Ten Italian naval aeroplanes, commanded by Commander Fougier, will make a short stay in Constantinople early in September on their return from the International Aviation Meeting at Bucharest.

8. Finally, the new United States cruiser, "Chester," will arrive here on the 1st September for a visit of one week's duration.

I have, &c.
ALEXANDER HELM

E 4750/1686/44 No. 70.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

No. 337.

Sir, *Constantinople, August 28, 1930.*

WITH reference to Mr. Edmonds's despatch No. 98 of the 25th March last, I have the honour to report that the cruiser "Yavuz" has now entirely completed her refit.

2. I am informed by Captain Macdonald, the British representative on the Straits Commission, that, during the months that have elapsed since the steam trials reported in the despatch under reference, the new fire control installation has been furnished. This enabled gunnery trials to be carried out early this month, since when the vessel has again been placed on the floating dock (the operation being supervised by a Swedish expert) to enable a thorough examination to be made before the Turkish authorities could take the ship over from the contractors. The result being satisfactory, the vessel has been finally handed over to the Turks.

3. As to the cost of repairs, new material, &c., excluding expenditure on [illegible] ships at Golzak, amounted to £T.1,000, of which £T.636,000 represents the sum due to be paid to the French contractors. Actually to date rather less than half this amount has been received by the latter.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

E 4766/1611/44 No. 7

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 4, 4 p.m.)

(No. 415.)

Sir, *Tabriz, August 29, 1930.*

IN my telegram No. 194 of the 17th August I had the honour to inform you that, as far as it was possible to ascertain in Tehran, there appeared to be no foundation for the reports emanating from Russian or Constantinople correspondents of the occupation of Persian territory to the south-east of the main Ararat massif had been effected by Persian troops. At that date my information was based on a conversation with Menahem Shevket, the Turkish ex-Ambassador, and on a telegram from Ilchi, His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz. Articles later in the Persian Government issued in the Tehran press the somewhat belated *démenti* of which I have the honour to enclose a translation herewith.*

2. The reticence of the Persian Government, and the fact that hostilities are [illegible] practically confined to operations against Kurdish rebels, renders it extremely difficult to obtain reliable information on the course of events. His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz is necessarily dependent to a very great extent on the information supplied to him by the Officer Commanding in Azerbaijan. The [illegible] reports, some of which have also been reproduced in the Nauen wireless [illegible] which may conceivably be garbled versions of the brief incursion into Persian territory reported in Tabriz telegram No. 20 of the 29th July of which I enclose a copy herewith,* all emanate from Constantinople. If, therefore, the situation were as unexceptionable as it is depicted in the Persian *démenti*, one would naturally suppose that the Turkish Government would have taken steps to deny these [illegible] rumours, unless, indeed, it is their policy to utilise them as a sort of *ballon d'essai* for [illegible] measures which they may later be forced to take. The Persian Government, on the other hand, may well have felt that, in view of the absence of independent [illegible] the simplest method of dealing with an embarrassing situation was to [illegible]. They waited five days before publishing their *démenti*, and as the Shafagh-i-Surkh" pointed out on the day following its issue, it was [illegible] to be expected that the Persian press should ignore the reports of foreign agencies long as the Government withheld the more reliable information which they alone could supply if they chose. The official warning appears, however, to have been

* Not printed.

[illegible] the "Messager de Téhéran" in its issue of the 15th August took [illegible] translate the [illegible] sentence [illegible] message, which ran:

"Wie [illegible] Blätter aus [illegible] melden, wird in [illegible] türkischen Kreisen nach wie vor die Ansicht vertreten, [illegible] operierenden türkischen Truppen auf persischem Gebiet stattfanden."

"[illegible] de [illegible] que les [illegible] turcs sont [illegible] l'entreprise [illegible] les [illegible] turques sur le territoire persan."

[illegible] Turks [illegible] attributes [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] R. H. CLIVE.

[illegible] N. 71

[illegible]

[illegible] their [illegible] Kurds [illegible] 3,000 [illegible]

[illegible] 200 [illegible] Turkish [illegible] 4,000 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Turkish shares [illegible] 10,000 [illegible] the Kurds being [illegible] Turks [illegible] employ [illegible] aeroplanes [illegible] rebels. The Kurds [illegible] captured from the Turks [illegible]

[illegible] troops [illegible]

The Turks [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] which has now received [illegible] Turkey [illegible] on account of [illegible] frontier [illegible] Persian [illegible] Ararat [illegible] the Turkish [illegible] Embassy in Teheran is assisted with the attaché [illegible] Major [illegible] who has to some extent [illegible] Kurdish [illegible] Persian [illegible] He holds strong views [illegible] represented in [illegible] matter of principle [illegible] and is [illegible]

It may be that the [illegible] intend to occupy the area of the Kara Dagh [illegible] the Persians to agree to [illegible] Ararat [illegible] the Persians [illegible]

[illegible] Persian [illegible] Persians [illegible] 1909 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Enclosure 2 in No 72.

Consul Palmer to Sir R Clive

(No 147 Confidential)

Sir *Tabriz, August* 12, 1930

I HAVE the honour to report that severe fighting took place on or about the 9th August near the Turkish frontier not far from Maku, between Persian troops and the Dasht Kards, whom the Persians had ordered to prevent crossing to Mount Ararat

2. No doubt the Kurds suffered losses, but those of the Persians are reported to be 100 men and four officers killed

3. The death of one member (an Armenian named Aghast, who was known by my second clerk) is beyond dispute

4. The Persian military are trying to conceal their losses, so that I cannot well ask them questions, and the gendarmerie has in any case been at Maku for the last few days

5. 250 troops had recently been sent to Maku from here, and 200 more left yesterday

Three field guns, six mountain guns and ten machine guns have also been sent there between the 10th and 11th August

6. It is generally stated here that the Persian conscripts are no match for the Kurds

7. Copy to His Majesty's Embassy, Angora, and His Majesty's High Commissioner, Baghdad

I have &
STANHOPE PALMER

Enclosure 3 in No 72

Consul Palmer to Sir R Clive

(No 151)

Sir *Tabriz, August* 19, 1930

I HAVE the honour to give some details obtained by Mr Andreasoff from a man who left Maku a few days ago.

Northern Area

2. To understand what appears to be happening I must first venture upon a few geographical "explanations" which I hope will prove helpful in explaining the Turkish strategy.

3. The name of Arabik is confusing. There is a village of that name marked on the map as near the River Araxes, but the same name Arabik is more usually applied to the entire plain running from near Igdir, south eastwards between the two Ararats and the river

4. The Turks appear to have two main objects

(a) To drive the Kurds into Persia, where the Persians are expected to deal with them.

(b) To obtain the Ararats district in the process of the move[illegible]

5. The Persian forces appear to be on a line stretching from Igdir to Bayezid, with a detached force at Dilman and several posts in the Arabik plain.

Maku itself was therefore, surrounded on three sides at least, though not very effectively on the north side, while patrols appear to have maintained touch occasionally between Bayezid and Arabik. The town of Bayezid itself was not however, in question as Turkish occupation according to most reports.

6. Apparently the Turkish commander realised that his posts in the Arabik plain were not strong enough and it is now alleged that [illegible] Russian co-operation.

7. About the third week in [illegible] Russian troops [illegible] Bayezid, Alexandropol and Kars [illegible] Russian troops [illegible] to be proof of this assertion

8. The Russian headquarters of the Armenian Soviet army is at Alexandropol (now Leninakan), and from that point there are forty-five posts spread along the River Arpa Chai to Arpa, its confluence with the River Araxes, and then along the River Araxes as far as Meghri in the Chapar mountains. Six Zogour Cavalry, in troops of 20 to 25 men, patrol between each pair of posts, while all fords on these rivers are guarded by sentries with rifle and machine-guns to watch. Data to hand, watch-dogs are chained at night.

9. The Russian forces in Armenia are said to be practically all cavalry, numbering from 9,000 to 10,000 men. They are also said to have two mysterious spots near Devalu (supposed to be artillery concentrations or "dumps") which recently no one has been allowed to approach.

10. The Turks clearly obtained at least an assurance of careful watch upon the Russian zone from the Russians, even if they did not actually secure the help referred to in paragraph 7 above.

11. The Turkish "drive" from Bayezid reported in my No 145 of the 11th August (paragraph 5), had not proved entirely successful, though it probably led to the Perso-Kurdish skirmish of the 9th August reported in my No 149. The troops of the Arabik posts next made an attack on or about the 5th August. They are reported to me as having been repulsed, lost their original posts and been chased over the Araxes, as reported in my despatch No 149 (paragraph 12).

12. I am told from another source, that Fevzi Pasha, Chief of the Turkish Staff, [illegible] operations.

13. It will be remembered that General Zeki Doguk took over soon after the operations began in June that he considered it was the Turks might occupy Arabik but that they could not hold it for long. This opinion at the time

Urfa

14. My informant does not believe that the Turkish Frontier Commission has yet put in its appearance.

15. The Persians have a long frontier to hold, as the Kurds not only attempt to break through towards Maku and Bashkish, but also turn south along the frontier for several miles in search of an unguarded spot.

Southern Zone

16. [illegible] Persians are represented to me as having established a cordon from Sauj Bolak to Saks.

17. Copy has been sent to His Majesty's Embassy at Angora (via Bayezid) and to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have &
STANHOPE PALMER

E 4851/107/44, No 73

Sir G Clerk to Mr A Henderson (Received September 8)

No 310

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 4, 1930

IN continuation of my telegram No 235 of yesterday from Angora, I have the honour to report that last evening I exchanged with the Minister for Foreign Affairs ratifications of the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Treaty which was signed at Angora on the 1st May, 1930.

2. I handed to him the Turkish instrument of ratification together with the [illegible] between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself,* to the [illegible] agreed by his Excellency and myself was an exact [illegible] English document.

3. At the same time I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegrams No 31 of the 30th May and [illegible] application by virtue of

* Not printed

article 37 of the treaty, of the stipulations of the treaty to certain British Colonies and Protectorates. Certified copies of this notification and of the Turkish Government's acknowledgment will be forwarded to you in due course.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Certificate of Exchange.

THE undersigned, having met together for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty between His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic, to regulate the commercial relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and such other territories under the sovereignty, protection or authority of His Britannic Majesty as he may desire should be bound by the treaty on the one side, and Turkey on the other side, signed at Ankara on the 1st day of March, 1930, and the respective ratifications of the said treaty having been carefully compared and found to be exactly conformable to each other, the said exchange took place this day in the usual form.

In witness whereof they have signed the present certificate and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

Done at Ankara, the third day of September, 1930.

GEORGE R. CLERK. DR. T. RUSTU.

E 4853/1058/44

No. 71

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 343.)

Sir,

Constantinople, September 4, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to your telegram No. 41 of the 28th June, that last evening I effected with the Minister for Foreign Affairs an exchange of notes to provide for the reciprocal grant, as between India and Turkey, of most-favoured nation treatment in matters of trade and commerce pending the negotiation and conclusion of a commercial treaty between the two countries.

2. Copies of the notes exchanged, as well as a translation of the Turkish note,* are enclosed herein. Apart from the insertion, as authorised by your telegram No. 53 of the 12th ultimo, of a clause relative to residence and travel, the texts of the notes are identical with those which were finally approved in your telegram under reference.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 74.

Sir G. Clerk to Dr. Tevfik Rustu Bey.

British Embassy in Turkey,
September 3, 1930.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, pending the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty regulating the commercial relations of the two countries, the Government of India, in order to avoid any impediment to the trade and commerce between India and Turkey on the lapse of the *modus vivendi* brought into force by

* Translation of Turkish note only printed.

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an exchange of notes on the 2nd July, 1929, to which India adhered on the 1st August, 1929, undertake, on condition of reciprocity, to accord, as from the expiration of the above-mentioned *modus vivendi*, to goods the produce or manufacture of Turkey a treatment in India which shall be as favourable in all respects as that accorded to goods the produce or manufacture of the most favoured foreign country. This treatment shall be accorded in all matters of commerce and navigation and as regards importation, exportation and transit, and, in general, all that concerns customs duties and formalities and commercial operations.

2. It is understood that the treatment of the most favoured foreign country stipulated in the preceding paragraph will not embrace the special advantages which are or may in the future be accorded in customs matters by Turkey to countries detached from the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923.

3. In India and in the territories under the administration of the Government of India Turkish nationals, and in Turkey nationals of British India and of territories under the administration of the Government of India, will have the right to travel freely, to establish themselves and to acquire moveable and immoveable property under the same conditions as the nationals of the most favoured foreign country.

4. The undertakings contained in this note will take effect as from the expiration of the *modus vivendi* mentioned in paragraph 1 above, and will remain in force for a period of six months at least, it being understood that the undertakings may be terminated by either party by giving three months' notice at the end of the third month or at any time subsequently. Failing such notice and subject to the foresaid right of termination they will remain in operation until the entry into force of the treaty of commerce which is now to be negotiated, as from which date they will [illegible].

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 74.

Dr. Tevfik Rustu Bey to Sir G. Clerk.

Translation.

Your Excellency,

Angora, September 3, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, pending the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty regulating the commercial relations between Turkey and India, the Government of the Turkish Republic, in order to avoid any impediment to the trade and commerce between the two countries on the lapse of the *modus vivendi* brought into force by an exchange of notes on the 2nd July, 1929, to which India adhered on the 1st August, 1929, undertake, on condition of reciprocity, to accord, as from the expiration of the above-mentioned *modus vivendi*, to goods the produce or manufacture of India a treatment in Turkey which shall be as favourable in all respects as that accorded to goods the produce or manufacture of the most favoured foreign country. This treatment shall be accorded in all matters of commerce and navigation and as regards importation, exportation and transit, and in general all that concerns customs duties and formalities and commercial operations.

2. It is understood that the treatment of the most favoured foreign country stipulated in the preceding paragraph will not embrace the special advantages which are or may in the future be accorded in customs matters by Turkey to countries detached from the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923.

3. In India and in the territories under the administration of the Government of India Turkish nationals and in Turkey nationals of British India and of territories under the administration of the Government of India, will have the right to travel, freely, to establish themselves and to acquire moveable and immoveable property under the same conditions as the nationals of the most favoured foreign country.

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third month or at any time subsequently. Failing such notice and subject to the aforesaid right of termination they will remain in operation until the entry into force of the treaty of commerce which is now to be negotiated, as from which date they will *ipso facto* cease to be effective.

I avail, &c.
DR. T. RUSTU.

E 4854/3476/44 No. 75.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 347.)
Sir,

Constantinople, September 4, 1930.

THERE have been few developments of importance in the political situation since Mr. Helm's despatch [illegible] No. 347 [illegible] [illegible] ed in completing its organisation one or two more [illegible] the local newspapers have been full of alleged declarations [illegible] friendly, especially since it became clear that Ismet Pasha was not prepared to abandon power without a fight.

2. The Prime Minister took the field on the 30th ultimo, when, on the occasion [illegible] ing of the Sivas Railway, he delivered what can [illegible] A much condensed summary of the latter is enclosed herein.

By a press which is now not as sure as it was that [illegible] has day is over, the speech was received with almost unanimous approval. It dealt very carefully in generalities and may be convincing to the Turkish mind, but the Prime Minister's arguments can be torn to shreds by an intelligent and informed person who submits them to a critical examination. Whether Fethi Bey has the desire or the ability to do this remains to be seen.

3. I have only just returned from Angora as the [illegible] is leaving, and I therefore propose to defer my general observations upon the situation until next week, as time does not allow me to write at any length now, and I felt that any expression of my views before I had been in contact with Government circles in Angora would be of little value.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 75.

Note respecting a Speech by Ismet Pasha.

ON the 30th August, 1930, the eighth anniversary of the final victory over the Greeks, the railway station at Sivas was formally opened. There is now, therefore [illegible] Sivas [illegible] new railways [illegible] Minister [illegible] Some [illegible] occasion.

Ismet [illegible] the opportunity [illegible] speech in defence of his railway policy, which has been much criticised in recent months. He said that the occasion rewarded him for years of trial and fatigue. The railway was the result of purely Turkish labour, its completion was a mile-stone on the road to national development, and it was in no sense the nightmare which it had been painted.

Ismet Pasha then described the genesis of the railway programme. [illegible] national necessity had insisted upon the construction of railways, for their absence had cost the country thousands of lives and much treasure. The short Konia line had proved its value in the national struggle, and, even in the darkest days when all seemed lost, the new Government had announced its intention of prolonging the [illegible] Railway to the Kizil Irmak. One of the ideas behind the retention of Angora as capital had been the development of a national railway system. And yet [illegible] was not the centre of Anatolia. Sivas was, and it had taken [illegible] In another seven years there would be railway communication with the

remotest frontiers of the country. The defence, the unity, the very independence of the country had necessitated the construction of railways, and nobody could pretend that it could be delayed. In sixty years the Government of the Sultan had built 2,300 miles of railway, all belonging to foreigners. The Government of the speaker had built and paid for half that mileage in [illegible] years. The country had had to make sacrifices, but these were [illegible].

Ismet Pasha next set out to prove that the [illegible] construction of the last ten years was impossible by other means than Turkish [illegible]. The collapse of the Chester project had proved that foreign capital was unobtainable. Fethi Bey, who now criticised him, had discovered this when he was Prime Minister in 1925, and [illegible] was aware at Lausanne that the Powers hoped to recover through their financiers much of what they had surrendered in the treaty. He had to choose between construction by the State and national extinction. The result was evident, and, even so, the peasants no longer had the burden of the tithe. He had concentrated [illegible] necessities, and every kilometre of new railway built was a step forward that helped the country. He himself had not been in favour of the purchase of the Anatolian Railway, but he had been persuaded by his colleagues and by Fethi Bey. He was now glad that he had done so, and he must for ever insist that all the railways remain the absolute property of the State. With national necessities in mind, he could not agree to the settlement of the Public Debt question till 1928, and even then he found that the sacrifices which he was prepared to make were too much. The burden had, in fact, proved unbearable.

With foreign political questions and the Ottoman Debt unsettled till 1929, how could foreign capital possibly come to the country? Was it wrong not to wait or to build 1,800 kilom. of railway before foreign capital was ready to come? That was the criticism levelled against him to-day, and he thought he had proved his case. [illegible] the criticisms that the Turkish-built railways had [illegible] of the contracts with the Swedish and other groups [illegible] was putting too heavy a burden on the present generation. As regards the latter, the annual Public Works budget was £T. 30 million. Turkey would not, however, be adequately equipped with roads and railways unless she spent this sum annually for a century. The probability was that future generations would have to pay more.

Much capital having been made by the Opposition out of the Müller report, Ismet Pasha pointed out that it was not a criticism of his policy. Herr Müller had said that Turkey's financial difficulties were due to two factors: expenditure on railways and [illegible]. But these things were essential to the national existence; they were not a policy, but facts that must be faced if Turkey was to survive. The report was thus not a criticism of Ismet's policy. The Government was going steadily towards [illegible] the wasp. Thanks to the railways [illegible] a [illegible] of purely Turkish [illegible] and improving her economic position.

Ismet Pasha said that [illegible] could to-day obtain the loan of £10 million, but at what price? By mortgaging the people's railways, which were worth £[illegible] million, [illegible] of foreign [illegible] country would curse the authors of such [illegible].

Ismet Pasha next replied to his critics in regard to monopolies by proving that the latter are not only necessary but profitable to the Government. The [illegible] monopoly now gave to the Treasury five times more than it did when exploited [illegible] difference of £T. 20 million went to the construction [illegible] the Treasury and [illegible] of the port monopoly, had killed many base foreign [illegible] could be changed in form as necessity demanded just as [illegible] administration were being daily modernised after careful [illegible].

Instead [illegible] having led the country into a blind alley, it had been a [illegible] those who said that foreign capital could not enter the country [illegible]. Capital would only enter a country which was stable and strong [illegible] railways were bringing Turkey to this state. Thanks to improved communications, troubles in the eastern provinces were only half as important as they were five years ago, and to-day no inhabitant of Turkey, in which none but Turks had a right to a national existence, could be influenced by any intrigue. The Sivas

Railway had been one of His great ambitions. It had been realised, and militarily Turkey was twice as strong as she had been. Her forces had become more mobile and invasion could be defeated with half the losses which would previously have been incurred.

Having stated that he did not want power for power's sake, Ismet Pasha said he would be glad to rest if and when he lost the confidence of the nation, but he would not retire in face of difficulties. He concluded by paying a warm tribute to the Turkish brains and labour which had brought the railway into being and to the Gazi whose illustrious name I wished not to mention in the midst of political discussions, but whose guiding hand was necessary for the completion of this great task, which might have been beyond the powers of a Government.

E 4975/3476/44] No. 76.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received September 15.*)

No. 349.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 4, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on my return from leave recently, I went to Angora to visit the Foreign Minister.

2. The day before I saw his Excellency he had received the Prime Minister of Iraq and he expressed himself to me as thoroughly satisfied with his conversation with Nuri Pasha. I have recorded in a separate despatch Nuri Pasha's account of what passed at the meeting.

3. While I have been away it would seem that the possibility of a Russo-Turkish-Italian Naval Agreement has become very present to the minds of some of my colleagues, induced possibly by the noticeably close relations that now exist between the Italian and Soviet Embassies at Angora. My French colleague was indeed moved by repeated rumours of such a pact to ask Tevfik Rustu point blank whether it had, or was likely to have any existence. Tevfik Rustu replied that it was true that both Russia and Italy had more than hinted at such a combination, but he had definitely turned it down and intended to retain that attitude. His Excellency did not mention the matter directly to me, but I have little doubt that it was in his mind for he took care to explain that during his forthcoming visit to Moscow his official conversations would be entirely confined to the three questions of disarmament, Pan-Europa, and Persia, and a more domestic discussion of the practice and progress of the Five Years Plan.

4. Throughout the interview Tevfik Rustü was more than usually cordial even when I had spoken to him somewhat insistently about the Greek proposal to the Mediterranean fleet—see my telegram No. 81—but I had felt all through that he was battling something up, and at the end of the interview out it came. His Excellency suddenly said to me that M. Rist, "whom," he added, "we only asked here on *your* insistence," in typical Tevfik Rusta shift—wanted to enslave Turkey to France and leave her without a vestige of financial or economic independence. M. Rist's report was a remarkably able document, and his suggestions were clothed in a most admirable form, but that was what they amounted to, and the author must have taken away from Angora a very poor opinion of the intelligence of the Turkish Government. However, no decision would be taken as to the Turkish rejoinder until the return of the Minister of Finance from Switzerland. (Saraoglu Sukri Bey came on to Constantinople from Angora to-day or to-morrow.) I contented myself with observing that, as I had not seen the report, I could express no opinion nor take any useful discussion. But my impression of M. Rist had been that he had realised very fully Turkey's difficulties and Turkey's determination to keep her independence, and I should be very much surprised if I did not find that these factors had been fully taken into account in his report. Tevfik Rustu assented that M. Rist was the Gazi's Oracle and that he himself had not been at all surprised for the report set forth exactly the policy of France towards this country as he had always known it to be.

I have &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 4976/1932/93] No. 77.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received September 15.*)

No. 351.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 4, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that General Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, passed through Turkey this week on his return to Bagdad.

2. Unfortunately, I was only able to see Nuri Pasha at Constantinople before his visits to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ismet Pasha at Angora, and to the Gazi at Yalova, as I had to go to the capital on the day his Excellency returned from there, and he had to leave for Bagdad before I could get back to Constantinople, but a member of my staff found him very pleased with his reception.

3. Nuri Pasha said that three main questions had been discussed:

(1) *Mosul Oilfields.*—Nuri Pasha had said that he had seen the Turkish note handed in by the Ambassador in London and told the Turks frankly that it was quite unconvincing. He pointed out that Iraq's interest in the exploitation of the oilfields was nine times as great as the Turkish and that real efforts were being made to develop the oilfields as soon as possible. He knew that the question was still under consideration and thought that there was some question of making an extra payment, but he hoped to know more definitely in a few days. Nuri Pasha got the impression that the Turks did not care in the least about the *tracé* of the pipe-line, realising as they did that the French were pushing the northern, just as the British desired the southern.

(2) *Frontier.*—The Turks had told him that they had been entirely [illegible] about the Iraq Kurdish policy and general attitude on frontier questions since 1926. Nuri Pasha pointed out that the last thing the Iraq Government desired was trouble on the frontier, and gave quite definite assurances that no Kurdish intrigues would be encouraged. The Turks [illegible] to the Barzan incident, Nuri Pasha pointed out that the Iraq Government had themselves decided to deal this year with the Sheikh of Barzan, had for three years raised the question at meetings of the Permanent Frontier Commission and had definite proof that the Sheikh had received arms and supplies, if not from the Turkish Government, then from Turkish sources independent thereof. He, Nuri Pasha, was only too anxious to put an end to the intrigues of the sheikh and had contemplated approaching the Turkish Government with a view to the latter holding the frontier on one side while the Iraq Government dealt with the sheikh on the other. It was now too late for action to be taken this year, but if the trouble continued he would probably make proposals to the Turkish Government in this sense next spring.

(3) *Commercial Treaty.*—The Turks were anxious to complete this as soon as possible. Nuri Pasha said that he was, too. Agreement would probably be reached, as regards the judicial convention, in the next month. The Turks had now proposed to him that the commercial treaty should also include residence clauses. He had replied that he was not competent to discuss this, but that they might make the proposal through the usual channels.

Nuri Pasha had asked the Turks what they thought of the new treaty. The reply was that the Labour Government had done two of the best things that had been done by the British Government since the war. By the conclusion of the Naval Treaty and of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The Turks were [illegible] the latter [illegible] had been [illegible] the French [illegible] Nuri Pasha that the French had suggested that the Turkish press should criticise the treaty in the direction of showing that [illegible] Iraq in the British Empire. The Turks had replied that they could not dream of doing this [illegible] considered the treaty to be an excellent thing, not only for Turkey but for Iraq, and Tevfik Rustu Bey indicated that, at a suitable moment, he would have articles inserted in the Turkish press in a sense favourable to the treaty. Nuri Pasha [illegible] appreciated this indication, for a favourable attitude towards the treaty would be very valuable to him in Bagdad.

The Turks had asked Nuri Pasha what Great Britain's attitude towards Turkey. They realised that British [illegible] towards Turkey [illegible] thought this could not [illegible] Nuri Pasha pointed out that it was perhaps best for the Turks to show reasonableness in the hope that Lawrence and the Arabs would [illegible] He gathered the impression that the Turks were still pretty well tied up with Russia.

In this conversation Nuri Pasha had also referred to the Lawrence reports and pointed out what absurd reports they were. He had himself seen and talked with Colonel Lawrence in London and the latter had been most amused at hearing these reports. The Turks had replied that they did not believe in the [illegible] the Lawrence reports which, at the beginning had emanated from French sources [illegible] way as the first reports of Lawrence [illegible] in Aleppo a few months ago. The Turks had [illegible] that [illegible] was doing her utmost to prevent [illegible] the [illegible] cordial relations between Turkey and Great Britain and Iraq.

4. When I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday he at once expressed satisfaction at Nuri Pasha's visit and said that he was quite satisfied as regards [illegible] attitude towards the Kurds.

5. With respect to the oil question, his Excellency was clearly much perturbed at the thought that the delay in exploiting the oil diminishes by so much the twenty-five years during which Turkey is to receive her 10 per cent. of the profits under the Treaty of Angora. It is of course the case that the twenty five years start from the coming into force of the treaty, but Tevfik Rustu certainly expected exploitation to begin within a year or two of that date. I have had the advantage of reading your despatch No. 530 of the 1st instant the very [illegible] and I hope that it will soothe Tevfik Rustu's [illegible] political disadvantage to our relations with Turkey [illegible] anything which the Turks will be all too ready to misrepresent as a deliberate intention to put on us as long as possible the day when [illegible] must start. The fact that, as the positions were [illegible] is just what the Turks would do themselves will not affect the Turkish point of view.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

P.S.—I have sent a copy of this despatch to the acting High Commissioner at Baghdad.

G. R. C.

E 4977/604/44 No. 78

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 564)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 10, 1930.*

With reference to my despatch No. 341 of the 4th instant, in which I reported the exchange of ratifications of the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Treaty of the 1st March, 1930, I have the honour to report that I have now received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note, dated the 8th instant, in reply to that which, as stated in my despatch under reference, I addressed to Tevfik Rustu Bey regarding the application of the stipulations of the treaty to certain British colonies and protectorates.

2. In accordance with the desire expressed in your telegram No. 37 of the 18th June to Angora, certified copies of my notification and of the acknowledgment of the Minister for Foreign Affairs are enclosed herein.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 78

Sir G. Clerk to Ler. Tevfik Rustü Bey.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, le 3 septembre 1930.*

D'ORDRE du Secrétaire principal d'Etat de Sa Majesté aux Affaires étrangères, j'ai l'honneur de notifier au Gouvernement de la République turque conformément à l'article 37 du Traité anglo-turc de Commerce et de Navigation, signé le 1er mars écoulé, le désir de Sa Majesté britannique que les dispositions de ce traité s'appliquent

La Barbade,	Barbados
Les îles Bermudes,	Bermuda
La Côte-d'Or britannique,	British Guiana
L'île de Ceylan	Ceylon
L'île de Chypre,	Cyprus
Les établissements des détroits	Straits Settlements and Dependencies
La Gambie (colonie et protectorat),	Gambia (Colony and Protectorate)
La Côte-d'Or,	Gold Coast
(a) La Colonie,	(a) Colony
(b) Ashanti,	(b) Ashanti
(c) Territoires du Nord,	(c) Northern Territories,
(d) Togoland britannique,	(d) British Togoland
La Jamaïque,	Jamaica
La Jamaïque y inclus les îles Turques et Caïques et Caïman),	Jamaica (including Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands)
L'île Maurice	Mauritius
L'île Malte	Malta
Le Nigéria	Nigeria
(a) Colonie,	(a) Colony
(b) Protectorat,	(b) Protectorate
(c) Cameroons britanniques,	(c) British Cameroons,
Bornéo du Nord,	North Borneo.
Rhodésie du Nord,	Northern Rhodesia.
Protectorat de Nyasaland,	Nyasaland Protectorate.
Les îles Seychelles,	Seychelles.
Straits Settlements,	Straits Settlements.
L'île de la Trinité,	Trinidad.
Les îles du Vent : soit	Windward Islands :—
Grenade,	Grenada.
Sainte-Lucie	St. Lucia
Saint Vincent.	St. Vincent.

J'saisis, &
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Certified a true copy of the original
(L.S.) H. ASHLEY CLARKE, *Secretary.*

Constantinople, September 10, 1930.

Enclosure 2 in No. 78

Tevfik Rustu Bey to Sir G. Clerk.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Ankara, le 8 septembre 1930.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence avait bien voulu m'adresser en date du 3 septembre 1930.

En réponse, je tiens à vous faire savoir que les dispositions nécessaires ont été prises à l'effet d'assurer, sur la condition de réciprocité, l'extension du Traité de

Commerce et de Navigation turco-anglais, signé le 1er mars 1930, aux territoires mentionnés dans la susdite note.

Veuillez, &c.
DR. T. RÜSTÜ.

Certified a true copy of the original
(L.S.) H. ASHLEY CLARKE, *Secretary.*

Constantinople, September 10, 1930.

[E 4978/3476/44] No. 79

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 355.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 8, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 347 of the 4th instant, enclosing a summary of Ismet Pasha's speech at Sivas, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the substance of Fethi Bey's reply, delivered at Smyrna last week, and a note of the press criticisms thereon.*

2. Fethi Bey's speech is restricted in scope possibly owing to the unfortunate incidents which followed upon his arrival at Smyrna last Thursday, and wisely endeavours to keep the differences between the Popular party and himself on the plane of ideas. As a fighting speech it is little calculated to rouse enthusiasm, but the time has not yet come for vote-catching. The elections are not due until next year and the place for more direct criticism and for inspiring hostility to the policy of the new party will be during the next session of the National Assembly, which starts at the end of October.

3. Great local interest has naturally been aroused by the enthusiasm which greeted Fethi Bey on his arrival at Smyrna. I should imagine that both he and the local authorities were surprised by the size of the crowds, and general attention appears to be focussed on the question whether the Government will succeed in keeping Fethi Bey's supporters in check. It is clear that even the Ismet Pasha party was largely due to the popularity of the Gazi, and it is not yet possible to say what proportion of the local electorate will vote with the Opposition.

4. The attitude of Fethi Bey seems to have been correct and tactful, and the reports of the Government papers, while trying to belittle the size and enthusiasm of the demonstrations have been, Turkey being what it is, remarkable for their moderation. It is noteworthy that the first care of Ismet Pasha, after hearing of the events in Smyrna, was, while insisting that order must be maintained, to give instructions that Fethi Bey was to be afforded full and free opportunity to set forth publicly his policy and his criticisms of the Government. Every effort is indeed being made by the leaders on both sides to maintain their political differences on the highest level and the Government is so far treating Opposition more than fair full freedom to the Opposition to express its views.

5. How long this happy state of things will last, it is impossible to say. The Government has hitherto felt that it could afford to be magnanimous, but the Smyrna demonstrations must have come as an unexpected shock, and if the example is followed in other parts of the country the hand of repression may again be raised.

6. Still too much importance must not be attached to the Smyrna incident. Constantinople can have been further hit, but it was primarily derived from what might be called the transit business—shipping agencies, banking, warehousing, transport. Smyrna itself, for the most part, is wealthy Turkish and Smyrniote Greek, and in order to hit the Greek principally Fethi Bey's supporters would have to attack Greek or foreign property. It is true that a few Turks in Smyrna have benefited by the Greek exchange, and have confiscated Greek properties for a tenth or less of their value, but on the whole Smyrna has had little reason to bless the new régime and for five years has had no opportunity to voice its grievances, the more so since many of the Ministers and of the most important Deputies come from Smyrna, and the party discipline there has been especially strong. It is therefore natural that when Fethi Bey arrived to lead

* Not printed.

his new gospel, and arrived, as the Smyrniotes must have thought, with the blessing of the Gazi, voice should be given to long-suppressed discontent. Whether Fethi Bey will, in the course of the coming session of the Assembly, show himself possessed of a political programme that offers a real remedy for the grievances of the people and capable of creating by constitutional means a party that will carry the country at the next elections remains to be seen.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 4979/3476/44] No. 80

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 15.)

No. 356.

Sir, *Constantinople, September 10, 1930.*

IN my despatch No. 355 of the 8th instant I had the honour to report the latest developments of the Opposition movement initiated by Fethi Bey.

2. Since my return recently from leave I have been trying to get at the real meaning and importance of this event, but I confess I find it very difficult to present you with a connected story, for much of it is guesswork and there are many cross currents, but I hazard the following picture, confused though it is, as possibly not being very far from the truth.

3. For some time the Gazi has been chafing at Ismet Pasha's policy, and last autumn matters nearly came to a head. Fethi Bey was here at the time and, though professing an ordinary leave, was ready, and indeed expected, to be called to the presidency of the Council. Faced, however, with the situation that would arise if Ismet Pasha suddenly fell from power, with important questions, such as the settlement of the debt and the Turco-Greek negotiations, left in the air, the Gazi gave way, but the crisis was only closed for the time.

4. Since then Ismet Pasha has developed his insistence on the constitutional nature of the Turkish State. The Gazi represents, but the Government governs. It was in this spirit that, when the Gazi left Angora for the south to savour Ismet Pasha kept all the Ministers at the capital and insisted on Turkish representatives abroad, when they came on leave, going to Angora to report there before seeing the Gazi.

5. Another and quite recent development, which may well have arisen from a fear among Ismet Pasha's stanchest supporters that a clash between the Gazi and Ismet and the downfall of one of them is inevitable, has been that some of the more far-seeing of the Turkish politicians have admitted to themselves that perhaps the Gazi's work is done. Being the Gazi, he can never in this country hold any other position than that of President of the Republic, but he cannot, like Marshal Pilsudski, retire from his lofty pedestal to the political arena. Thus some minds could even foresee a crisis to hold that it would not be so great a disaster to the country if one of the Gazi's drinking parties ended in his sudden demise. I do not mean that there has ever been any suggestion or idea of assassination, but some of these men have a feeling that the Gazi is too young and energetic to remain content to be a figure head while his terrific energy in the administration of the State can only hamper the constitutional development of the country.

6. But the present issue of a licence to an open and "official" Opposition is mainly due to two other factors. Under the existing régime all debate and discussion takes place in the meetings of the People's party. Decisions are taken there by majority vote, and party discipline exacts that thereafter in the Assembly itself there shall be unanimity. During last winter criticism grew in volume at the party meetings, and some of the leaders must have foreseen that even party discipline could not control the proceedings in the Assembly. Since, then, opposition, though its sets purpose existed, and must one day inevitably find voice, possibly a belief that it would lead to riot, if not to revolution, it was clearly desirable to control its every move. Moreover, the Government could not expect to live for ever as the Government is now constituted in the country, its disappearance would mean chaos and the power in the hands of the most successful and loudest-voiced mob orator. From what Tevfik Rüstü has told me himself it seems clear that some members of the Government asked Ismet whether it would not therefore be better

to foster an official Opposition, the members of which would be as imbued with republican ideals as the present Government. Public opinion would be placated by having a legitimate channel for criticism, and at the same time a potential Government would be over the administration of the country smoothly and constitutionally so that in the course of nature the present Government party would disappear or would be being trained.

2. Considerable support of this idea among the responsible leaders of the People's party. The Gazi was fully aware and more the increasing weight of Ismet Pasha and at the same time hearing more and more of the criticisms of the Government that were finding voice. Moreover, it is natural to suppose that he, too, mused to the day when he would no longer be here to guide the country. Both factors would almost inevitably lead him to consider the advantage of encouraging the institution of a reasoned Opposition.

3. This summer the differences between the Gazi and Ismet Pasha increased and came to a head during the presence here of both Fethi Bey and General Kemaletin Satir Pasha, Ambassador in Berlin. I have it from a very confidential and trustworthy source that the quarrel between the Gazi and Ismet Pasha went so far that the Gazi asked Kemaletin whether he would replace either Ismet Pasha or Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff, a proposal which the general wisely declined for it was proudly only a 'boutade' or the President in a fit of irritation but the Gazi returned to the charge as regards Fethi Bey. Ismet finally refused to give Fethi his place to Fethi Bey except constitutionally. Fethi Bey became a member of the National Assembly and built up his own political party to obtain the votes of the majority of the electors. Although probably the Gazi's position in the country is great enough for him to have carried the day had he assisted, he apparently decided not to do so, whether because he felt that he would be risking his own position too much if, as was probable, [illegible] or from a genuine respect for the Constitution, it is impossible to say. In any case, he accepted the position, and the result was the creation of the Liberal Republican party.

4. As for the prospects of that party, it is difficult to prophesy. The events at Smyrna last Thursday and Friday show that there is a place for it in the body politic. Fethi Bey and wisely led, it might well develop into a serious and effective Opposition ready and fit, when the time comes, to take over the government of the country. It is, however, handicapped by the circumstances of its birth and has, in public opinion, unfortunately started on the wrong set of rails. Fethi Bey himself, I hear, now feels that he would have done better to have resigned his Embassy and sought election as a Deputy first and then have started his opposition in the Assembly itself. Moreover, he has not been too fortunate in the associates whom he has chosen or who have been thrust upon him, to build up and direct the new party. Hamdi Bey, the secretary-general of the party, is the Gazi's greatest friend and his appointment can be, and doubtless by many has been, read as a measure of the Gazi's direct interest in the party. But Nuri's reputation is not of the best, and his influence over and constant association with the Gazi have long been deplored by the most decent elements in Turkey. When Fethi Bey's intentions were first announced many of the more serious minded and intelligent Turks welcomed them. They would probably have adhered to the new party, but the nomination of Nuri Bey as secretary-general as well as a natural reluctance to show their hand until it was seen on which side the scales were weighted, deterred them. They felt that Ismet Pasha's policy might be open to criticism and a less narrowly nationalistic policy might be better for the country, but sooner Ismet with his narrowness and obstinacy but also with his admitted personal honesty, than a Government of which the strings would be pulled by a man of Nuri Bey's doubtful reputation.

5. Again, as usual, the Levantines spoilt the Gazi's own market by acclaiming him as the champion of the minorities. There may indeed there certainly are Turks broad minded and far seeing enough to realise that Greeks, Jews, Syrians and Armenians can be more beneficial to the economic prosperity of Turkey than they are allowed to be to-day, but there is no Turk consistent enough to admit that, calls for political equality in the first place.

6. Furthermore, Fethi Bey, already looked upon by many here as too devoted to France, was ill served by the local French organ and the publication of the [illegible] repudiations and insults of the French Embassy. Better Ismet and his stubborn head than a heaven sent genius, if he is to take his directions from the Quai d'Orsay.

7. Lastly, there is one most formidable obstacle for Fethi Bey to overcome though it is never even whispered. The Grand National Assembly is *not* a Parliament where the conduct of the State and the measures of Government are debated and discussed, but the instrument created and used by the organisation (the Popular party) which runs this country to give the necessary legal and constitutional polish to its acts. And a seat in the Assembly is merely the well-paid reward for party merit given in return for absolute allegiance to party discipline. A Deputy gets 500 liras a month from the party funds besides various other advantages including special fees for attendance at the various commissions which are supposed to examine Government bills and laws. This is not a position to be lightly given up on the mere chance of getting re-elected as a follower of Fethi nor has the latter the funds probably that they supplement the allowance, even if he were to carry the country. For the moment it is hoped that realising that Fethi must [illegible] the Gazi has promised the start of a fund given him 150,000 liras from his own presidential fund but this will not go very far to cover the expense of organisation production of newspapers and so on and a good deal of it will, anyway, have to be earmarked for the sixty existing Deputies who, many of them possibly against their will, are as Tevfik Rushi informed me, to be told off to adhere to the new party. The Foreign Minister said: 'We are so rich politically that we can now afford ourselves the luxury of an Opposition.' Ismet Pasha's confident attitude appears to rest on a solid basis.

8. None the less the day that Fethi Bey's letter was published in the Turkish papers marks a momentous date in the history of modern Turkey. The principles of criticism and free speech have been asserted and sanctioned and they will grow in spite of all efforts that may be made in the future to suppress them. [illegible] which records the beginning of the end of the one man dictatorship of the Gazi. But [illegible] as said above already cleared the air. The Government will be merely substituting its own responsibility but to the country at large for that of the will was still supreme and indeed it may seem to remain so for a long time to come. But the grant of [illegible] Liberal Opposition means that, short of civil war, [illegible] the setting up of Turkey will sooner or later leave Cankaya for the [illegible] Assembly. What effect this will have upon Fethi Bey's future is another question.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 4980/3476/44 — No. 81.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received September 15*)

(No. 557)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 10, 1930.*

IN my despatch No. 556 of to-day's date I have discussed at some length the present political situation in Turkey and the possible developments that will flow from the constitution of Fethi Bey's Liberal Republican party.

2. It must, however, be admitted that it is exceptionally difficult to gauge these developments with any degree of certainty for the simple reason that notably little is known about the real plans or motives of the three Turkish leaders: the Gazi, Ismet Pasha and Fethi Bey. The position of the first is the most important and at the same time the most obscure, for the leaders of both parties claim his support. It has been clear for some time that the country was waiting for a lead. The Smyrna events have brought matters to a head, and Yunus Nadi Bey, the proprietor of the 'Cumhuriyet' and Turkey's most successful, most unscrupulous and most 'adaptable' journalist, apparently found the position so intolerable that in his newspaper he published on the 9th instant an open letter, in which he requested the Gazi to define his attitude. The President at once obliged, and his reply is published to-day. I have the honour to enclose the texts of these two communications.

3. It is to be hoped that the Gazi's [illegible] Yunus Nadi Bey, but I find it hard to believe that it will satisfy him. The Gazi still balances himself carefully on the wall and with complete casuistry leaves his position quite as obscure as before. He must [illegible] clearing his attitude more clearly

but these can only be guessed, and until he comes out into the open the political situation in Turkey must remain nebulous

4 I ought to add that in some quarters the Gazi's letter is taken to be a definite intimation that he wishes to take the administration of the country into his own hands The phrase "après convenient connaissance de cause" is taken to apply to his present term of office which expires on the 1st November, 1931 Those who so think may be right, but it is unlike the Gazi to give so broad a hint of his intentions so long before they can be carried out

I have, &c
GEORGE R CLERK

Enclosure 1 in No 81

Extract from the "Cumhuriyet" of September 9, 1930

A Son Excellence Gazi Mustafa Kemal
Président de la République turque

DEPUIS le jour où une de nos imprimeries d'Izmir a été assaillie et le siège du parti du peuple lapidé, nous apprécions l'importance des nouveaux devoirs qui nous incombent dans le pays

Témoins des intrigues qui sont mises en œuvre par de nouveaux groupements pour vous nuire, en votre auguste personne celui qui a toujours été et qui sera toujours notre chef spirituel, nous avons pleinement conscience du devoir qui nous est échu de conserver intact le dépôt de la chose publique qui nous a été confié Nous vous demandons d'éclairer notre religion, non pas tant pour faciliter notre tâche que pour éclairer la situation Soyez assuré à notre auguste chef, que quoi qu'il advienne la chose publique sera pleinement défendue et sauvegardée Daignez recevoir l'expression de notre filial hommage – YUNUS NADI

Enclosure 2 in No 81

Extract from the "Cumhuriyet" of September 10, 1930

A Yunus Nadi Bey
Rédacteur en chef du
Journal "Cumhuriyet" *Izdora, 9 septembre* 1930

J'AI lu votre lettre ouverte adressée à personne dans le "Cumhuriyet"

Parlant des derniers événements d'Izmir, vous me dites que d'autres partis politiques prétendent que je leur appartiens J'ai également lu les publications faites à ce sujet par certains journaux et j'ai entendu qu'on sème de pareils bruits parmi le public

Je crois avoir été assez franc dans la lettre que j'ai adressée à Fethi Bey Il est sûrement au courant de cette vérité

Je répète encore une fois ici tout ce que je répète cette vérité

Le seul parti politique qui existe est celui qui s'est formé dès mon arrivée en Anatolie et que j'ai fondé avec peine

Le seul chef de ce parti est le peuple turc Aucune raison n'existe et ne peut exister pour d'autres chefs

Après m'avoir accordé cette confiance, le peuple a fait de moi le chef du parti du peuple Aucun parti politique ne peut exister sur une autre base

Il m'est pénible de vous répéter ce que je ressens pour les derniers incidents d'Izmir Je parle avec mes sentiments les plus sacrés Ma douleur a été d'autant plus grande que les auteurs en sont des jeunes

Les provocateurs de ces actes ne peuvent, naturellement, pas échapper aux lois de la république

Cela forme une réponse au journal "Cumhuriyet" ainsi qu'un éclaircissement au public GAZI M KEMAL

E 4958/282/44] **No. 82**

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Constantinople, September* 14, 1930

IT is officially announced that President of the Republic who is here has on the recommendation of a meeting of Cabinet held on Saturday night issued a decree summoning Assembly to meet in special session on 22nd September

Reason given for this unexpected step is that, owing to grave exports [urgent] currency is in danger of undue appreciation and that Council of Ministers desire to have larger powers to maintain currency at rate of about 1,030 piastres to the pound, which has been current for some months. There has, so far as I am aware been no sign recently of any considerable appreciation, and closing rate yesterday was 1,030

E 5018/1511/44 **No. 83**

Acting Consul Meade to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)
Sir, *Aleppo, August* 29, 1930

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 64 of the 24th August regarding the Kurdish rising, I have the honour to forward certain supplementary information concerning opinions prevalent in Aleppo, which may be true and possibly of interest My informant is a notable Kurd, who is considered to be reliable and impartial

2 It appears that there are three Kurdish societies

(a) *Khoybun*, in Northern Kurdistan, comprising the sons of Sheiks Said they are said to be in close touch with the Bolsheviks
(b) *Khaybun*, in Syria, whose head office is in Beirut, and who have enlisted the support of the Armenian Nationalist Society, called "Tachnak"
(c) *Khaluskaran*, in Turkey and Persia, of which many leading Turks and Persians are said to be members

3 It is only natural that all the developments of this rising should be followed with great interest by Kurds in Syria The rebels however would not appear to have enlisted their complete sympathy as they are considered to be based on religious rather than political motives and the Syrian Kurds are waiting and hoping for the rallying cry of independence. Meanwhile the French authorities are keeping watch to repress any movement and although raids across the frontier are reported it is probable that the chief activity in Syria is propaganda

4 The Turkish Kurds near the Syrian frontier are reported to be only too willing to help were it not for the large supply of arms and ammunition which the Turks have sent to Diarbekir to guard against any trouble in that quarter Besides these Kurds are not born fighters, and so they prefer secret activities, such as attempts to rouse feeling in Syria

5 It further appears that the rebels are in close correspondence with the Bolsheviks, who are assisting them, but that this help is only taken through sheer necessity, as British help was not forthcoming Kurds here believe, however, that the "Khaluskaran" Society is actively engaged in an attempt to enlist British support

6 According to the latest reports, it is stated here that the 53rd Turkish Regiment has joined the rebels, with the result that the Turks are being defeated along the whole line. The Turks are accordingly massing their forces, in order to undertake a general offensive

7 I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul to the acting British consul general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus

I have, &c
GEOFFREY MEADE

E 5032 1511 44 No 84

Sir C Clerk to Mr Henderson Received September

No 90
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople* 17 1930

Mr HELM's despatch No

Press of last two days has announced complete suppression of Kurds in Ararat region. Definite confirmation impossible to obtain but colour is lent to statement by departure of Chief of Gomers, Staff from Angora whence he was seen off by Prime Minister and Government, nominally for Sivas, but in reality, so the papers now say for the scene of operations on the eastern frontier

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E 5039 1511 44 No

Sir R Clive to Mr A Henderson (Received September 18)

No 931

Sir

Gulhek September 3, 1930

I HAVE the honour to report that Memduh Chevket Bey the Turkish Consul-General at Tabriz left on the 31st August His successor is expected in a few days

2 Before his departure Mr [illegible] told [illegible] that [illegible] Erzerum [illegible] Van [illegible] and Angora had all been highly coloured if not absolutely untrue He insisted for instance that no ultimatum at all had ever been sent to the Persian Government although according to the press no less than three had been [illegible] He maintained that not one single Turkish soldier had entered Persian territory and that the Turkish Government at any time threatened to cross the frontier I then asked him what was the grievance of the Turkish Government against the Persian Government? He said they really had none at all except that four years ago two well known Turkish Kurdish chiefs had settled down on the Persian side of the frontier, and in spite of repeated protests from the Turkish Government and the usual promises by the Persian Government no steps had been taken to remove them On the other hand, the rectification of the frontier on the eastern side of Lesser Ararat was essential to Turkey, to enable her to control the situation in future [illegible]

3 I then asked him whether in his opinion the Soviet Government had been fishing in troubled waters and whether they were in any way responsible for the undoubted friction which existed between the Persian and Turkish Governments this summer He denied this absolutely, and maintained that on the Russian side of the frontier [illegible] Armenians [illegible] days were a potential source of danger the Kurds were perfectly quiet and he had no reason to suppose that the Soviet authorities had done anything to stir up trouble This may be true but there is no doubt that Memduh Chevket who was an intimate friend of Dyakov the late Soviet Ambassador here has very strong Russian sympathies

4. Yesterday afternoon in the course of a visit to Texmourtache I asked his Highness what were his views about the recent Kurdish trouble. He began by discoursing generally on Turkish politics He maintained that Ismet Pasha had been the villain of the piece and in order to strengthen his own position in Turkey had been responsible for the series of exaggerated press reports from Constantinople Tewfik Rushdi Pasha he [illegible] seriously The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had no convictions and was at any moment ready to

adopt a different policy What he did not understand was the real attitude of the Gazi, who, on the one hand [illegible] to put a stop to Persian press propaganda, while on the other, he had always spoken of the most friendly terms of Tewfik Pasha's friendship [illegible] Memduh Chevket's resignation [illegible] that there was [illegible] about by the antagonism of the Turkish General Staff who [illegible] Persians and of being out of sympathy with the Turkish policy in Kurdistan

5 His Highness then went on to speak of the Kurdish policy of the three countries Turkey Persia and Iraq The policy, he said was fundamentally different in each country The Turkish Government, under Ismet Pasha, frankly resolved to annihilate the Kurds, an impossible policy to maintain, as one could not annihilate a whole people The Persian policy, he admitted had been in the past to let the Kurds alone They had done nothing for the Persian Kurds, at the same time they had tried to [illegible] annoy them The Iraq Government, on the other hand, [illegible] the British authorities had adopted a policy of encouraging the Kurds by allowing them to [illegible] their language, by promising [illegible] schools, and [illegible] to the Iraq Kurds This policy, he feared must in the end have a disturbing effect both on the Turkish and the Persian Kurds, and he said frankly that, if he were a Turkish or Persian Kurd, his whole sympathy would be with the policy of the Iraq Government as it was, however he looked to the future with anxiety, and the Shah was undoubtedly perturbed Although the Iraq Government might not be in favour of a united Kurdistan yet their present policy had the appearance of a first step in that direction His Highness said that he had read the speeches which Major Young and Jaafar Pasha had recently made in Parliament and though he [illegible] by Government [illegible] Mongolia [illegible] doubt as to the correctness of the Soviet Government's [illegible] attitude towards the [illegible] Armenians

6 Finally, I asked him about the question of frontier rectification [illegible] Van and whether he thought the Turkish demands were reasonable [illegible] Persians were [illegible] to any concession to the Turkish point of view and also because [illegible] part of the frontier such as the [illegible] far, would be greatly resented by the Kurds and the whole column would fall on the Persian Government

7 I enclose copy of the latest report which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz on the Kurdish situation *

I have, &c
R H CLIVE

P S *September* 5 Since writing the above I have received a copy of Paris despatch No 930 of the 14th August.

I have always known Ala the present Persian Minister in Paris to be a busybody who [illegible] for the truth I need only remind you of his visit to London in the summer of 1929 but his recent gratuitous *démarche*, without instructions, on the strength of [illegible] impliqués which it is now known were inaccurate and misleading, strikes me as amazing

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the Government of India and His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Iraq

P P S *September* 8 In connexion with the following I enclose copy of a telegram addressed on the 7th September to the [illegible] by their Tabriz correspondent *

R H C

* Not printed

[E 5104 1511 44] No. 86.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received September 22.*)

No. 4.

Sir, *Constantinople, September 18, 1930.*

IN my telegram No. 310 of the 17th September, I had the honour to inform you that Major O'Leary had been commissioned by the Turkish Government to write a series of articles on Kurdistan. Your Lordship will have noted the contents of these reports. Hitherto the movements of Turkish troops in the eastern provinces have been shrouded in mystery. Interest has, therefore, been keen with the final operations which lasted five days. In his second report Major O'Leary has set out to describe briefly a picture of the whole Kurdish movement of this year and of the measures taken by the Turkish Government to combat it. In a country where it has been almost impossible to obtain accurate information for press reports unfortunately unreliable and in the peculiar circumstances prevailing in Eastern Turkey other sources of information are scarce and of little value. Major O'Leary's report is, therefore, I think, of particular interest as a fairly reliable record of what has taken place.

2. The Turkish Government are to be congratulated on the success of their operations as there is no doubt that the Kurdish troubles have given them much cause for anxiety during the past summer. Winter is approaching in these mountainous areas and tranquillity can be expected for some considerable time. But Kurdish [illegible] will undoubtedly raise their heads again, and, unless the Turkish Government can substitute something more [illegible] for the present repressive policy of the Turkish Government, they will not succeed in their object completely as seems to be assumed to-day.

3. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 86.

Major O'Leary to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 16, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to accounts in the local newspapers based on telegrams of the Anatolian Agency, the Turkish forces under Salih Pasha have inflicted a decisive defeat on the rebels in the region of Mount Ararat.

The last stage of these operations began on the 7th September, with a movement from the north of the mountain. Salih Pasha was able to occupy the saddle between the greater and lesser Ararat on the 10th September. The Kurds were then driven off in a south-easterly direction, leaving many dead. All resistance is now said to be at an end.

Marshal Fevzi Pasha has sent a telegram of congratulation to Salih Pasha and has left Ankara on a visit of inspection of the Ararat area.

Although this version of the last phase in the suppression of the Kurdish revolt emanates from official sources, it would perhaps be premature to assume that no further operations are necessary before tranquillity is restored in the eastern vilayets.

I have &c.

B. J. O'LEARY,

Major, G.S.

Enclosure 2 in No. 86.

Major O'Leary to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 17, 1930.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 8 of yesterday's date, reporting the success of the Turkish forces under Salih Pasha, I have the honour to enclose a summary of the military movements in Eastern Turkey since February of this year.

This account has been based on information collected from various sources, and I supplemented by a [illegible] not precisely known [illegible] of credit or to fidelity.

I have &c.

B. J. O'LEARY,

Major, G.S.

Enclosure 3 in No. 86.

Summary of Military Movements in Eastern Turkey.

Kurdish Revolt, 1930.

THE following account of military events in Kurdistan during the spring and summer of this year is based on reports from a number of sources of very different credibility. It is, unfortunately, improbable that any certain knowledge of the causes of the revolt, of its development and of the various phases of suppression will [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] General Staff. We have endeavoured to piece together from these [illegible] editions from all available material, trusting that, however inaccurate the details may be, the broad outline will agree with the reality.

2. Since the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion of 1925 the eastern vilayets had enjoyed a period of unprecedented tranquillity although occasional acts of brigandage were not unknown in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers. A trustworthy description of the district between Diarbekir and Lake Van describes it as late as May of this year, as perfectly quiet and slowly progressing towards civilisation under the enlightened guidance of Ibrahim Tahi Bey.

3. Kurdish aspirations, however, were far from quiescent, and a number of malcontents were planning a general rising. Conspicuous among these were Ibrahim Bey, chief of the Celali Kurds, Halis Bey, son of Sheikh Abdul Meet, a certain Selahettin, son of the Sheikh Said who was executed in 1925, and the sons of Kor Huseyn, chief of the Haydaranli tribe. It is not clear how close the collusion was between these different leaders, nor is it known whether all the elements which were ultimately in revolt formed part of the original conspiracy. It may be that the severe measures of repression exercised by the Turkish Government discouraged some intending rebels from participation, while exciting other Kurds, hitherto peaceful to join in the rebellion. There is, in any case, little doubt that at the beginning of the year a considerable effort was made by propaganda and threat to embrace as many tribes as possible in the movement.

4. The arrest in February of Halis of Selahettin [illegible] known as the Seal-maker, was the first indication which reached the general public of trouble in Kurdistan. Soon after this, Celali tribesmen began to raid villages in the Ararat zone. Halis escaped, and, it is thought, found his way to Persia, where he continued to incite the Kurds to revolt. During April several engagements occurred between Government troops and rebels, with indecisive results.

5. The General Staff had realised some time before this that the affair was assuming serious proportions, and it was determined, not merely to [illegible] but to liquidate the Kurdish question once and for all. Sedat Pasha, commanding the IXth Corps was not confident of the prospects of doing this, and was, therefore, replaced by Salih Pasha, the VIIIth Corps Commander, a younger and more energetic man. A force was organised of two composite army corps of trained soldiers from the various formations, and the bulk of the available aircraft of the Turkish army was sent east. The two corps were put under the command of Huseyn and Omer Halis Pashas. The total force can be estimated at 15,000 men, exclusive of a number of units held in readiness in Western Turkey.

6 Salih Pasha's intention was, apparently, to converge on Mount Ararat crushing the insurgents between these two corps, but the Northern Corps seems to have come into action before the southern, attacking the Kurds near Igdir, on the 12th June. The success was only partial, and a number of tribesmen retired to the heights [illegible] Some of them are supposed to have crossed the frontier, and to have received reinforcement as well as arms and ammunition from the Kurds in Persia.

7 A minor engagement took place close to the Persian frontier on the 3rd July when a Turkish force advanced to the swamps of the Sari Su to bombard Kuchuk. They were repulsed, leaving fifty prisoners and four machine guns with the rebels.

8 Ihsan Bey had remained with the Kurds on Mount Ararat. They were established with their families in tents and in caves, and numbered over 3,000 armed men. Towards the end of July the revolt was spreading throughout the Vilayets of Mush, Van and Bitlis. The ranks of the insurgents were swollen by armed volunteers from both sedentary and nomadic tribes, and fighting was reported at places as far west as Mush. On the other hand a number of Kurds remained loyal and were enlisted in the militia.

9 At the beginning of July a large force, led by [illegible] advanced from the east on Lake Van, which lies at the north [illegible] This force was probably composed partly of Kurds who had [illegible] the Lake with Mount Ararat and partly of Russians who had risen [illegible] There was also a force of Kurds from Persia with their [illegible] pillaged and burnt but no serious [illegible] resisted successfully.

10 On the 30th July the Second Corps [illegible] Near Dere, near the Soviet [illegible] four days, but is described as a complete victory by the Turks. [illegible] to have been regular cavalry and machine guns were skilfully handled. It is probable that the Government troops sustained heavy casualties, but they were successful in breaking the Kurdish resistance in this zone. In the subsequent weeks sporadic disturbances were reported but were easily suppressed. A ruthless policy of destruction was followed by [illegible] number of villages burnt. Apart from their failure to settle with Kurdish opposition once and for all the Turks have not suffered by the savage treatment of prisoners, particularly women, by the rebels.

11 At the end of August a very serious extension of the rebellion seemed imminent when it was learnt that the tribe of Barzani on the Iraq border, and a leader named Hajo further west had joined the revolt, but a prompt reinforcement of the troops on the southern frontier quelled this outbreak, the exact extent and motives of which remain obscure.

12 The Kurdish resistance was now confined to the rebels on Agri Dag under Ibrahim Bey. The tactical problem of their reduction was complicated by the position of the boundary with Persia, which crosses the summit of the lesser Ararat [illegible] and a force of the Kurds without entering [illegible] gather to aid the Turks to [illegible] effect an exchange of territory. On the other hand their own troops were not efficient. They are believed to have suffered at the end of July in disarming some Cossack [illegible] over the border but on the 9th August in a fight near Mafur they sustained a reverse and lost 150 men.

13 Since [illegible] is to have spent the month of August in reorganising his [illegible] while awaiting political developments. On the 7th September he was about to launch his decisive attack and in five days he has forced the passage at Sirdar Bulak between [illegible] and is now engaged in [illegible] remaining rebels. The operations are officially declared to [illegible] conclusion.

I have, &c.,
B. H. O'FARY,
Major, R.A.

Constantinople, September 16, 1930.

E 5112/3476/44 No. 87

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Henderson (Received September 22.)

(No. 92.)
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, September 21, 1930.*
MY despatch No. 356.

I learn that Ismet Pasha will resign to-morrow, but will be called upon by President of the Republic to form a new Government. Ismet's intention is by this means to strengthen his Cabinet by getting rid of three or four inefficient or [illegible] Ministers [illegible] by the Minister of Justice.

E 5118/3476/44 No. [illegible]

[illegible] *Henderson. (Received September 22.)*

No. [illegible]
(Telegraphic.) G. *Constantinople, September 22, 1930.*
My telegram No. 2.

Inspired press announces forthcoming resignation of Ismet and rearrangement of Cabinet. Ministers of Justice and Public Works go, the latter to become secretary general of Popular party, the former because his speeches and [illegible] of his Department have provided the best weapons for attacks of Opposition. Vasif Bey probably becomes Minister of Education once more in place of Cevad Hikmet [illegible] Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Changes will certainly strengthen Government.

E 5955/323/44 No. [illegible]

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople.)

(No. 583.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 22, 1930.*

Mr. HELM, while in charge of His Majesty's Embassy, reported that according to a statement made by the secretary general of the new Liberal Republican party, Fethi Bey, if returned to power, would favour Turkey joining the League of Nations, provided she were assured of support in seeking to obtain an elected (or in permanent) seat on the Council. Mr. Helm added that the French Ambassador was anxious that Great Britain and France should support any application made by Turkey for entry into the League.

2. The French delegation have not yet mentioned the matter to their British colleagues in Geneva, and I understand that, no doubt owing to the fact that the [illegible] is still pending, the Turkish authorities have not approached [illegible] with the view to [illegible] to you to give the [illegible] of the Turkish Government's question [illegible] Between [illegible] and serious discussion.

3. His Majesty's Government have no desire to take any initiative in proposing to join the League, as that is a matter which Turkey alone must decide in accordance with what she believes to be her own best interests. But if you are approached, you should, of course, make it quite clear that Turkey's entry into the League would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government.

4. [illegible] the question of her election to a non-permanent seat on the Council, he might explain that His Majesty's Government cannot pledge their vote in advance, and could not enter into any bargain regarding the election of Turkey to the Council as the price of her entry into the League. If, however, Turkey entered the League unconditionally, His Majesty's Government would hope to be able to support her candidature for the Council at the first favourable opportunity, which would no doubt occur during the early years of her membership.

5. Lastly, if you should be sounded on the point of the promise of a semi-permanent seat on the Council, the reply suggested at the end of your despatch

No. 1 ... the 14th ... approved ... despatch No. ... of the 27th ... last ... strike ... the ... election ... Council can only be sought ... expiry of ... ordinary ... current ... circumstances of the case ... that ... before ... what happens during or after ...

I have &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 5188 3476 44 No. ...

... *Office* ... 26 1930

No. 140

... 26 1930

... Your ... of the ... Prime Minister ... paragraph ... new ... Nyasa ...

E 5204 3476 44 No. ...

... *Office* ... 1930

No. 141

... 1930

... Mr. ... Mr. ... Mr.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Extract from Times, Post, Daily Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, Daily News, Morning Post, and Daily Chronicle of September 6, 1950.

Kurdish Situation.

The Treaty.

THE TREATY of Sèvres, which was signed on August 10, 1920, by representatives of the Sultan of Turkey, Turkey ceased to exist as an independent State. The Treaty was signed by the Allied Powers and by Turkey, and it was ratified by the Turkish Parliament on July 24, 1923. The Treaty was signed by the Allied Powers and by Turkey, and it was ratified by the Turkish Parliament on July 24, 1923.

The Present Situation.

24. On the 6th September, 1950, the Turkish Government announced that it had decided to withdraw its troops from the Kurdish region of Iraq. The withdrawal began on the 10th September, 1950, and was completed on the 20th September, 1950. The withdrawal was carried out in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920, by representatives of the Sultan of Turkey, Turkey ceased to exist as an independent State. The Treaty was signed by the Allied Powers and by Turkey, and it was ratified by the Turkish Parliament on July 24, 1923.

27. The raid of the Turks into Persian territory has been officially denied by the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but such circumstantial reports of the bombing of Kurds in Persian territory, of an advance of 10 kilom. into Persian territory, of his representatives urging the Turks to withdraw, &c., had been previously given to me [illegible] that I cannot attach the very least faith to the official *démenti*.

Further, M. Ardsrooni gave me circumstantial details of the Turkish operations from Bayezid towards the Persian frontier and of their intention to occupy B[illegible]sh.

Troops from Tehran

28. On the 14th August it was reported to me that troops were expected here from Tehran *en route* to Maku.

None ever appeared. [illegible] —

In Persia: Southern Zone

29. The general confirmed that he had stretched a strong cordon from Sakiz to Sauj Bulak. It seems quite possible that troops may have been moved towards Sakiz from outside Azerbaijan.

E 5358/282/44 No. 94.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 374.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 1, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 25th September the Grand National Assembly voted a law, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation herein, authorising the Government to take certain measures in connexion with the temporary stabilisation of exchange.

2. Hitherto all [illegible] connexion with [illegible] operations have [illegible] of Turkish [illegible] stabilisation at 1,030 piastres to the £ sterling. For some time past, however, the competent authorities have been envisaging the possibility of a reversal of the position.

3. As the result of investigation [illegible] exchange operations [illegible] and that foreign [illegible] the market [illegible] to pay for Turkish produce [illegible], with the result that the supply of Turkish [illegible] requirements, and, this being the case, there was every [illegible] if left unchecked, there would be a marked appreciation of Turkish [illegible] would be maintained until the export season had closed. This appreciation, although only of a temporary nature, would nullify the efforts of the Government to stabilise the exchange, and would, moreover, inflict hardship on [illegible] and who would, therefore, [illegible].

4. It was [illegible] expedient to [illegible] measures for the purpose of preventing [illegible] temporary appreciation of the Turkish [illegible] and the law [illegible] the 27th September, authorised the Government [illegible] money from its reserves on condition that [illegible] on the market [illegible] the equivalent Turkish [illegible] deposited with this bank.

5. This operation will be reversed when it is found that there is a scarcity of foreign exchange on the market. In that case, the sterling reserve will be put on the market and the equivalent in Turkish currency will be withdrawn and restored to [illegible].

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Law No. 1726 respecting the Temporary Stabilisation of Exchange, voted September 25, 1930, promulgated September 27, 1930.

(Traduction.)

Article 1er. Le Gouvernement est autorisé à faire usage de la faculté accordée à la Banque centrale de la République turque par l'article 14 de la loi concernant ladite banque en conformité de l'article 30 de la [illegible] le montant de billets de monnaie de réserve nécessaire pour acheter des devises étrangères à couverture or ou qui peuvent être effectivement converties en or au pair.

Les devises qui seront ainsi achetées serviront de contre partie aux billets de [illegible] de monnaie, ces devises seront utilisées exclusivement pour retirer du marché et [illegible] billets de monnaie se trouvant en circulation. Aussitôt que la Banque centrale aura été constituée, ces devises et les opérations faites à ce sujet lui seront [illegible]stérées par la banque dépositaire avec toutes les recettes et dépenses y relatives.

Art. 2. Les billets de monnaie qui seront mis en circulation en vertu de l'article 1er possèdent le même caractère légal que les billets se trouvant actuellement en circulation. Le montant de livres turques mis ainsi en circulation et le montant de devises représentant la couverture seront publiés, à la fin de chaque semaine, par le Ministère des Finances et par la banque dépositaire.

Art. 3. La présente loi entre en vigueur à partir de la date de sa promulgation.

Art. 4. Le Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'application de la présente loi.

E 5359/3476/44] No. 95.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 375.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October [illegible], 1930.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegrams Nos. 93 and 101 of the 20th September and the 28th September last, the Cabinet resigned on the 25th September and the formation of a new Cabinet was entrusted to Ismet Pasha. According to the press his Excellency showed considerable reluctance to reassume power and suggested that his place should be taken by someone else, and only gave [illegible] owing to the insistence of the President of the Republic.

2. The new Cabinet shows four changes and is constituted as follows:—

Prime Minister: Ismet Pasha.
Minister for Foreign Affairs: Tevfik Rustu Bey.
Minister of National Defence: Abdul Halik Bey.
Minister of the Interior: Sukru Kaya Bey.
Minister of Finance: Saracoglu Sukru Bey.
Minister of Public Health: Refik Bey.
Minister of Justice: Yusuf Kemal Bey.
Minister of [illegible]: Esat Bey.
Minister of National Economy: Mustafa Seref Bey.
Minister of Public Works: Zekâi Bey.

[illegible] of Yusuf Kemal Bey will be found in the notes on leading Turkish personalities transmitted under cover of Constantinople despatch No. 92 of the 26th February, 1929. A biographical note on Zekai, Mustafa Seref and Esat Beys will be found as an enclosure to this despatch.

3. There is no doubt th[illegible] Government [illegible] Ministers of [illegible] Works [illegible] retained in his new capacity of Secretary General of the People's party, and the [illegible] Minister of National Economy has been replaced by a more effective personality. [illegible] Cabinet would have been further strengthened had Saracoglu Sukru Bey been [illegible] at the Ministry of Finance, for his retention means continuity in the financial policy of the Government [illegible] which the strongest attacks of the new opposition have been directed, but I am informed that Ismet Pasha was adamant

4. It seems that besides the changes in Cabinet there are to be certain modifications of the policy hitherto followed by Ismet Pasha. The speeches at the meetings of the parliamentary group of the People's party, at which for the first time free discussion has been allowed, leads to the rather obvious supposition that these changes are designed to forestall the criticisms of the new Opposition and take the wind out of Fethi Bey's sails.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 95.

Biographical Notes.

Fevzi Bey.

BORN in Karaferye in 1874. Educated at the Harbiye School and graduated in 1894. Gazetted to the Vth Army (Syria). In 1898 entered the Harbiye (Military School) where he occupied different functions for twelve years. After the proclamation of the Constitution he proceeded to Germany in order to complete his studies. In the last phase of the Balkan War he was commander of the 9th regiment and during the Great War commander of the 20th division. He was wounded by his own request when he was chief of staff of the Fourth Army Headquarters. Before the afterwar is president of the Council of Ministers and concurrently the Ordu Derbentma Pazarcik Erzurum and Erzincan Deputy. Is director of the telephone company, member of the Constantinople Municipality, and was elected Deputy for Bursa three years ago. He knows three foreign languages, and has occupied himself for many years with the study of pedagogy. Appointed Minister of Education in Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet September 1930.

Fevzi Bey.

He is 52 years old. Born in Bosnia. A graduate of the Mulkiye School and became kaimakam and mutessarif. Was Deputy for Adana in the first Angora Assembly and in 1921 was a member of Behic Sami Bey's peace delegation to London. In the following year Turkish economic expert at the Lausanne Conference. Was a member of the Independence Tribunal.

Elected Deputy for Adana in June 1923, he became Minister for Agriculture in March 1924. In September was appointed Ambassador to London, but was recalled in 1925, owing to his having, on his own account, proposed to the Council of the League of Nations that Mosul which he was instructed by Angora to withdraw. In May was appointed Ambassador at Moscow, and in November 1926 was present at Odessa at the interview between M. Chicherin and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Resigned in September 1927 on his election, possibly not of his own volition, as Deputy for Diarbekr. A member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly. In 1929, when all Powers were obliged by the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty of Lausanne to negotiate fresh treaties, was appointed chief of the delegation for the negotiation of commercial treaties. Appointed Minister of Public Works in Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet September 1930.

Zekai Bey has been reported as being anti-British in sympathy in the past, and when in London alienated Turkish sympathisers by his lack of courtesy towards [illegible] Angora, but later in the same year, on the occasion of the Turkish delegation visiting the Soviet Union, he showed himself more conciliatory.

Mustafa Seref Bey.

He is 46 years old. Born in Burdur. A graduate of the Faculty of law at Constantinople and Paris. Was director of the Law School at Konia, a professor at the Turkish University, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce. Elected Deputy for Burdur. Took part in the Lausanne Conference. Lately one of the [illegible] Commercial Treaties. Appointed Minister of National Economy in Ismet Pasha's new Cabinet September 1930.

He is one of the ablest and best informed of the commercial treaty negotiators. Not attractive personally, but should make a good Minister.

[E 5360/3476/44] No. 96.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 379.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 1, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 378 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that during the meetings of the People's party which have been occupying the past week, statements were made by the Ministers of Finance and National Economy regarding matters affecting their respective departments.

2. Saracoglu Şükrü Bey gave an account of reliefs in taxation already effected and went on to outline further reductions which the new Government intended to effect in the near future. He closed his remarks with a defence of the monopolies, which [illegible] the object of sharp attacks on the part of Fethi Bey. The Minister [illegible] that the monopolies were advantageous, not only to the Treasury but [illegible] development of the country. He spoke more especially of the spirit and powder monopolies, where, he said, Government participation had resulted in [illegible] increasing utilisation of the raw materials obtainable in the country.

Mustafa Seref Bey, for his part, spoke of the port monopoly, the Agricultural Bank, and the so-called sugar monopoly. (Although the State participates in the sugar refineries in the country, the sugar monopoly as such no longer exists, but the [illegible] is collected in the form of an addition to the normal customs duty.) The Minister was at pains to explain that the port monopoly was not [illegible] but that Government control had done much [illegible] for port services and to remedy the chaotic state of affairs after the war, when enormous profits were made by unscrupulous private companies. In defence of the very high tax on sugar, the Minister stated that study of conditions abroad showed that cane sugar was now everywhere preferred to beet-sugar, the former being considerably cheaper. Thus countries which produced sugar from beetroot had everywhere raised high tariff barriers against cane-sugar to prevent dumping. In this respect Turkey was merely following their example. The Minister, speaking then of [illegible] production, stated that in 1930, on a total capital of [illegible] the Bank had [illegible] farmers, and had established [illegible] per cent. plus 1 per cent. commission, [illegible] closely [illegible] the neighbouring countries.

3. Time will show whether the new Minister of National Economy will be able to surmount successfully the problems which face him. But his defence of the three topics chosen by him for his first public essay is not altogether happy. On the same page of the Government newspaper which published in full the Minister's statement there appeared a paragraph reporting the probable resignation of the director of the port monopoly, who wishes to enter the political arena. The paragraph concluded by wishing the director better luck there than he had had in the "unhappy affairs of the monopoly in our unhappy port." As regards sugar, the accuracy of the Minister's statement of the change-over in public taste from beet to cane-sugar seems open to question, while his optimistic account of the activities of the Agricultural Bank does not tally with popular reports of the notorious indifference hitherto shown by the bank towards agricultural interests.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5382/324/44] No. 97.

Mr. Strang to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 344.)

Sir, *Moscow, September 29, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Tevfik Rustu Bey, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Moscow for a short visit on the 24th September. He left Moscow on the 27th September for Leningrad, where he intended to spend a day or two before returning home via Moscow. The immediate purpose of the visit was to return M. Karakhan's visit to Angora last December.

2 Tevfik Rustu was entertained on the evening of his arrival at a banquet given by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which was followed by a Government reception to which members of foreign missions were invited. On the evening of the 25th September there was a reception at the Turkish Embassy. On the morning of the 26th September, Tevfik Rustu received the heads of foreign missions individually and in the evening of the same day there was a gala performance at the opera, at which a box was placed at the disposal of each foreign mission. I submit some remarks on these functions in my despatch No. 580 of the 30th September.

3 Immediately on his arrival Tevfik Rustu gave an interview to the [illegible] y, a record of which is enclosed.* In his statement, Tevfik Rustu said that the str[illegible]thening of Soviet Turkish friendship was a natural process. He defined the basis of Turkish foreign policy as peace and equality among nations. He evaded, as well he might in Moscow, a question as to the effect of Fethi Bey's new party upon Turkish foreign policy. He stated, in reply to another question, that M. Briand's Pan-Europa was of no interest to Turkey. He expressed his pleasure at the warmth of his reception and at the prospect of renewing his acquaintance with Soviet statesmen, and summed up the aim of the collaboration between the two countries as the struggle for peace and the reduction of armaments.

4 Speeches were exchanged at the official banquet on the 24th September, records of which are enclosed.* In his speech of welcome, M. Litvinov referred to his guest of the days when both their countries had heroically withstood the armed attacks of world imperialism. Out of that common peril, successfully overcome, had grown the friendship which now united them and which was a [illegible] factor in world politics. He complimented Tevfik Rustu for striking [illegible] note in the conduct of foreign relations by the Treaty of Neutrality signed with the Soviet [illegible] Powers [illegible] at the time when they were still trying to destroy the Soviet and Turkish revolutions by armed intervention they were still threatening the life of both countries in a new way and with fresh means under the guise of peace (that is to say, presumably the so-called united economic front against the U.S.S.R., and the possibility of foreign financial control in Turkey). Soviet-Turkish friendship was, therefore, a matter of great historical importance [illegible] the best [illegible] Besides, both Turkey and Russia needed [illegible] construction. The "Izvestiya" of the 25th September [illegible] tion of M. Litvinov's speech. [illegible] *

5 Now if I have rightly [illegible] Tevfik Rustu was good [illegible] His policy is to [illegible] Government not to be [illegible] to enter no group. If M. Litvinov asks him not to join the supposed anti-Soviet front, he can easily, I should think, promise not to do so, but if M. Litvinov goes further and asks for solidarity with the Soviet Union against the [illegible] Turkish policy. In his reply M. [illegible] Rustu naturally emphasised the positive [illegible] Soviet-Turkish friendship as a service to the two countries themselves, and [illegible] but rather of solidarity against [illegible] In the [illegible] of his reception and for the [illegible] found that Soviet-Turkish friendship had [illegible] He [illegible] to regard the [illegible] of peace and [illegible] countries [illegible] in any way [illegible] to [illegible] He was following with great interest the efforts of the Soviet Government to raise the moral and cultural level of the people of the Union, to whom he brought a message of greeting from the Turkish nation.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM STRANG.

* Not printed.

Mr. Strang to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 7.)

No. 578.

Sir, *Moscow, September 30, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 577 of the 29th September, I have the honour to report that I had two conversations with Tevfik Rustu during his stay. The first at the reception given by the Turkish Ambassador and the second when the [illegible] visited the heads of missions individually. I found him talkative and [illegible]. He spoke in terms of warm friendship for Sir George Clerk, and said that the relations of our two Governments could not be better. There was absolutely no question of serious importance now outstanding. He said that the new Anglo-Iraq treaty might stand as an example of how His Majesty's Government kept their word. By the conclusion of that treaty the Mosul question was now finally dead and buried. The Russians had asked him about the treaty, and this is what he had told them.

2 He said that relations between the Turkish and Soviet Governments were excellent. He had come to Moscow to return Karakhan's visit and to develop [illegible] contact with members of the Soviet Government, which was the best possible [illegible] for [illegible]. The Soviet Government appreciated his policy, and M. Litvinov had gone out of his way in his speech to pay him a quite unsolicited compliment for striking out a new line by the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1925.

3 [illegible] ndment [illegible] idea of his policy was to establish good re[illegible]ations with all [illegible] to be bound to none. Turkish foreign policy was [illegible] and in the treaties which she had concluded with other countries, all of which had been published. It was essential to avoid all special or regional combinations or groups. Such political devices were out of date and entirely out of harmony with [illegible] without in the world. He was sorry to see that his view was not [illegible] cepted in the world to-day, and in fact, he might say that it was [illegible] nd in Washington that the value of a policy of avoiding such [illegible] ments was really understood. The virtue of his policy was proved by the fact that at the present moment there was no Government, not even the Persian [illegible] rnment with whom the Turkish Government was not on good terms. Of [illegible] e he had liquidated outstanding problems. Greco-Turkish relations, to take [illegible] outstanding example, had never been so cordial. The treaty of neutrality signed with Soviet Russia in 1925 had been a starting point, and he had continued on that road ever since. Tevfik Rustu then made some remarks about disarmament which I report in my despatch No. 579 of [illegible] September.

4 I have little comment to make on the general question of Soviet-Turkish relations. It is clearly to the interest of both countries to make the most of their [illegible]. The Soviet Union finds in Turkey her only friend. The two countries [illegible] neighbours, and the Soviet Union would like to maintain the old ties of [illegible] [illegible] (this date impossible, to prevent Turkey, now that she has [illegible] [illegible] from being [illegible] through dangerous [illegible] [illegible] of the Straits. Turkey's problem is, I suppose to [illegible] the tightrope between friendship with her powerful and potentially dangerous neighbour and good relations with the Great Powers who are equally her neighbours. She may even aspire, if she is ambitious, to act as a bridge between them.

5 I should add that I drew his Excellency's attention to the message from his correspondent in Turkey published in the "Times" of the 17th September, from which it appeared that there was some anxiety in Turkey at the continued presence in the Black Sea of the two Soviet warships, "Parishkava Kommuna" and "Profintern" and to the leading article in the same issue in which it was suggested that this anxiety was shared, not only by the other States bordering the Black Sea, but by the great Mediterranean Powers also. Tevfik Rustu made light of this report which he had not seen. He said that his Government had no naval ambitions. They had no money to spare for armaments, for they were not going to fight anybody. They did not regard these Soviet ships as in any way threatening their security.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM STRANG.

E 5384 324 44 No 99

Mr Strang to Mr A. Henderson (*Received October 7*)

(No 580)

Sir *Moscow, September 30, 1930*

IN my despatches Nos. 577 and 578 of the 29th September I had the honour to report on the visit of Tevfik Rustu Bey to Moscow. The Soviet authorities were at special pains to entertain him, and some remarks upon this aspect of his visit may be of interest to you.

2. Tevfik Rustu was entertained at an official banquet [illegible] arrival. Of this I am unable to speak, as foreign representatives were not present. The banquet was followed by an official reception at the Government [illegible] tournament, a large mansion standing in its own grounds in the best [illegible] This house, which was erected some few years ago by a *nouveau riche*, is built in a rather more restrained, though still magnificent, style than most [illegible] Moscow houses which have their own new Embassy, err on the side of over decoration. It is admirably designed for official receptions, and parts of it are [illegible] for officials. M. Karakhan has taken up his residence there, [illegible] rooms which I shall occupy in the new Embassy.

3. The reception was given not by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, as is usually the case, but by the President of the Council of Peoples Commissars, M. Rykov. Everyday clothes were worn. The guests were received by M. and Mme. Rykov, to whom they were introduced by M. Litvinov, [illegible] and Mme. Rykov, after his cure. M. Rykov is small and neatly built, quiet in manner and of dignified carriage, a pure Russian with a face rough featured but of some charm. Mme. Rykov is a stout, jolly little housewife.

4. There were about 300 people present, including, in addition to the members of the Diplomatic Body and their wives, a fair number of Soviet officials, military and naval officers and journalists. Two members of the Council of Peoples Commissars were present besides Rykov and Litvinov, namely, Voroshilov, Commissar for War, and Mikoyan, Commissar for Trade. Voroshilov was in plain clothes and looked a vigorous, rather comic, person, of coarse and somewhat disputed appearance. He was originally a factory worker who came into prominence during the civil war, when he was already a member of the Stalin clique in opposition to Trotsky. Mikoyan was in white blouse and dark [illegible] of Armenian personality, slim and active, with black Armenian features, [illegible] aquiline nose and cropped head. Other notabilities were Schmidt, Rykov's uncle, Muklevich, head of the navy, a placid, rather melancholy looking man in simple naval uniform, Enukidze, secretary of the Central Executive Committee, a heavy Lord Georgian, of whom everyone speaks well, Senior Soviet Ambassador Agaora Karakhan, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, handsome, rather effeminate, well groomed [illegible] and pince-nez, and last but not least, Budenny, chief of the cavalry of the Red Army, the idol of the troops and of the people, [illegible] short thick set soldierly man with [illegible] moustaches and [illegible] good [illegible] I had some talk with Budenny and [illegible] and he [illegible] him, he remembered co-operating with our forces against the Turks in Mesopotamia during the war. Apart from Budenny and the officials of the Narkomindel, the Soviet officials mixed little with the foreigners, but formed themselves into small separate [illegible]

5. About 11 P.M., when everybody had arrived, there was a short musical entertainment by artistes from the opera, after which Tevfik Rustu opened the ball with Mme. Litvinov. Fox trots are severely frowned on in this country, gramophone records of these ideologically unsound melodies command a high price in the "black market" and are smuggled in under unimpeachable but misleading labels. It is said that even Komsomols and Komsolkas, who ought to know better, meet in secret to satisfy their hunger for enchantment by dancing the *bourgeois* dances; however the ban was lifted for once in Tevfik Rustu's honour. About 1 A.M. the buffet was opened and we were treated to a supper of oriental sumptuousness, at which nothing was lacking from caviare to champagne. After supper there was more dancing, and the company dispersed about 3 A.M.

6. I am told that it is quite unprecedented for so many of the Soviet officials to attend a reception of this kind. Even the reception in honour of King Alexander was organised by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and not by the Government as a whole. The Danish Minister, who has been here seven years, has never before been in the same room with M. Rykov. It was remarked at the reception given by the German Ambassador on the 11th August last, the national anniversary, that for once some of the Soviet notabilities had turned out to attend even a foreign reception. There may be some significance in this new development, but I will refrain for the moment from speculating [illegible]

7. The reception at the Turkish Embassy on the evening of the 25th September was almost a repetition of the previous evening's entertainment. It was attended by the same company and was of equal magnificence. The differences were that even more dress was worn, except by some of the members of the Government, that there was much less room in which to move about, that Huseyien Ragip Bey had secured a number of the corps de ballet to dance for us, and that the air was heavy with the news of the shooting of the forty-eight specialists announced that very morning.

8. The gala performance at the opera was organised by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. M. Litvinov and his company occupied the Royal Box. The Diplomatic Body were ranged in boxes in order of seniority right and left of it. The audience was much less proletarian in appearance than usual—the result, I am told, of a tripling of the price of seats for the occasion. We were treated to a special performance, consisting of the first act of the "Krasni Mak" (the "Red Poppy"), a modern propagandist ballet (the first not unlike the others, has very little action in it), the third act of "Prince Igor" and a divertissement composed of a series of short dances and excerpts from ballets. Tea and cakes were served in the foyer during the second interval. The same members of the Soviet hierarchy were present in an appearance.

9. It is noteworthy that no reference was made in the press to the reception given by the Government to Tevfik Rustu. The fact that a reception had been given by the Turkish Ambassador was reported, but it was not stated that the members of foreign missions were present.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM STRANG.

E 5515 324 44 No 100

Mr Strang to Mr A. Henderson. (*Received October 13*)

No. [illegible]

Sir *Moscow, October 9, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 577 of the 29th September, that, before his departure for Leningrad on the 27th September, Tevfik Rustu Bey was the guest of the Commissariat for War at the Red Army Club in Moscow. Tevfik Rustu was accompanied by the Turkish Ambassador, by Fehmi Refka Bey, Deputy of the Grand National Assembly, and by Nuri Bey, of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was received by the Commissar for War, M. Voroshilov. There were also present M. Litvinov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kalinin, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Smirnov, Soviet Ambassador to Angora, and the chiefs of the Red Army and navy. Speeches were made by Voroshilov and by the commander of the Moscow military district, to which Tevfik Rustu replied. His Excellency was then entertained to luncheon, after which he visited the military museum and was present at a dramatic performance.

2. In the afternoon of the 27th September, Tevfik Rustu attended a reception [illegible] by the Society for Promotion of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Speeches were made by the president of the society, M. Petrov, and by Tevfik Rustu. None of the speeches, either here or at the Military Club, is [illegible] special mention.

3. On the evening of the 27th September Tevfik Rustu left for Leningrad, [illegible] the members of his staff. He was received, with a guard of honour, by the civil and military chiefs of the Leningrad district. He saw the sights of Leningrad and [illegible] a performance at the opera. He returned to Moscow on the 30th September and left Moscow on the morning of the 2nd October for Sotchi on the Black Sea, [illegible] proposed to pay a visit to M. Kalinin, president of the Central Executive [illegible] there on holiday.

1 The following official communiqué was published in the "Izvestiya" of the 3rd October

"During the visit to Moscow of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüstü Bey, a friendly exchange of opinion in regard to Soviet Turkish relations and other questions relating to international politics took place between him and MM Litvinow and Karakhan the Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs respectively There also took part in the conversations the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Hussein Hami Bey and the Soviet Minister at Angora M Suritz

During the conversations both countries were able to agree that the interests of the U S S R and Turkey in relation to peace in the Near East and international politics were absolutely identical It was also agreed that Soviet Turkish friendship at the present time was a more powerful factor of peace than anything else

As regards mutual relations between the U S S R and Turkey both sides were mutually satisfied that there was no single question outstanding between the two countries which could in any way disturb the good understanding between them and on the contrary that their relations were all the time taking on a closer and more friendly character It would be the task of both Governments to see to it that these relations continue both close and friendly

"In the course of the exchange of views, it was generally felt that meetings of this kind between the persons responsible for the foreign policy of both countries was the best means of strengthening the relations between them, and it was therefore decided to apply this method in the future Tevfik Rüstü Bey left Moscow for Sotchi on the morning of the 2nd

2 Some foreign colleagues have inferred from the fact that Tevfik Rüstü stayed rather longer in Moscow after his return from Leningrad than was originally intended that conversations of some importance have taken place They have even suggested, in view of the prominent part played by the chiefs of the army and navy at the various receptions organized in Tevfik Rüstü's honour, that the nature of a military understanding is under consideration It is true that the foreign military attaches except the assistant Turkish military attaché were not invited, absent from Moscow during the whole of Tevfik Rüstü's visit It is also to be noted that the Turkish military attaché is given opportunities of acquiring information which are offered to none of his colleagues I find it, however, rather difficult to believe that any important new understanding of this character is under negotiation It would imply a reversal of the Turkish policy of non-entanglements as consistently practised during the last few years and as expounded by Tevfik Rüstü himself during his present visit It is probable that the Russians have made special efforts to draw the Turks more closely to them. There is evidence of such an intention in M Litvinow's speech reported in my despatch No [illegible] and, indeed, the formation of Fethi Bey's party, which stands for a rapprochement between Turkey and the Western Powers and the [illegible] Soviet Union [illegible] not wishing to strengthen at this moment the tie between Turkey and herself and correspondingly to weaken relations between Turkey and the rest of the world Tevfik Rüstü's dismissal of the continued presence of the Soviet warships in the Black Sea as a matter of no importance might conceivably lend colour, though I doubt it to the idea that some military and naval [illegible] Pact was under consideration, but [illegible] that [illegible] would be certainly dubious But there is no [illegible] and [illegible] is hardly [illegible] that Moscow has to offer

I have &c.
WILLIAM STRANG

[E 5508, 3478, 44] No. 101

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(*Received October* 13.)

(No. 386.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 8, 1930

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a note by Mr Morgan, counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, on the Extraordinary Session of the Grand National Assembly, which closed on the 2nd instant

2. I agree with the view expressed by Mr. Morgan, who attended all the debates, that the discussion has been beneficial, and I feel that, although the Opposition did not show any great parliamentary strength, its existence has at least opened the windows of the Assembly and let a draught of fresh air into that rather stagnant atmosphere

I have &c.
GEORGE R CLERK

Enclosure in No. 101

Memorandum

ON the 2nd October the extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly, which met on the 22nd September to deliberate on a Bill to safeguard the value of Turkish currency, came to an end

In the course of this short session [illegible] the Government, the [illegible] Republican Party, the resignation of Ismet Pasha's Government, and its return to power with certain Cabinet changes, and certain modifications of its programme

On the closing day of the session, the new Government's policy was announced Ismet Pasha and Fethi Bey engaged for the first time in debate, and the Assembly expressed its confidence in the Government by 261 votes to 12

The interest which the Ghazi, the Deputies, and the public displayed in the proceedings of the Assembly during its session was intensified on the 2nd October on the occasion of the debate between the Government and the Opposition. Yet all must have known that the plan from which the creation of a stage Opposition sprang and which had for object the ousting of Ismet Pasha from office had been abandoned, and that the Opposition had now no other wish than to fade out.

The debate might have been colourless, but Ismet Pasha and evidently [illegible] keyed up [illegible] the [illegible] by his policy [illegible] he could, for he vigorously attacked the [illegible] Opposition and showed [illegible] resentment in his treatment of [illegible] have been [illegible] Ghazi awaiting the opportunity of showing his power [illegible] Ghazi his exuberance manifested his relief at his escape from danger

He was frequently enthusiastically applauded by the Government Deputies while the Ghazi seemed to follow his speeches with [illegible]

Fethi Bey accepted his position [illegible] He was [illegible] but the appearance of his party [illegible] Government to drop [illegible] Ismet Ministers whom the Opposition [illegible] regards its policy to alter those parts which the Opposition disapproved He was heard with sympathetic consideration by the majority of the Deputies, and his speech earned him the Ghazi's indulgent smiles

Occasionally Fethi Bey was drawn to protest that he was a good Republican when wild men of the Government party accused him of being the leader and friend of reactionaries, Communists, law breakers and evil doers, but, in the main he showed himself calm and even apathetic

A point of interest in the debate arose out of Fethi's plea for fair treatment of the Ottoman Debt question Ismet Pasha, in reply, declared that he had to choose between spending money on national defence, and paying the Ottoman Debt, and that he had elected the former alternative, national defence being a question of life and death for Turkey, for a debtor's right to live came before his obligation to pay his debts

When the debate ended on the Assembly rose until the 1st November and it was felt that the discussion which had taken place during the session had been beneficial that the reforms suggested by the Opposition had been accepted by many members of the Government and that, until the day comes when Turkey can risk having free elections, much good would be done by continuing the system of having a number of Government Deputies to act as an Opposition party.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN

Angora, October 4, 1930.

E 5509/1932/93 No. 102

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received October 14.*)

(No. 387.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 8, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Francis Humphrys, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, arrived here on his way to Bagdad on the 4th instant and left for his post this afternoon.

2. Sir Francis Humphrys and I went to Angora on the 5th October for two days and had official interviews with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Under Secretary of the Angora Office. This morning before leaving he also had an interview here with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who returned from Russia yesterday and leaves for Angora to-night.

3. The High Commissioner will no doubt report in due course to the Colonial Office the substance of these interviews and it is unnecessary for me to describe them at any length. But I may be allowed to put on record the excellent impression which Sir Francis Humphrys made upon the authorities as well as my belief that the visit has established a valuable personal contact, that it came at a most opportune moment and that it will be of great use to the High Commissioner when discussing with the Iraq Government the policy of that country towards Turkey.

4. I hope that the High Commissioner's interviews with the authorities at Angora left nothing to be desired. He had a long conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and at the return luncheon given by the Vali the Prime Minister, contrary to his most invariable habit, was present and, after the manner of the Gazi, the atmosphere was one of sincere friendship and cordiality. The Gazi was at his best and kept us for nearly two and a half hours discussing the autochthonic races of India and Mesopotamia, giving with great frankness, his opinion of ex-King Amanullah, and telling us confidential stories of his relations with Enver Pasha during the last phase of Enver's career.

5. I understand that, apart from talks with other Turkish authorities, the Kurdish problem, both in Turkey and Iraq, was discussed frankly, but in the same friendly spirit, no real complaint was made of the weakness of the Iraq Government except to which the Sheikh of Barzan had been able to support the Kurdish rebels in Turkey. Indeed, some allowance seemed to be given to the fact that the Iraq Government had, not yet been able to bring the Sheikh's district into complete control. But the High Commissioner was asked to press upon the Iraq Government the necessity for them to take effective measures in the interests of both countries, and I feel that Sir F. Humphrys was able to convince the Turks that it was not goodwill so much as material force that was lacking in Bagdad, and his assurance that he would impress the facts upon the Iraq Government immediately on his return clearly gave confidence and satisfaction.

6. Sir F. Humphrys took the opportunity to point out that the Permanent Frontier Commission was designed for such matters, and that much could be done if the Commission, and more especially the Turkish members, showed a more active sense of their powers and responsibilities.

7. The Iraq-Turkish frontier question happened also to coincide with the receipt of your telegram No. 88 of the 3rd instant, relative to the possibility of the Turkish Government seeking permission for their troops to enter, or operate within Iraq territory. Happily, it had not to be raised either by the High Commissioner or myself since, as I reported in my telegram No. 111 of to-day, the Permanent Under Secretary when describing the present situation of the Turkish troops on the frontier spontaneously added that there was no intention of asking for leave to cross the

frontier and said that renewed instructions had been sent to the Turkish officer in command to respect the integrity of Iraq territory.

8. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

[E 5652/463/44] No. 103.

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 537. Confidential.)
Sir, *Athens, October 13, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to Mr. Harvey's despatch No. 418 of the 23rd July, that I asked the Prime Minister on the 6th October what line he proposed to take at Angora in the matter of the naval agreement with Turkey. M. Venizelos said he intended to try and conclude a modest agreement based on the principle of parity, though he did not define more precisely what he meant by parity. He had decided to take no naval experts, as, if Greek and Turkish experts once sat down to discuss relative values of ships and guns, they would be certain to fall out at once, as each would produce demands that would be rejected by the other side. But he proposed to invite the Turks to agree that each Power should inform the other, six months in advance, of any orders for new ships. This would give time for explanation and negotiation and for considering whether it was necessary to place a corresponding order.

I sounded the Turkish Minister about the prospects of a naval agreement being reached during M. Venizelos's visit to Angora. Enis Bey said that the principle of parity had already been agreed upon. I asked whether the present position was to be taken as parity or some other maximum force as a limit. Enis Bey said some considerably larger force might be fixed upon, but that did not mean that it would be attained. He did not mention the six months' notice mentioned to me by M. Venizelos, and I did not refer to it.

3. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
PATRICK RAMSAY.

[K 12472/12472/244] No. 104.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received October 20.*)

(No. 397.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1930.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 446 of the 25th July, I have the honour to report that I have transmitted to Mr. W. D. W. Matthews the King's Commission appointing him to be His Majesty's Consul at Trebizond and Mersin, together with the exequatur of the Turkish Government.

2. In the note transmitting the exequatur to me, the Turkish Government maintains the existence of [illegible] on the jurisdiction of His Majesty's consular officers in the Vilayet of Van, Erzerum, Ardahan,* Erzingan, Kars and Bayazid, as well as certain unspecified districts, described as military zones, in the Vilayet of Trebizond, Samsun and Sinop.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

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* Ardahan is in fact in the Vilayet of Kars.

[E 5648/466/44] No. 105.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received October 20*)

(No. 398)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1930.*

WITH reference to paragraph 6 of Mr. Helm's despatch No. 336 of the 27th August, I have the honour to report that the Soviet cruiser "Chervonaya Ukraina," accompanied by the destroyers "Mezamoynik" and "Charoushi," arrived here from the Black Sea on the 1st October. These units were joined the next day by two submarines.

2. Any celebrations or visits that took place other than the formal visit of the local Turkish authorities, were of a purely private nature. The senior naval attaché here sought an interview with the commanding officer, but was informed that the latter was [illegible] to be absent from Constantinople. One or two naval attachés did however subsequently obtain permission to go on board the cruiser, and Captain Sechi, the Italian naval attaché, was politely received. He was much struck by the respectful attitude and strict discipline of the crews. On the other hand the officers were slovenly, dirty and [illegible]. No one saw the whole time and the officer in charge [illegible] to offer to him in everything. The men were of good physique and well fed.

3. The cruiser and the destroyers left for Mudros on the 5th October, and the submarines two days later for the Piræus. It was understood that the cruise was being undertaken purely for the purpose of exercise, and that there was no intention of making formal visits to any other ports.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5850/3476/44] No. 106.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—Received October 20.)

No. 399)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Tevfik Rüstü Bey, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has lately returned from an official visit to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

2. His Excellency was accompanied on his journey to Moscow by the Soviet Ambassador at Angora, M. Sourtz, and by Falih Rifki, editor of the "Hakimyeti Milliye." For his return the Soviet Government placed at the Minister's disposal one of their newest passenger boats, the "Ajaristan."

At the close of the visit a communiqué was issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that, at the conversations held by Tevfik Rüstü with M. Litvinov and M. Karakan on questions of international policy, Turkish and Soviet interests and views were found to be in perfect agreement and that relations were becoming constantly closer and more friendly. A copy of this communiqué is enclosed herein.*

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5649/324/44] No. 107.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 400)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 14, 1930.*

THE municipal elections now being held throughout Turkey have greatly stirred the press and the inhabitants of the larger towns.

2. The appearance of an Opposition party enjoying some measure of Presidential favour has, for the first time since the establishment of the republic enabled people to express openly and without serious immediate consequences to themselves views contrary to those of the Government.

* Not printed.

3. Men and women voters are availing themselves of the privilege, the People's party leaders are exhorting the people to claim that freedom has at last become a reality in Turkey. Democratic leaders assist at the polling booths, personal statements and similar signs of real pleasure in the elections.

4. I gather that the majority of the voters are against the Government, but as the ballot boxes are under the sole control and supervision of Government officials there is little security to the secrecy of the ballot.

5. In Constantinople divers of the Free party have stormed several of the polling stations in the act of stuffing the ballot boxes, and placing them in public view. Motor cars and gendarmes, assisted by police and fire engines, have been necessary in maintaining the inviolability of the invisible ballot boxes and the partiality of those in charge of them.

6. Foiled in their attempts to secure the boxes, individuals or groups desirous of entering peacefully to record their votes for the Free party pass through rows of policemen to learn that their names cannot be found in the register of voters. Voters of the People's party meet with no such difficulties, and in one district a class of schoolgirls was able to vote for the Government candidates.

7. The People's party state that their candidates will obtain overwhelming majorities in all districts. They estimate that possibly 5 per cent. of the electors will vote for the Free party. The people composing this small percentage have been classified by the Government party as follows: convicts enjoying temporary liberty, reactionaries—religious, sartorial or alphabetical, knaves who have sold their souls for some [illegible] who believe that their sugar and petroleum [illegible] cancelled, Communists, [illegible] Jews and Armenians.

8. Fethi Bey has come out openly in favour of the participation of the parties in the elections, and the lists of candidates submitted by the Free party [illegible] Christians. Fethi Bey's attitude has aroused the indignation of the Government press which fears that the [illegible] possibility of a Christian hero to Democracy.

9. The elections, after lasting a fortnight, will come to an end on the 19th October. Whatever their result, they will have provided the people with the joy and excitement of having been able for the first time for many years to express their personal opinions with something approaching freedom.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5768/463/44] No. 108.

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received October 25.*)

(No. [illegible])

Telegraphic. *Athens, October 24, 1930.*

MY telegram No. [illegible] of 24th October. Visit of M. Venizelos to Angora.

I am reliably informed that the Greek Prime Minister will visit Constantinople on his return and that while there he will pay a visit to the Ecumenical Patriarch. He will also announce publicly to the Greek community in Constantinople the abandonment by Greece of all designs on the former Turkish capital and will recommend that [illegible].

I learn that Turkish Government were consulted about proposed visit and stated that they [illegible] by agreement but satisfaction thereat.

[E 5780/3476/44] No. 109.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 411)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 24, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 400 of the 14th October, I have the honour to report that the Turkish municipal elections [illegible] in almost every district, been won by the candidates of the People's party [illegible]. In Constantinople (the birthplace of Mahmut Esat Bey, ex-Minister of Justice) [illegible] has the distinction of having confided their municipal destinies to [illegible] of the

of

Free party in Constantinople and Smyrna the figures, as announced, were as follows:—

	People's Party	Free Party
Constantinople	[illegible]	[illegible]
Smyrna	[illegible]	[illegible]

2. The Government seem to have won their victory mainly by intimidating disqualifying Opposition voters, or by tampering with the ballot-boxes. At Adalia, for instance, the president and members of the Free party's local organisation were imprisoned during the elections. The Opposition newspaper [illegible] agitating for their release, as well as for that of numerous other Free party representatives imprisoned in other towns.

3. Some of the leaders of the Free party profess to be satisfied with the [illegible] obtained so shortly after the creation of the new party, and look forward with confidence to greater success at the parliamentary elections next year. They [illegible] some support for this view in the number of people [illegible] result of the parliamentary elections will probably none the less be decided [illegible] by Turkey's rulers.

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

E 5860 323 44] No. 110

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

(No. 1187.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 27, 1930*

IN the course of a visit this afternoon, the Italian Ambassador said that he had been instructed by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to ask me whether it would not now be expedient for the Italian [illegible] to take joint action at Constantinople with a view to inducing Turkey to join the League of Nations. I told the Italian Ambassador that, although I should be quite ready to examine Signor Grandi's proposal and let him have a considered opinion, I [illegible] any purpose would be served by taking the action which Signor Grandi had in view. Our attitude as regards Turkey joining the League was perfectly well known to the Turkish Government, and it seemed better to leave any further action in the matter of applying for membership of the League to their initiative.

I am &c.
ARTHUR HENDERSON

E 5798 323 44] No. 111

Sir R. Graham to Mr. A. Henderson [illegible]

(No. 734.)

(Extract.)

Sir, *Rome, October 21, 1930*

IN conversation yesterday the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had instructed the Italian Ambassador in London to approach you on the subject of the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations. Signor Grandi said that not so long ago the Turks attached, as a condition to their entry into the League, [illegible] upon them of a permanent seat on the Council. Signor Grandi had told them frankly that this was a ridiculous pretension. They were now in a more reasonable frame of mind and could probably be attracted into the League if the matter [illegible] adroitly. Signor Grandi added that he considered it highly desirable [illegible] Turks away from Russia and towards the League, if this could be [illegible] you would certainly receive Signor Bordonaro [illegible]

I have &c.
R. GRAHAM

[E 5918 463/44] No. 112

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson—(Received November 1.)

No. 1[illegible]
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, October 31, 1930*

ATHENS telegram No. 160.
Following agreements were signed yesterday:—

1. Treaty of friendship, neutrality, conciliation and arbitration.
2. Treaty of commerce and navigation, including residence and consular articles and [illegible] schedules.
3. Protocol [illegible] of naval armaments. Text by bag. Its essence is no [illegible] to denounce or [illegible] contract without six months' notice to the other party to allow for friendly exchange of views.

Agreements will be published as soon as possible with the exception of tariff [illegible] which must await [illegible].

Visit has passed off in a [illegible] and both parties are delighted. Triumphal arch decorated in Turkish and Greek national colours and with message of welcome in Greek was erected, and M. Venizelos [illegible] review of troops on Turkish national day. At dinner given last night by [illegible] Minister, Ismet Pasha toasted Greece and noble Greek nation. It is understood that the latter and Turkish Minister for [illegible] to Athens in April.

[illegible]

E 5919 463/44 No. 113

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (Received November 1.)

No. 1[illegible]
(Telegraphic.) *Angora, October 31, 1930*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

M. Venizelos is to visit the Ecumenical Patriarch in Stamboul to-morrow with the full consent of Turkish Government. M. Venizelos is as desirous as Turkish [illegible] that the visit should not take the form of a manifestation, and it is being [illegible]

[illegible] realised that if they expect M. Venizelos to attend review of [illegible] at Angora they must give Greek public opinion something pleasant [illegible]

[illegible]

E 5947 1511 44] No. 114

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson—(Received November 5.)

(No. 113.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His [illegible] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit copy [illegible] No. 11 from His Majesty's military attaché at this Embassy, dated the [illegible] regarding the situation in Eastern Turkey.

[illegible]

from Mr. [illegible]

to Foreign Office, 1944.

(No. 11)

Sir,

Angora, October 24, 1944.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 9 dated the 17th September, 1944, I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a report by the Military Attaché on his journey to Eastern Turkey.

The Turkish authorities had provided facilities for the journey, and the Military Attaché was received with great courtesy by the Turkish officials and military authorities whom he met. He was impressed by the high standard of training and discipline of the Turkish troops, especially in the mountain warfare schools at Lake Van and Erzurum, and by the efficiency of the arrangements for the defence of the Russian frontier.

It is suggested that a Turkish force could operate with great success in the event of a German withdrawal from Greece, and that the Turks would be glad to be given the opportunity of fighting the Germans. The Military Attaché, however, points out that the Turkish Army is short of artillery and transport, and that the withdrawal of German troops from Greece would probably be followed by the withdrawal from Anatolia and Thrace of Turkish troops and their posts allegedly taken over by Bulgaria.

The Military Attaché's report gives a picture of the Turkish Army which, I think, will be of interest to the Service Departments concerned. I have forwarded a copy to the War Office, and I propose to send a copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, for his information.

I am, &c.,

(For the Ambassador),

[illegible]

Military Attaché.

E 6042 463 44 **No. 12**

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. Eden (Received November 7).

No. 881.

Sir,

Athens, October 29, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a telegram No. 1 of the 24th October, I addressed to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by the Royalist delegates who left Athens for Cairo on the 19th instant.

2. Mr. Venizelos's statements, as reported in my despatch No. 537 of the 21st October, will be of general nature will no doubt be studied carefully in the matter of letting Greek armed forces, those who are sceptical of the apparent change of heart of the Turks will appear to be justified and the opponents of the Government will not lose the opportunity of declaring that the results have not at all justified their speeches and promises on the subject of the Anglo-Soviet Pact. I do not help matters by calling attention to the fact that the Soviet Ambassador in Angora has received no instructions from his Government to make any démarche in favour of the Pact, and that the Soviet Press has not published any comment on the Pact since the 9th October, 1944.

3. Meanwhile, the Venizelos Government have not yet succeeded in forming a Cabinet. It is reported that they have been unable to find a Minister of Finance willing to accept the post, and that the Ministry of Public Works has been refused by Mr. Kyrou, the Minister of Communications. Mr. Venizelos is also reported to be having difficulty in finding a Minister of Agriculture. Should the Government fail to form a Cabinet, it is probable that the Regent will call upon Mr. Sophoulis to do so.

4. Nevertheless I observe that it is not only among political opponents that doubts are entertained as to whether the visit will not in the result prove to have been an illusory manifestation. For this reason the part will be scrutinised with a critical eye. If, as seems probable from M. Venizelos's statements, as reported in my despatch No. 537 of the 21st October, it will be of a general nature will not present any difficulty in the matter of letting Greek armed forces, those who are sceptical of the apparent change of heart of the Turks will appear to be justified and the opponents of the Government will not lose the opportunity of declaring that the results have not at all justified their speeches and promises on the subject of the Anglo-Soviet Pact. I do not help matters by calling attention to the fact that the Soviet Ambassador in Angora has received no instructions from his Government to make any démarche in favour of the Pact, and that the Soviet Press has not published any comment on the Pact since the 9th October, 1944. Since the Ambassador's departure for Moscow, I have received further reports from Athens and Salonika to the effect that there is a feeling of uneasiness and apprehension among the Communists and Left-wing elements at the prospect of the withdrawal from Greece of German troops, and that the Communists are preparing to take advantage of this withdrawal for the purpose of establishing themselves in power.

5. The Military Attaché, in his report, gives a picture of the operations against the Communist bands in Greece. He points out that the Greek Government have not been able to provide the Greek Security Battalions with the arms and equipment which they were promised by the Germans, and that the Germans have withheld supplies of arms and ammunition from the Greek Army. He considers that the Greek Government should be encouraged to take more vigorous measures to disarm the Communist bands, and that the Allies should be prepared to supply the Greek Government with the arms and equipment which they require for the purpose. I am sending a copy of this report to the War Office, and I propose to send a copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, for his information.

6. His Majesty's Minister at Cairo has been informed of the contents of this despatch.

I have, &c.,

(For the Ambassador),

PATRICK RAMSAY.

E 5860 323 44 **No. 13**

Mr. Eden to Mr. Law (Received November 7, 1944).

My dear Minister,

Foreign Office, November 7, 1944.

YOU will have heard that on the 27th October Venizelos made a statement to the Greek Parliament in which he said that he would be willing to pay a visit to Moscow for the purpose of discussing with the Russian Government the Greek question as a whole. He added that he would be glad to go to Cairo first in order to discuss the matter with His Majesty's Government.

2. I have now received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Cairo reporting that Venizelos has expressed a desire to see me there. I am sending Venizelos a message to the effect that I would be glad to see him in Cairo, but that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time.

3. I am sending you this letter in order that you may be aware of the situation. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time.

4. I am sending you this letter in order that you may be aware of the situation. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time.

5. I am sending you this letter in order that you may be aware of the situation. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time.

6. I am sending you this letter in order that you may be aware of the situation. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time. I am also telling him that I do not think that a visit to Moscow would be opportune at the present time.

Yours sincerely,

ANTHONY EDEN.

E 6088 463 44 **No. 14**

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden (Received November 10).

(No. 41)

Sir,

Moscow, November 1, 1944.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 840 and 841 of the 31st October, I have the honour to report that M. Vyshinsky sent for Mr. Sophoulis, the Greek Minister, on the afternoon of the 31st October, and informed him that the Soviet Government had decided to withdraw their Military Mission from Greece. The Mission would leave Athens on the 1st November, and would proceed to Cairo, where it would report to His Majesty's Minister. Representatives of the Soviet Military Mission in Athens would be withdrawn from Athens to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Consulates in Greece would be closed.

2. Nevertheless I observe that it is not only among political opponents that doubts are entertained as to whether the visit will not in the result prove to have been an illusory manifestation. For this reason the part will be scrutinised with a critical eye. If, as seems probable from M. Venizelos's statements, as reported in my despatch No. 537 of the 21st October, it will be of a general nature will not present any difficulty in the matter of letting Greek armed forces, those who are sceptical of the apparent change of heart of the Turks will appear to be justified and the opponents of the Government will not lose the opportunity of declaring that the results have not at all justified their speeches and promises on the subject of the Anglo-Soviet Pact. I do not help matters by calling attention to the fact that the Soviet Ambassador in Angora has received no instructions from his Government to make any démarche in favour of the Pact, and that the Soviet Press has not published any comment on the Pact since the 9th October, 1944. Since the Ambassador's departure for Moscow, I have received further reports from Athens and Salonika to the effect that there is a feeling of uneasiness and apprehension among the Communists and Left-wing elements at the prospect of the withdrawal from Greece of German troops, and that the Communists are preparing to take advantage of this withdrawal for the purpose of establishing themselves in power

[illegible]

demand ... should also serve as a measure both of the success ... and of the change in Graeco-Turkish relations ... inaugurated ...

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 17.

[illegible]

[illegible]

E 6033/163/44

No. 18.

[illegible]

violation of the Turkish Constitution that one section of the Turkish community should be confined to certain restricted localities and denied freedom of movement and domicile in the country of which they are citizens. In practice such freedom would mean that the Greeks—and the same is true of other minorities such as the Armenians and Jews—would re-establish themselves as traders and merchants throughout Turkey and, thanks to their superior aptitude and long experience, soon drive the Turk from the field in which he is laboriously and expensively learning to labour. Possibly, the immediate economic effect on the country might be profitable, but it would mean the end of the effort to make of the Turk a competent and puppet citizen of his own democratic State. But though this and other difficulties still remain, and must be left to the passage of years and experience to solve, the visit of M. Venizelos to Angora has definitely marked the end of a period of racial bitterness, memories and latent hostility and is a striking justification of the sincerity and pacific intention of Turkish foreign policy.

5. Perhaps the clearest proof of that sincerity on the part of both Governments is furnished by the Naval Pact which has been concluded. Both parties had long realised the desirability of arriving at some agreement, but both parties had also rather despaired of finding the common formula, and the solution, which was reached at the last moment, is not only ingenious but, given the circumstances, as practical as could be hoped for.

6. Last summer Italian mediation was active at various critical stages of the negotiations, and there is little doubt that both parties owe a certain debt to Signor Mussolini for bringing them together again when rupture seemed very near. It was therefore natural, especially in view of the close relations between Turkey and Italy, that public recognition of Italy's good offices at that time should have been made upon reaching the final agreement. Both M. Venizelos and M. Mitkhalakopoulos were at pains to assure me that there was in this nothing more than a natural act of gratitude and courtesy, and I am confident that that is so.

7. The Hungarian visit was an event of less importance to Turkey [illegible] though it certainly was to Turkish national pride and it calls for only a sentence or two as being a further example of Turkey's intention to be friends with all countries that are ready to be friends with her, were it not that Count Bethlen found himself as unable to avoid bringing in the question of treaty revision as Mr. Dick to keep Jem Charles's head out of his memorandum. I have quoted, in my despatch No. 409 of the 20th November, Count Bethlen's remarks, though I was unable to share my French colleague's perturbation, I think that the Hungarian Prime Minister would have been better advised to have avoided any reference to treaty revision, for the Turkish comment was that it was not happy inasmuch as one of the principles of Turkish policy, which has been stated over and over again, is that Turkey is entirely satisfied with her frontiers as now laid down and only asks to be allowed to pursue her own development within those frontiers. Apart from this little note of discord, everything passed off admirably and the Turks were genuinely pleased at the visit, which they looked upon as an affirmation of the comradeship between the two races.

8. I am not sure that some of my colleagues do not persist in seeing more in the Hungarian visit than an exchange of friendly courtesies, and our diplomatic dove-cote was mildly fluttered by the report of Signor Mussolini's speech on the 27th ultimo, which reached here during the festivities. But the reference therein to treaty revision, though it may have encouraged Count Bethlen's own allusion to that subject and more especially the statement that it is only towards the east that Italian expansion can be directed, have aroused singularly little comment among the Turks, even though Anatolia is still bare of population. A few years ago such an utterance would have aroused fear and resentment in Angora, but to-day Turkey feels strong enough to accept such phrases calmly. It is, of course, possible to argue that Turkish calmness is due to the existence of a Turco-Italian-Hungarian understanding, formed as a counter weight to France and the Little *Entente*, but such a combination is so entirely foreign to the declared basis of Turkish foreign policy and to the policy effectively pursued by Turkey during the four years that I have been here, that I find it difficult to accept it or to see in Count Bethlen's visit anything more than an act of inter-State courtesy, of value to both countries as a public affirmation of sincere and mutual friendliness.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Budapest.

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

(E 6090/3476/44) No. 119

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received November 10.*)

(No. 422.)

Sir, *Angora, November 4, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 442 of the 3rd November, 1929, I have the honour to report that the new session of the Grand National Assembly was opened on the 1st instant, and I enclose a French translation of the speech delivered by the President of the Republic on the occasion.

2. I was present at the ceremony and followed carefully the reaction of the Deputies to the Gazi's words. The points that were most noticeable were that the loudest applause during the whole speech followed the President's reference to the opening of the Sivas Railway. There is some significance in this, for the only open and considered criticism of Ismet Pasha's Government was directed to the extravagance of its policy in building railways, and the Sivas Railway is entirely its own. On the other hand, the information that the lists for subscription to the State Bank were open to the Deputies was received in stony silence. The allusion to the Greek Premier's visits was naturally applauded, while the references to the administrative irregularities of the municipal elections, and to the abuse of the liberty of the press were received with somewhat rueful countenances. The general impression I derived was that the position of Ismet Pasha is, at the moment, as strong as, if not stronger than, ever, and that Jelal Bey has got a long and difficult task in front of him.

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 6091/3476/44 No. 120

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(*Received November 10.*)

(No. 423.)

Sir, *Angora, November 4, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 440 of the 30th October, 1929, I have the honour to report that the usual celebration of the Turkish National Day took place on the 29th ultimo in circumstances of special *éclat*, owing to the presence of the heads of the Greek and Hungarian Governments.

2. There was the usual reception by the Gazi of the Diplomatic Body, followed by a review of the troops in Angora and of boy scouts from all over the country. As usual the troops impressed one as first-class military material, though, except for the so-called guards, the marching and alignment did not seem to my unmilitary eye as good as last year, while the march past of the artillery was markedly less successful. This was probably due to the antics of some of the Turkish aviators who flew over the troops and the stands at a height of a few feet, a manœuvre that, however striking as a demonstration of Turkish progress in the art of flying, will, I devoutly trust, not be repeated, for the slightest mishap or misjudgment could have literally swept off the face of the earth the Gazi and his Government, as well as M. Venizelos and Count Bethlen, to say nothing of all the heads of foreign missions in Angora.

3. As soon as the last of the detachments of boy scouts had passed, the review ended, and it must be confessed that nobody, except possibly those who had been waiting all day to take part, regretted the disappearance of the serried ranks of the cadets of the military college and university school children of various age and representatives of Turkish sport in appropriate dress who have hitherto been a prominent and picturesque feature of the day's proceedings.

4. [illegible] there was the customary dinner to the diplomatic mission at the Angora Palace Hotel, at which the Gazi was present, followed by a [illegible] which took place this year in the records [illegible] of the cricket at Ogh[illegible]

I have &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[illegible]

E 6092 463 44] No. 121

Sir R. Graham to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received November 10*)

No. 809)

Sir, *Rome, November 4, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to the press, the Prime Minister has received the following telegram from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the signature of the Graco-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality Conciliation and Arbitration

'At the moment of proceeding to the signature of the Graco-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality Conciliation and Arbitration, which follows the signature of the agreements which eliminated the material difficulties existing between [illegible] I am happy to express to your Excellency my most friendly and sincere thanks for the work which your Excellency [illegible] and bring about this agreement which is being made operative at this moment of signature'

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM

C 8313 3519 62] No. [illegible]

[illegible] *to Mr. A. Henderson* (*Received November 11*)

No. 434)

Sir, *Angora, November 4, 1930*

I HAVE [illegible] to acquaint you for the information of the Marquess of Reading that I left Angora on the morning of the 31st October. [illegible] his Excellency was good enough to [illegible] to me. His train for Geneva [illegible]

2. Dr. Tevfik Rustu told me that he intended to go straight [illegible] without a break anywhere though M. Briand might come to the train [illegible] interview with the latter. Our conversation left on his return his Excellency rather than [illegible] Rome in order so he said to maintain that personal contact with Signor Mussolini to which, in view of the close and friendly relations between Italy and Turkey, attached great value. He implied that he not only wished to give a first hand account of the visits of the Greek and Hungarian Prime Ministers, but also that he wanted to discuss with Signor Mussolini the lines of the policy Turkey proposed to follow in Balkan affairs.

3. He asked me to ask Lord [illegible] Excellency to repeat to Signor Mussolini [illegible] to Italy, that Italy [illegible] in the event of any serious European [illegible] would not be willing to see Turkey who would see it either an adhesion to some [illegible] between Italy and Turkey and possibly Hungary, or alternatively a Pact of mutual assistance between Italy and Turkey. He [illegible] that such an agreement would be directed against [illegible] to be a party to it. The second object of [illegible] was to explain that relations between Italy and Turkey were now so close and friendly that it was the duty of both countries to [illegible] interests was foreshadowed. Dr. Tevfik Rustu professed to see in the phrase merely a reference to Dalmatia and Albania, but it is difficult to think that he can really be so easily satisfied and not to believe that his idea of visiting Rome on his way from Geneva has not been inspired by a wish to be more definitely reassured as to the exact meaning of Signor Mussolini's cryptic words.

4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to describe the developments in the Balkans which he hoped might be one of the consequences of the agreement with Greece. He said that he hoped that both Greece and Turkey would now establish a state of friendship with Bulgaria, the result of which would be that that country, freed from all anxieties on two of her frontiers, would no longer suffer from an inferiority complex and be able to approach the question of a definite understanding with Yugoslavia in a liberal and broad-minded spirit. But such overtures depended, in Dr. Tevfik Rustu's views, on two preliminary conditions, the one, that the people of Macedonia should be left absolutely free to decide for themselves to which country they belong, and the other, that any sort of understanding or alliance between Yugoslavia and Roumania directed against Bulgaria be definitely dissolved. His Excellency's thoughts for Balkan peace did not at present go further than this, and, indeed, it was no certainty that even so far was practicable, but he felt that an advance along these lines offered the best chance and it occurred to him that his idea should find favour in the eyes of His Majesty's Government. He considered that Great Britain and Turkey were the only two [illegible] Balkan powers [illegible] alliance with Yugoslavia. He [illegible] to be the case. The Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore much hoped that he would find at Geneva some representative of His Majesty's Government with whom he could fully discuss the question.

5. [illegible] his Excellency was urgently summoned by telephone to the Prime Minister and the conversation ended. I, therefore, thought it well to send [illegible] private and personal note containing two observations which I would have [illegible] naturally had time permitted. Dr. Tevfik Rustu is so apt to be carried away by [illegible] enthusiasm, which leads him to regard the most reasoned and mildest criticism as a proof of hostility, that it seemed to me advisable to prepare his mind [illegible] possible set back. I accordingly called his Excellency's attention to the possible doubt whether the Yugoslav Government would ever consent to the condition that the people of Macedonia should be left free to declare themselves either Yugoslav or Bulgarian, and I pointed out that his second condition involved, or seemed to involve, some change or modification of the Little *Entente*. The Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia signed on the 31st August 1922 recognised all treaties concluded between Yugoslavia and [illegible] and that any which involved or implied modification of the Little Entente seemed to raise a fresh question.

6. I should add that I did have an opportunity during the interview to get in a word as to the possible danger of a triangular friendship of Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria being misinterpreted as a "regional" and counter-balancing arrangement but Dr. Tevfik Rustu brushed this aside as being incompatible with Turkey's known and [illegible] policy of no "group" alliances or understandings.

7. I have [illegible] copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome and His Majesty's Ministers at Athens, Belgrade and Sofia.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

E 6150 463 44 No. 122

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received November 14*)

No. 375)

Sir, *Athens, November 4, 1930*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 71 of to-day to inform you that the Secretary of the Greek Legation, Mr. Venizelos, who has been well known [illegible] with the exception of [illegible] who pretend to be members of the Greek [illegible] Greece [illegible] majority of [illegible] well-to-do, decent as an [illegible] object.

2. The Prime Minister, for instance, points out to me the facilities for trade between the two countries created, and the [illegible] place their relations on a very satisfactory basis. "Hemerissios Typos" remarks that now that a new period of friendship between [illegible] Greece has shown that she intends to respect [illegible] Turkey will turn should take it upon herself to propose [illegible] the idea [illegible] her own people [illegible] the great advantage [illegible] Greek [illegible] that M. Venizelos's success is rightly [illegible] great career. "Ethnos" declares the [illegible] without exaggeration, the most important event which has occurred [illegible] 1912." M. Venizelos and Ismet Pasha and their conductors [illegible] heroes in the [illegible] The

Greek people says "Hestia," who have shown that they know how to fight and to fall for their country now show that they are capable of comprehending a higher and nobler ideal of patriotism relieved of the horror and barbarism of war, and that they are capable once more of achieving wonders as in the distant past and of illumining the whole world with their civilisation.

3. With respect to the naval agreement, however, opinion is far from unanimous. Of the Republican papers, "Hemerissios Typos" remarks that owing to the urgency with which it was drafted, the naval agreement is so elastic that it may be considered as non existent in reality. "Proia" (Royalist) says that it welcomes enthusiastically the historical hour in which good relations were restored between the two peoples, and that it is satisfied with the agreement concerning the settlement of Greek citizens in Turkey but it is astonished at the naval agreement which seems to recognise the *status quo* of naval armaments which [illegible] superiority to Turkey. Such superiority "Proia" considers to be unjustifiable by any argument. The same paper points out that no guarantee was obtained with regard to the free establishment of Greeks in Turkey.

4. I have transmitted a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have &c.
PATRICK RAMSAY

E 6166/1611/44 — No. 154

M. Peacock to Mr. Henderson. — (*Received November 15.*)

No. 562.

Tehran, November 3, 1930.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 141 of the 3rd September regarding the resignation or recall of Mamdouh Shevket Bey, the former Turkish Ambassador in Persia, I have the honour to inform you that his successor, Ridvanbeg Oglou Husrev Bey, who presented his letters of credence on the [illegible], had an interview to-day with a representative of the Tehran [illegible] at which, after the usual platitudes, the Ambassador broached afresh the question of the rectification of the Perso-Turkish frontier in the region of the two Ararats, and stated in unequivocal language, that the only possible solution of the problem [illegible] consolidation of Lesser Ararat to Turkey. He did not fail to attribute the Kurdish rising to the intrigues of a third Power (thereby no doubt following the lead of the entire Persian press), but he laid much stress on the [illegible] with which the insurgents had been able to escape to the fastnesses of the Lesser Agri Dagh, from which, he implied, the Persian forces had been quite unable to dislodge them. If this region were transferred to Turkey, he declared, the Tabriz [illegible] could be used by traders in [illegible]. A policy of procrastination was worse than useless, and the Turko-Greek and Turko-Soviet frontier adjustments had clearly shown how beneficial to both parties was a reliance on modern international methods. When asked whether he foresaw an improvement in the commercial relations of the two countries, he replied firmly that none could be expected until the [illegible] had been finally and definitively solved. The resolution [illegible] could therefore not lead to closer economic co-operation.

2. His Excellency's remarks contained little else of [illegible]. After insisting at some length on the duty of the leaders of the press in both countries to co-operate in burying their heritage of [illegible] religious hatred, he was asked what exactly Mustafa Kemal Pasha had meant when, in a recent pronouncement, he spoke of the close racial ties which united the two nations. The Ambassador replied with aplomb that recent researches carried out by Turkish archæologists had conclusively proved the common Altaic origin of both nations, and that these important discoveries would shortly be incorporated in a text book for use in Turkish schools. It is permissible to doubt whether such revolutionary contributions to ethnological science will greatly appeal to a nation which has always prided itself on its pure Aryan descent.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have &c.
R. C. PARR

E 6199/463/44 — No. 1

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson. — (*Received November 17.*)

(No. 577. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, November 5, 1930.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you with reference to my despatch No. 571 of the 4th November, that I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and asked for his impressions on the recent official visit to Angora.

2. M. Michalakopoulos informed me that the [illegible] reception of the Greek mission had been cordial beyond all expectation. [illegible] of the two countries [illegible] Greece and Turkey in opposition to each other. Neither had joined any group directed against any other group, and Greece was not and had no intention of being "à la remorque" to any Great Power. This appears to me intended to indicate that Greece has no intention of being drawn in on either side in a possible quarrel between Italy and Yugoslavia. I asked M. Georges Melas, who went to Angora with the mission, why complimentary messages had been sent to M. Mussolini and what Italy had to do with the Greco-Turkish agreement. He replied emphatically "nothing whatever," and that a message had only been sent by Rushdi Pasha, and that, though the Italians had endeavoured to obtain some recognition of their alleged good offices, nothing had been done. I remarked to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as his Excellency well knew, His Majesty's Government were naturally interested in anything which might tend to the pacification of the Balkans and I [illegible] that it was now Bulgaria's turn for a settlement. He did not reply to this [illegible] to say that Turkey was quite satisfied with her present frontiers, which [illegible] area larger than France and comprised territory which would support [illegible] million. M. Michalakopoulos thought Greece would [illegible] benefits by closer commercial co-operation with the Turks.

3. On my asking whether public opinion was satisfied with the naval agreement he maintained that it was, and added that any attempt to go into precise definitions by experts would obviously have raised endless disputes.

4. In the evening I had a private interview with the Prime Minister, at which I congratulated his Excellency on the successful conclusion of his visit to Angora and asked for his impressions.

5. M. Venizelos said that he was very glad he had gone to Angora, for his reception there had been far beyond his expectations, and he was touched by the manifestations of sincere friendship with which he had been received there. In this connexion I understand that it is on account of the very favourable impression he received at Angora that M. Venizelos did not think it worth while, when visiting the Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople, to make the statement mentioned in my telegram No. 159 of the 24th October.

6. M. Venizelos said that on going into the relations of the two countries it had been found that there were no points of dispute left between them. Neither party was bound by any combination to bring it into conflict with another. If either party had disputes with another country such as Italy, which threatened the peace it could count on the other party not joining in. Turkey was quite content to remain with her present frontiers, and he had remarked to Ismet Pasha that her attitude was unlike that of Hungary, which was ready to go to war to rectify her frontiers.

7. Turning to the naval agreement, M. Venizelos said he was quite satisfied with it, as any attempt at more precision meant discussion by experts, which would have led to endless [illegible]. He thought that if friendly [illegible] between Greece and Turkey develop as he hoped they would, the question of the relative strength of their respective fleets would never arise, and if either Power required to order another ship for any purpose, there would be time for friendly explanations. M. Venizelos even remarked that in his opinion Italy and France would be well advised to [illegible] in a friendly [illegible] out of their deadlock as Italy really knew very well that [illegible] and it was only a question of face. [illegible] forward this suggestion M. Venizelos demurred saying it was not for him, Prime Minister of a small Power, to advise Great Powers.

8. I asked his Excellency what he thought of Turco-Russian relations. He said the Turks desired good relations with her as a neighbour, but the Soviet Government had undertaken to abstain absolutely from propaganda in

Turkey, and when a few [illegible] the Turks dropped on them, the Soviet [illegible] express their thanks to the [illegible] Ismet Pasha pointed out that Turkey had some interest in Russia because there were some 37 million Moslems living in Russian territory, which presumably made it worth while for Russia to maintain good relations with Turkey.

9. With regard to the League of Nations, M. Venizelos told me that he had enquired whether Turkey intended joining the League. The reply was that Turkey would like to enter the League if she got a semi-permanent seat on the Council. He had pointed out that there might be some difficulty about the semi-permanent seat, but that if Turkey joined she might well be elected to a non-permanent seat. Ismet Pasha had stated that if Turkey were to join the League for a semi-permanent seat the Soviet Government would understand. But if she joined with only the prospect of a non-permanent seat she would give offence to the Soviet Government, who naturally attached importance to Turkey's company in exclusion from the League.

10. On my mentioning Count Bethlen, M. Venizelos informed me that M. de Chambrun had shown some apprehension at the simultaneous visit of the Hungarian Prime Minister, but that it had come about accidentally. M. Venizelos would like to have avoided the simultaneous [illegible] the door to possible misunderstandings, but his own visit [illegible] 15th to the 20th, and M. Michalakopoulos had [illegible] 20th would be a suitable date for Count Bethlen's visit [illegible] the case [illegible] had preferred to leave it [illegible] that my French colleague is also apprehensive as to the object of the Hungarian Prime Minister's visit to be shortly followed by a visit of the King [illegible] to Angora, and thinks it [illegible] indicate [illegible] treaty revision [illegible]

[illegible] M. Venizelos is extremely [illegible] impressed with what [illegible] considers that the Turks have [illegible] made great progress [illegible] great future before them as a nation. He reminded me that in the [illegible] never called themselves "Turks" at all, nor did they admit that they were [illegible] whereas now they are proud of being Turks of Anatolian stock, as distinct from the [illegible] of wandering Mongol tribes. They had done with the Ottoman Empire [illegible] the Moslem religion still existed and was practised in the mosques, nobody took any more notice of it, and it no longer stood in the way of progress on [illegible] lines. M. and Mme. Venizelos appear to have been much struck with the [illegible]

12. [illegible] opinion I should say that it is too early to form a correct estimate of the results of the Prime Minister's policy towards Turkey. His Excellency is convinced of the sincerity of his new friends, but how far that depends [illegible] is confined to his personal friendship with Ismet Pasha only the future can show. Critics, who include my French colleague, point out that M. Venizelos sacrificed the rights of the Greek refugees and brought back nothing but a confirmation of the superiority of the Turkish navy. Some [illegible] made for the optimism of M. Venizelos, but the question [illegible] Graeco-Turkish commercial co-operation is going to benefit the Greeks [illegible] at Constantinople. If the Prime Minister's expectations [illegible] new era of Graeco-Turkish co-operation in trade has dawned, then [illegible] visit to Angora is amply justified. [illegible] achievement, and for the time being [illegible] approved [illegible] disapproved by the people of Athens. [illegible] the fact that the Refugee Bonds have for the first time [illegible] quoted above par on the Greek Stock Exchange.

13. I have transmitted a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
PATRICK RAMSAY

C 8428/3519/62] No. [illegible]

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 17.)

(No. [illegible])
Sir,

Athens, November 8, 1930.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 577 of the 7th November, to inform you that, when I accompanied my French colleague to attend the [illegible] to the "Unknown Sailor" on the Island of [illegible] in the Straits of [illegible] I had some conversation with M. Clément Simon about the recent visit of the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to Angora.

2. The French Minister had not yet seen M. Venizelos, and I found him full of apprehension concerning the significance which rumour attached to the simultaneous presence in Angora of the Hungarian Prime Minister and the part played by Italy in the [illegible] He seemed to be persuaded that the simultaneous [illegible] visit to Angora of the [illegible] Greece and [illegible] the Balkans [illegible] particularly the [illegible] Italy.

3. I gave M. Clément Simon some account of my interview with the Prime Minister on the previous day, but I was unable to dispel his suspicions, which he said [illegible] proved by the statements of Count Bethlen and the congratulatory [illegible] sent from Angora to M. Mussolini.

4. The local press, especially the extreme Opposition organs, has given free [illegible] after the usual fashion of Balkan correspondents when any [illegible] in Balkan politics offers an opportunity for sensational articles, [illegible] I have not heard it at first hand, I gather my Balkan colleagues are in a state of nervous tension.

[illegible] On the 7th November I had some further conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Soviet Legation. I mentioned to His Excellency that the press [illegible] over the [illegible] Count Bethlen and M. Venizelos [illegible] French colleague [illegible] Italy [illegible] for the formation [illegible] the Little Entente [illegible] M. Michalakopoulos [illegible] M. Mussolini [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] Great Power [illegible] Bey had sent a telegram to Mussolini [illegible] M. Venizelos and he, M. Michalakopoulos, had passed at the Italian Embassy and paid their compliments to the Italian Ambassador. M. Michalakopoulos explained that he himself could not well have done less, as he had been Minister for Foreign Affairs when [illegible] Turkish [illegible] He recalled that in 1928 [illegible] to get Greece to join in the signature [illegible] pact between Italy, Turkey [illegible] when M. Michalakopoulos refused [illegible] of the out-standing differences between Greece and Turkey over the refugee exchangeables questions, Italy did not wait but signed a pact with Turkey [illegible]

6. With regard to the Hungarian Prime Minister, M. Michalakopoulos said that the press had wrongly interpreted two after-dinner speeches made by Count Bethlen at Angora. His Excellency had declared that he stood for peaceful revision of the peace treaties, for which provision was expressly made in article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which related to international treaties which could be regarded as obsolete or as no longer corresponding to existing conditions. M. Michalakopoulos explained that, if Count Bethlen had merely declared himself for a policy of peace, he would not have satisfied his compatriots; if he had declared himself for revision alone, he would have exposed himself to the charge [illegible] a new war. In these circumstances what could he do better

than to declare himself for revision by peaceful means? On my asking whether to attach credence to a press report that Count Bethlen was shortly coming to Athens, M. Michalacopoulos said there was no question of such a visit, as M. Valko had recently been to Athens, but M. Benes was probably coming here to return a visit of M. Venselos.

7. He added that the French Minister had been received by the Prime Minister on the 7th instant, a week before M. Clement Simon's departure, during M. Venselos's explanations and reassurances in connexion with Count Bethlen's presence at Angora and [illegible] with regard to the revision of peace treaties followed closely his previous statements to me, the substance of which was reported in my despatch No. 577 of the 16th ultimo. It may be of some interest [illegible] to the question of disarmament. M. Venselos had taken note of the Prime Minister's assurance that Greece belonged to no treaty revisionist [illegible] with M. Venselos of the danger of getting drawn into such [illegible]. M. Venselos admitted privately that his personal view was not that treaties should be binding for ever and ever, but he declared that he regarded the present moment as a most dangerous one in which to raise the question of revision in any form. According to M. Clement Simon, M. Venselos told him that at Angora the Italian Ambassador had again pressed for the signature of a pact *a trois* (Italy, Turkey, Greece), but that this had been refused on the ground that Italy had left Greece in the lurch when she signed done with Turkey, and Greece had since been obliged to make her own terms with Turkey and that at great sacrifice. M. Venselos certainly made no such statement to me, and I cannot help wondering whether this statement should not rather be attributed to a report from M. de Chambrun than to M. Venselos. M. Venselos assured the French Minister that the sympathies of Greece would always be with France and England, but he claimed the right to be on equally friendly terms with Italy. For this reason he had instructed M. Politis, the Greek delegate on the Preparatory Disarmament Conference at Geneva, not to take sides for or against either party. Both Greece and Turkey wanted disarmament for financial reasons, but they quite understood that for the time being the countries were obliged to continue arming because of the existing lack of security.

8. The French Minister asked M. Venselos whether the naval agreement with Turkey meant that every order for, say, torpedoes, revolvers, equipment or boots for the Greek navy would have to be notified to Turkey six months in advance. He was told that was the case, but that it did not apply to orders already placed but not completed. I believe there is one more French submarine to be completed and delivered.

9. M. Clement Simon told me that the whole tone of M. Venselos's statement was that of a speech for the defence, and that he had the impression that M. Venselos now felt that he had gone too far with Italy and is anxious to withdraw from her clutches. The French Minister, moreover, considers that M. Venselos has gone down very much in the esteem of political circles in Athens and lost popularity in the country owing to the Turkish agreements, and especially the visit to Angora, which M. Clement Simon describes as quite unnecessary for the purpose of signing a costly [illegible] and bringing back a naval agreement securing Greek naval [illegible] Turkey on the sea.

10. I think this view, which coincides with that of the opposition and Royalist press, is somewhat exaggerated, just as M. Clement Simon's suspects of the secret entry of Greece into a revisionist block appeared to me to lack judgment. But I have noticed that a good many Greeks of good standing, including Venselists, seem to have their doubts as to the wisdom of this epoch making visit of a Greek Prime Minister to the Turkish capital.

11. I have transmitted a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Constantinople and Rome and to His Majesty's Minister at Budapest.

I have &c.

PATRICK RAMSAY

[E 6190/3476/44] No. 1

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson. (*Received November 17*)

(No. 433.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 13, 1931.*

ALTHOUGH, as reported in my despatch No. 411 of the 23rd October last, the Government party secured a victory in the municipal elections, it is becoming clear that the Turkish Government has realised that it does not possess the confidence of the nation.

2. The number of those who voted, or tried to vote, against the People's party, was greater than had been anticipated, but more striking still was the great number of those who abstained from voting, and on whom the Government had counted to [illegible] the polls. From the elections emerged the fact that the people were profoundly dissatisfied.

3. The Gazi was, to some extent, conscious of this dissatisfaction when he approved the foundation of an opposition party by Fethi Bey, and appeared to be [illegible] Ismet Pasha from office, and thereby [illegible] by bringing in a more liberal Government under the leadership of the late Ambassador in Paris. But when Ismet Pasha, under the threat, had remodelled his Cabinet and had promised reductions of taxation, it appeared as though the Gazi and the People's party were satisfied that enough had been done to placate public opinion, and that nothing remained for Fethi Bey but to dissolve the party and retire to some other [illegible].

4. The municipal elections, however, showed that the people were far from satisfied with the sops offered to them under pressure by Ismet Pasha. The Gazi seems to have taken note of this, and, in his speech on the occasion of the opening of the Assembly, he made it clear that the party system was to continue, and that by-elections were to compete in next year's parliamentary elections. At the same time he warned both parties to purge themselves of all elements that were not truly republican. It is clear that he perceives that the existence of a second party enables popular discontent to find expression and, to some extent, allays it.

5. Since this pronouncement the People's party has been hard at work reforming its organisation, inspecting its clubs in all districts with a view to educating the voters and securing new adherents and finally altering the Government programme and promising more reductions of taxation. There are rumours of the formation of a national *bloc* or even of a Coalition Government with the Free party, but the latter, while willing to combine with the Government against foreign enemies and [illegible] of monarchy and anti-republicans at home, seems to want a free hand in criticising the financial and economic policy of the Government.

6. In its desire to gain public opinion and widen its basis, the Government party are now said to be approaching opponents whom it formerly persecuted. Refet Pasha, who was in 1926 arrested and tried for being a leader of the anti-Government Progressive party, has been staying at Angora for a few days, and, although he states that his visit is purely [illegible] has been visiting Ismet Pasha. Mustafa Fehmi Bey has been offered the post of [illegible] of the Bank of Industry and Mines.

[illegible] has reorganised his organisation, proclaiming that there is no room for any but good republicans in his party, and is on the 15th November to address a parliamentary question to the Government on the subject of the irregularities committed during the municipal elections and Government interference in them. It is also reported in the press that the Gazi has had an interview of over two hours with him in the house of Tahsin Bey.

7. There is no doubt that the Gazi has been working hard to probe the popular sentiment and find a remedy for it. In a few days he is to set out for a tour of [illegible] accompanied by the Minister of the Interior, the secretary of the Free party, a representative of the People's party (Saffet Bey, the secretary general, being unable to leave Angora during the period of reorganisation of the People's party) and certain Deputies. The Gazi's object is to ascertain the actual views and condition of the people to form his own opinion about the conduct of the municipal elections, and probably to learn whether his personal prestige still stands where it did.

8. In view of the distress prevailing everywhere, it will need all the Ghazi's ability to content his people. The only remedy seems to lie in improving the financial situation, a problem that will tax Turkish statesmanship to the utmost.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 6207/3476/44 No. 128

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received November 17*)

No. 437
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, November 17, 1930.*
MY despatch No. 433.

On Saturday last National Assembly rejected Ethem Bey's vote of confidence motion by 225 votes to 10. Yesterday Fethi Bey's Liberal party decided to dissolve itself, leaving for the time at least, the official Opposition in Turkey. Disappearance will be regarded here as a setback in political development of the country.

E 6332/463/44 No. 129

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received November 24*)

No. 442.
Sir, *Constantinople, November 17, 1930.*

I HAVE read with great interest the despatches to you, Nos. 271 and 277 of the 27th October and 5th November, from His Majesty's Minister at Budapest, and Nos. 577 and 584 from His Majesty's Minister at Athens, relative to the recent visit of Count Bethlen and M. Venizelos to Angora.

2. I have no further information as to the inner history and purpose of the Angora meetings beyond that already given in my previous despatches reporting on the visit, but I venture, in the quality of an observer looking at things from the Turkish end, to submit the following marginal notes on the despatches from Athens and Budapest.

3. To take Count Bethlen's visit first, while it is possible that there was some idea of sounding the possibility of an Italian-Hungarian-Turkish understanding, I am inclined to think that the chief reason for the journey was nothing more than that suggested in paragraph 3 of Lord Chilston's despatch No. 271. Count Bethlen almost admitted as much to me, and I expect that his language since his return to Budapest is due to his need to give adequate and plausible reasons for his excursion.

4. As regards the Venizelos visit, I see from Mr. Ramsay's despatches that M. Clement Simon has not changed since he was my colleague in Prague, but my personal opinion is that M. Venizelos in carrying out his bold and statesmanlike initiative had a purpose in view, namely, to end the long feud between Greece and Turkey. As was stated recently in the "Manchester Guardian" of the 5th November, the feud was not really one between the two peoples, but between Ottomanism and Hellenism, the one a decrepit institution and the other a fresh ambition. Whether the writer of these words is equally correct in saying, as he does, that both are now extinct is more questionable, and I for one have been surprised that Greek objections have not been more vociferous. The Greeks of Turkey will probably still have cause for complaints in their non-Turkish business and in the law courts, but the Turks have appreciated the promptness of M. Venizelos's gesture, and I hope and believe that the suspicion of Greek intentions which has poisoned all relations between the two countries has been dissipated.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

E 6533/252/44 No. 130.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received November 24.*)

(No. 457.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 19, 1930.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 220 of the 11th June last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith tables* showing the budget estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 1931-32 as submitted by the Ministry of Finance to the Grand National Assembly.

2. A balanced budget has once again been presented to the Assembly for consideration, but the present estimates differ from those of the past two or three years in that an appreciable reduction has been estimated in both expenditure and revenue.

Revenue.

3. Revenue is established at £T 204,657,000 as against £T 222,732,000 for the current year. The estimated fall in revenue (£T 18,075,000) is accounted for by —

(a) Duties hitherto derived from the transaction tax, which the Turkish Government proposes to abolish at the end of the present financial year (31st May next).

(b) Reduction in the rates of certain taxes, such as the land tax, customs duties and the tax on cattle.

4. A fall in the estimated yield of customs duties (the lower estimate is no doubt based on the actual yield of these duties during the current financial year).

5. It will be observed, however, from the estimates of revenue attached* to this despatch that the sum of £T 5 million is shown under the heading of "Receipts from revenues." This is not in reality a revenue, as it represents the amount which in the view of the Ministry of Finance will be returned to the Treasury as the result of reductions in the personnel and consequently in the expenditure of Government Departments during the coming financial year.

6. Actually, therefore, the estimated yield of taxes in the course of the next financial year is only £T 199,657,000, and the real reduction anticipated is over £T 23 million, a decrease of over 10 per cent.

Expenditure.

7. In order to present balanced estimates to the Assembly, some appreciable cuts in expenditure had to be made. For the financial year 1931-32 expenditure is estimated at £T 204,040,385 as compared to £T 222,646,523 for the current year. The reduction of £T 18,606,138 in Government expenditure has been effected principally by cuts in the votes for the Ministries of National Economy, Public Works and National Defence, and those specified in the vote for the payment of the Ottoman Public Debt coupons.

8. If the proposed retrenchment and the approved Five Year Plan of the Board of Economic Experts of the Government will be partly financed by [illegible] and it is hoped to realize the estimated receipts from the present [illegible] duties, corresponding reductions in the [illegible] of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration are proposed.

9. The [illegible] £T 3,669,089 in the estimates of the Ministry of National Defence does not imply any reduction in the purchase armaments or decrease in personnel, but is accounted for solely by an estimated saving of about £T 4 million on the cost of rations and forage due to the reduced [illegible] of wheat, barley and other food-stuffs.

9. As the budget stands at present, the main feature of interest on the side of revenue is the proposed abolition of the transaction tax and the revision of other taxes in order to lighten taxation, a policy urged by the now defunct Opposition, the early days of its constitution; and, on the side of expenditure, the proposed reduction in the vote for payment of the Ottoman Public Debt coupons.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

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* Not printed.

E 3324 3476 44

[illegible]

[illegible]

GEORGE R. CLERK

E [illegible] 3476 44

[illegible]

(No. 441)

[illegible]

3. [illegible] the Gazi [illegible] sensitive [illegible] His Excellency was [illegible] spirits and, [illegible] even greater [illegible] department with the Prime Minister [illegible] Assembly [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

E 6337 [illegible] 44 [illegible]

[illegible]

(No. 415.)

Sir, [illegible] November 20, 1930.

[illegible]

4. [illegible] Deputies [illegible] Mustafa Kemal [illegible]

5. [illegible]

6. [illegible] Mustafa Kemal [illegible] Gazi [illegible]

7. [illegible] Mustafa Kemal Pasha [illegible] Gazi's support [illegible]

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

* Not printed.

E 6338 2085 44 No. 1[illegible]4

Mr. Newton to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received November 24.)

(No. 928.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 2[illegible], 1930.*

WITH reference to Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 712 of the 27th August, concerning [illegible] railway material for Turkey, I have the honour to report that, according to [illegible] Julius Berger [illegible] the Turkish Government [illegible] western line [illegible] Beli[illegible] expected [illegible] year [illegible]

2. [illegible] from [illegible]

3. [illegible] Turkey [illegible] for [illegible]

4. [illegible]

[illegible] Turkish [illegible] Austria [illegible] of Austria [illegible] possibility of carrying out the [illegible]

I have, &c.
B. C. NEWTON

E 6412 463 44 No. [illegible]

Mr. R[illegible] to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received November 27.)

(No. 603.)

Sir, *Athens, November 21, 1930.*

WITH reference to [illegible] despatch No. [illegible] of the [illegible] November, I have the honour to [illegible] Chamber of Deputies [illegible] M. Michalakopoulos made a lengthy speech in their support [illegible] enclosed herein.* The agreements were [illegible] Affairs without [illegible]

2. [illegible] Chamber [illegible] M. Venizelos [illegible] MM. Kaphandaris, Papanastasiou [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs, MM. [illegible] Kondylis [illegible] M. Michalakopoulos [illegible] their full

* Not printed.

approval with the policy of rapprochement with Turkey, whilst reserving their right to criticise certain details of its fulfilment in the course of the debate in the Chamber. All the other members of the commission approved the policy no less warmly, and the general conclusion was reached that the agreement signed at Angora constituted the foundation of a genuine *entente*. Nor was any objection raised in regard to the opportuneness or otherwise of the visit to Angora, M. Papanastassiou observing in particular that the agreements and the pact would have been valueless unless MM. Venizelos and Michalakopoulos, by visiting Angora, had created the necessary atmosphere of cordiality. Information was sought regarding the naval pact, and the commission were apparently satisfied with M. Venizelos's replies.

3. M. Michalakopoulos, in his speech in the Chamber, [illegible] the sequence of agreements with different States concluded by the present Government and expressed his hope and wish that, after the settlement of the outstanding differences by the agreements which should be concluded with Bulgaria and Albania, [illegible] Turkey, however, had an exceptional importance, he declared, for Greece, and [illegible] the whole of Europe. It had, in fact, [illegible] Excellency traced the course of negotiations since [illegible] by the Cabinets of MM. Caphandaris, [illegible], which was interrupted by the [illegible] Government to MM. Kondylis [illegible] particularly successful in reaching a settlement [illegible] referred to the exaggerated reports which had arisen [illegible] Angora of the Greek statesmen with Count Bethlen [illegible] departure from Athens [illegible] should arrive on the 7th October, [illegible] and M. Michalakopoulos should leave on the [illegible] October. In reality, however, the visit [illegible] departure from Athens [illegible] personal one concerning his own country dispute was taken seriously [illegible] other the fact that the two missions had not yet reached agreement on certain articles of great importance in the commercial convention. It was therefore decided that they should leave on the 15th October. The Turkish Government had therefore enquired whether they saw any objection to meeting Count Bethlen, who had been invited to Angora on the 27th. They had replied that it would be most incorrect on their part to avoid meeting the Prime Minister of a State for which in the past Greece had had no grounds for hostility and to which she was at present attached by a Treaty of Commerce and Pact of Friendship and Arbitration.

5. His Excellency next discussed in some detail the nature of the Pact of Friendship, the Naval Agreement and the Treaty of Commerce and Establishment. Referring to the Naval Agreement, his Excellency mentioned the difficulty of reaching agreement by means of negotiations with technical experts, and recalled how the three great maritime Powers, Japan, the United States of America and Great Britain, had failed to reach agreement on a technical basis until the present Labour Government had taken the initiative in giving a political complexion to every discussion, and thus at last agreement had been reached.

6. Referring to the Constantinople establishment Convention, his Excellency said [illegible] Turkey [illegible] the Powers. Criticism had been expressed that the Commercial Convention did not confer the right of establishment on Greeks. A more careful examination of the question would be sufficient to show that [illegible] would be harmful to Greece. [illegible] pertinent to [illegible] treaty [illegible] same privileges to Turkish [illegible] the agreement.

7. In a section of his speech, in which he drew attention to the widespread adoption of methods of reconciliation and arbitration, M. Michalakopoulos stated that the new world had given a great impetus to the idea of arbitration, and that he had learnt with amazement that Canada, having a certain territorial dispute with the United States of America, had agreed to submit the question to arbitration, and that Canada had respected although it had resulted in that country losing an area of territory equal to that of Italy. He compared the unsuccessful efforts made by Great Britain through Lord Hollins before the war to reach an agreement for the limitation of armaments with the German Emperor [illegible]

successful agreement for that purpose just concluded between the three greatest naval Powers, and characterised it as proof of the new spirit of the times. He also quoted with approval a statement of Mr. Buxton's before the Minority Commission at the recent Assembly of the League, that the party which governed England to-day was convinced that economic questions went before all others and had superseded the question of minorities.

8. In conclusion, M. Michalakopoulos referred to the small minorities who still remained in Turkey and Greece who, he was convinced, would become not a source of quarrel and suspicion, but a means of facilitating co-operation between the two countries. It was in keeping with all precedence that at the head of the Greek Republic during the course of the present negotiations there had stood the descendants of two families who had been the head and front of the hundred years ago the struggle for independence, MM. Kondouriotis and Zaimis.

9. M. Michalakopoulos subsequently visited M. Tsaldaris at home, where he repeated to him the substance of the discussions which had taken place in the commission, as a result of which the Royalist leader was declared [illegible] satisfactory record with the Government as to the principle of agreement with Turkey and the other Balkan States, which [illegible] reservations which he had previously expressed [illegible] with the Government had handled the Graeco-Turkish question.

10. I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether the Greeks who had left Constantinople would be allowed to return and reside there under the Establishment Convention. M. Michalakopoulos replied that those who had left with Turkish passports would be allowed to [illegible] but not those who had left without such passports, but he did not think many would wish to return owing to the stagnant conditions of trade and industry there since the transfer of the capital to Angora.

11. I have transmitted copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have &c.
PATRICK RAMSAY

E 6430/6121/44 No. 136

Sir R. Graham to Mr. A. Henderson (*Received November 28*)

No. 210
Confidential. *Rome, November 27, 1930.*
My Lord, No. 194

I have the honour to report that His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs has returned here this morning and there will be various functions in his honour. Signor Grandi has assured me that visit is one purely of courtesy. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs declared to him during the course of the present negotiations there had stood the descendants of two families who had been the head and front of the hundred years ago the struggle for independence, MM. Kondouriotis and Zaimis.

I have, &c.
PATRICK RAMSAY

(E 6482/1511/44) No. 137

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(*Received December 1.*)

(No. 445.)

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 124 from His Majesty's consul at Trebizond, dated the 15th November, respecting military operations against the Kurds.

Constantinople, November 23, 1930.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure in No. 137

Consul Matthews to Sir G. Clerk

(No. 124)

Sir, *Trebizond, November 15, 1930*

I HAVE the honour to report that military operations against the Kurds in the Agri dag region have now come to an end, and that military posts have been established in various points of the mountains with a view to preventing the return of Kurds from Russian and Persian territory.

2. I am informed that operations of suppression are now being carried out against the Kurds of the Persian region in a manner which resembles the operations against the Armenians in 1915.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS

E 6495/6121/44 No. 138

Sir R. Graham to Mr. A. Henderson (Received December 1.)

(No. 886)

Sir, *Rome, November 28, 1930*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 240 of yesterday evening, I have the honour to report that Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras accompanied by his chef de cabinet and three Deputies, Mahmut Bey of Erzerum, Hilmi Bey of Necmettin Sadik of the Akshehir and Asaf of Aidin, arrived in Rome at 8.40 yesterday morning. He was met on the station by Signor Grandi, his chef de cabinet, Mr. Lord of the European department and other officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador and his staff.

2. His Excellency passed a very busy day. At 11 he was received by His Majesty the King at the Quirinal and at 11.30 by Signor Grandi at the Ministry, where the two statesmen were stated in an official communiqué to have reviewed the various questions at the present moment of friendly relations between their countries. They are to have examined the various political and economic questions and matters which have established a coincidence of opinion on every point. Almost immediately thereafter Signor Grandi returned the visit of the Turkish Minister. In the evening the latter was received by Signor Mussolini who afterwards addressed an interview to the Turkish journalists. At 8.30 his Excellency was entertained by Signor Grandi at a dinner attended by Tevfik Rüstü Aras, the Turkish Ambassador and his staff, the president of the Senate, the Ministers of War and Justice, the Under Secretary of State of the Presidency of the Council, the chief of the Press Bureau of the head of the Government and officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Today a reception was given at the Senate in honour of the Minister.

3. Press comment has been cordial and there has been little comment on the purpose of the visit. It seems to have been an endeavour to press with the primary object of keeping in touch with Signor Mussolini and Signor Grandi.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM

E 6806/1511/44 No. 139

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson (Received December 8.)

(No. 453)

Sir, *Angora, December 3, 1930*

WITH reference to despatch No. 542 of the 3rd November from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, I have the honour to report that according to a communiqué issued by the Tass Agency at Moscow on the 29th ultimo, the Persian Government have offered to cede to Persia a piece of territory in the neighbourhood of Kotur on the Russo-Persian frontier about 38 miles north-east of Baskale in the Valavet on Van, in exchange for a similar piece of territory in the vicinity of Bulak Bashi, a Persian frontier post to the north of Lesser Ararat. The latter area is said to include Little Ararat but to leave within Turkish territory the whole of the Lesser Ararat massif, a fact the importance of which is at present included in Persia.

2. Vague references to this proposal have recently appeared in the Turkish press, which is beginning to be understood that the Turkish offer has been accepted by the Persians and that in fact no serious difficulty any longer exists between the two Governments. I am informally by a number of my staff whether these announcements correctly represented the state of the Persian Chargé d'Affaires replied that they were premature. All that I could ascertain was that the Turkish Government had communicated to the Persian Government proposals which represented the point of view of the Turkish General Staff and that I should be soon aware the views of the Persian General Staff would be. Mohamed Khan Sayyad was quite right about the matters of an agreement being reached in the course of the next few months, but from all that it would be on a basis of less extensive territorial readjustment than the Turks were proposing. Persia has to decide at the future, and could not afford to accept a dangerously illogical frontier, except with a neighbour with whom her present relations were excellent.

3. In reply to a further enquiry by Mr. Roberts as to the movements of Kurds on the Persian Chargé d'Affaires said that it thought there would be a large exodus next spring, but not as large as it could be as this year. It has succeeded in getting its chiefs and some 200,000 others. Of this total a large proportion of the force estimated at 12,000 fighting men have been disposed. Moreover, more than principal rebel chiefs have made good their escape across the Persian frontier. Of these Ihsan Nuri was seen in Tehran. The Turkish Government are anxious that Persia should extradite Ihsan Nuri, but the Persian Government do not feel that as a political refugee he should be sent to his death.

4. With regard to the remarks of the Kurdish representative on the proceeding page, the Persian Chargé d'Affaires is of opinion that it is impossible to form a correct estimate of the Kurdish losses, as every village and every tribe has its own method of dealing with its dead. Many of these are buried secretly in the mountains, and however great the losses may have been, the Kurds would not allow more than 1,000 or 2,000 men to be counted to have been killed in the fighting between the 7th and 10th July, as it was well known that they would not allow more than this number to be killed without taking steps to avenge their deaths.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

C 8961/170/7 No. 140

Mr. Hibbert to Mr. A. Henderson (Received December 8.)

(No. 371)

Sir, *Sofia, December 4, 1930*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 361 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his way back from the visit which he paid to Rome after attending the meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, arrived here on the evening of the 1st instant, and left for Constantinople on that of the 3rd instant. His Excellency was accompanied by a chef of the secretaries of the President of the Turkish Republic (Tevfik Bey), by three Turkish deputies (Mahmut Bey, Necmettin Sadik Bey and Asaf Bey, editors respectively of the "Hakimiyeti Milliye," the "Akshem" and the "Vakit") by his "chef de cabinet" (Kemal Aziz Bey) and by the Turkish consul at Milan.

2. The visit was duly welcomed through it has been by the press and by public opinion as the expression of a friendship which means that Bulgaria is not alone in the world was not to be lightly thrown. No utterance or letter on the part of Tevfik Rüstü Bey or of any other statesman that could be taken to attach to it any immediate political significance. At the functions arranged for him by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires and by Mr. Nicoloff, he seems to have received a cordial, genuine and loud welcome from the crowd. Bulgaria, in consultation, with whose appears to be anxious to preserve its association and sympathy to Greece, Turkey and Rumania, was not slow to take advantage of the conversations on the visit which she has had with Bulgarian Ministers. He told me, however, that he was leaving Sofia in an optimistic frame of mind. There were, in his opinion, two ways in which Greco-Bulgarian reconciliation might come about either the Bulgarian grievance as to the

[illegible] of the B[illegible] in Greek Macedonia might be settled in such a way as to make a good [illegible] atmosphere which would facilitate the settlement of [illegible] disputes [illegible] the slate might be first wiped clean of the [illegible] disputes in order to clear the ground for the minority question to be tackled. He himself inclined to favour the former course, and he intended to do his best to [illegible] M. Venizelos to [illegible] full consciousness of the importance of doing nothing to [illegible] And as to the [illegible] counter-claims, why should not the Græco-Turkish example be followed, and the neutral members of the Mixed Græco-Bulgarian Emigration Commission be empowered to act as a tribunal to settle everything at a stroke by arbitration? In any case he was convinced that M. Venizelos would sooner or later find a solution, and he was equally [illegible] that [illegible] goodwill on the Bulgarian side. All that was required for a solution [illegible] was that the two parties should [illegible] atmosphere that [illegible] Then, when the [illegible] between Greece and Bulgaria [illegible] Bulgaria, [illegible] States which would [illegible] expected from [illegible]

[illegible]

4. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's representatives at Constantinople and Athens.

I have, &c.
S. P. WATERLOW.

E 6721 1932 93 — No. 4.

[illegible]

[illegible]

My Lord, [illegible] October 29 to November 20, 1930.

WHEN [illegible] November 1929 [illegible] Bagdad [illegible] His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople [illegible] the Turkish Republic [illegible] Egypt and [illegible]

[illegible]

that his own prestige [illegible] Moreover [illegible] by disloyal and inexperienced Ministers. [illegible] strong personal [illegible] for Aman Ullah and the Afghan nation [illegible] stressed that [illegible] welcoming efforts [illegible] to his throne [illegible] his people.

The Gazi [illegible] the Afghan troubles, but said that in his talks with Aman Ullah he [illegible] always [illegible] impressed [illegible] his views [illegible] felt strongly that [illegible] deserving [illegible] verdict [illegible] the fact that [illegible] Aman Ullah [illegible] civil war.

3. [illegible]

[illegible]

and I assured them that any failure to take prompt and effective action would be due to lack, not of goodwill, but of resources

I also emphasised that the Permanent Frontier Commission could only contribute to the peace of the border if more care was taken to carry their findings into effect. Otherwise, it was obvious that the aggrieved parties would continue to take reprisals in their own way

The two Ministers, who were very cordial, assured me that they were satisfied of the friendly intentions of the Iraq Government, and promised to co-operate in the prevention of frontier raids. These have recently caused considerable havoc in Southern Kurdistan, due probably to the withdrawal of the Turkish posts from the vicinity of the border

5. Ismet Pasha was very expansive at the lunch party given by Sir George Clerk, and regaled me with stories about Lord Curzon, for whom, in spite of their acute political differences, he professed a profound admiration. He told me that he had no real complaint to make against Iraq, but hoped that efforts would soon be made to bring the Sheikh of Barzan under control as he was showing active sympathy with the rebel Kurds in Turkey. He reminded me that his Government had a pecuniary interest in the early development of the Mosul oil fields, and remarked that if the Iraq Government permitted the pipe line to be laid through Syria, they would enable the French to obtain a stranglehold on the country. It was ridiculous, he said, to expect that the French would ever give up the Syrian mandate. The best and safest outlet for the Mosul oil, he naively added, would be through Adana

6. I returned with Sir George Clerk to Constantinople on the 8th October and had an interview with Tevfik Rustu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had just come back from Moscow. He seemed very anxious that the French should somehow be induced to evacuate the "bec de canard," which he described as a useless wedge between Turkey and Iraq

With all these high authorities, I was enabled through the kindness of His Majesty's Ambassador to have interesting conversations and the personal contact that has been established should prove to be of great value to me in my work at Bagdad. For such fruits as this enjoyable visit may bring forth I am indebted to the generosity and forethought of Sir George Clerk

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS
High Commissioner for Iraq

C 9142 8856 19] No. 142

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 458)

Sir, *Angora, December 9, 1930*

AS foreshadowed in paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 418 of the 1st November last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text, for which I am indebted to my Greek colleague, of the Græco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration which was signed at Angora on the 30th October.

2. Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty deal with friendship and neutrality respectively and are on the usual lines. Article 3 binds the parties to have recourse to a conciliation procedure, the details of which are laid down in articles 8 to 20. Article 4 excepts from this procedure (i) questions which, in virtue of treaties in force between the two parties, lie within the competence of either; (ii) questions involving sovereign rights and (iii) differences arising from circumstances antedating the treaty "and which belong to the past." If the parties do not agree on the question whether a given matter falls within one of these categories, the point may be referred to arbitration or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

3. Articles 21 to 24 provide for arbitration before the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of such differences between the parties as it shall not have proved possible to settle by the conciliation procedure. The court may settle *ex æquo et bono* such questions as are not of a juridical nature. Reference

to the court will be by means of a *compromis*, or, failing agreement on the terms of a *compromis*, the parties may each apply to the court with a *requete*. The decisions of the court will be executed in good faith by the parties. Any difficulties of interpretation to which a decree of the court may give rise are to be submitted for a ruling to the court itself (article 24). In accordance with article 27, the court is also to adjudicate upon any disputes arising out of the interpretation of the treaty.

4. Article 28 stipulates that the treaty is to remain in force, from the date of the exchange of ratifications, for a period of five years in the first instance, but may, if not previously denounced, be renewed indefinitely for further periods of five years.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

Enclosure in No. 142

Traité d'Amitié, de Neutralité, de Conciliation et d'Arbitrage

LL. Présidents de la République Hellenique et de la République turque, soucieux de suivre en toute circonstance une politique de concorde, voulant affirmer leur désir de contribuer à l'œuvre de la paix générale et de résoudre selon les principes les plus élevés du droit international public les différends qui viendraient à s'élever entre la Grèce et la Turquie, ont décidé de réaliser dans un traité leur intention commune et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires

Le Président de la République hellenique:

Son Excellence M. Eleftherios K. Venizelos, Président du Conseil des Ministres,

Son Excellence M. André Michalakopoulos, Vice-Président du Conseil des Ministres, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,

Le Président de la République turque:

Son Excellence Ismet Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres, Député de Malatya,

Son Excellence le Docteur Tewfik Rüschti Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Député d'Izmir,

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

ARTICLE 1er

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à n'entrer dans aucune entente d'ordre politique ou économique et dans aucune combinaison dirigée contre l'une d'elles.

ARTICLE 2

Au cas où l'une des hautes parties contractantes, malgré son attitude pacifique, serait l'objet d'une agression de la part d'une ou de plusieurs Puissances, l'autre partie s'engage à observer la neutralité pendant toute la durée du conflit.

ARTICLE 3

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à soumettre à la procédure de conciliation prévue dans les articles 8-19 ci-après toutes les questions qui viendraient à les diviser et qui n'auraient pu être résolues par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires. En cas de non-réussite de la procédure de conciliation un règlement judiciaire sera recherché conformément aux articles 20-23 du présent traité, à moins que les parties ne soient d'accord pour recourir à un tribunal arbitral constitué conformément aux articles 55 et suivants de la convention pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux du 18 octobre 1907 ou à tout autre accord existant entre elles.

ARTICLE 4

Les dispositions de l'article précédent ne s'appliquent pas aux questions qui, en vertu des traités en vigueur entre les hautes parties contractantes, rentrent dans la compétence de l'une d'elles, ni aux questions qui se rapportent au droit de souveraineté. Chacune des parties aura le droit de déterminer, par une déclaration écrite, si une question relève du droit de souveraineté, l'autre partie pouvant, en cas de contestation, recourir à l'arbitrage ou à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale pour faire décider de cette question préjudicielle.

Les dispositions de l'article précédent ne s'appliquent également pas aux différends nés de faits qui sont antérieurs au présent traité et qui appartiennent au passé.

ARTICLE 5

Les différends pour la solution desquels une procédure spéciale serait prévue par d'autres conventions en vigueur entre les parties en litige seront réglés conformément aux dispositions de ces conventions.

ARTICLE 6

S'il s'agit d'un différend dont l'objet, d'après la législation intérieure de l'une des parties, relève de la compétence des autorités judiciaires ou administratives, cette partie pourra s'opposer à ce que ce différend soit soumis aux diverses procédures prévues par le présent traité, avant qu'une décision définitive ait été rendue dans des délais raisonnables par l'autorité compétente.

La partie qui, dans ce cas, voudra recourir aux procédures prévues par le présent traité devra notifier à l'autre partie son intention dans un délai d'un an, à partir de la décision susvisée.

ARTICLE 7

Sur la demande adressée par l'une des parties contractantes à l'autre partie, une commission permanente de conciliation sera constituée dans les six mois qui suivront l'échange des ratifications du présent traité.

Sauf accord contraire des parties, la commission de conciliation sera constituée de la façon suivante :

1. La commission comprendra cinq membres. Les parties en nommeront chacune un, choisi parmi leurs nationaux respectifs. Les trois autres commissaires seront choisis d'un commun accord parmi les ressortissants de tierces Puissances. Ces derniers devront être de nationalités différentes, ne pas avoir leur résidence habituelle sur le territoire des parties, ni se trouver à leur service. Parmi eux, les parties désigneront le président de la commission et, en cas de désaccord, le sort déterminera lequel des trois commissaires sera le président.

2. Les commissaires seront nommés pour trois ans et seront rééligibles. Les commissaires nommés en commun pourront être remplacés au cours de leur mandat, de l'accord des parties. Tant que la procédure n'est pas ouverte, chacune des parties aura le droit de procéder au remplacement du commissaire nommé par elle.

3. Il sera pourvu, dans le plus bref délai, aux vacances qui viendraient à se produire par suite de décès ou de démission ou tout autre empêchement, suivant le mode fixé pour les nominations.

ARTICLE 8

Si, lorsqu'il s'élève un différend, il n'existe pas une commission permanente de conciliation nommée par les parties, une commission spéciale de conciliation sera constituée pour l'examen du différend dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la demande adressée par l'une des parties à l'autre. Les nominations se feront conformément aux dispositions de l'article précédent, à moins que les parties n'en décident autrement.

ARTICLE 9

Si la nomination des commissaires à désigner en commun n'intervient pas dans les délais prévus aux articles 10 et 12, le soin de procéder aux nominations nécessaires sera confié à une tierce Puissance choisie d'un commun accord par les parties et si l'accord ne s'établit pas, à ce sujet chaque partie désignera une Puissance différente

et les nominations seront faites de concert par les Puissances ainsi choisies. Enfin, si dans un délai de trois mois, ces deux Puissances n'auront pu tomber d'accord, chacune d'elles présentera des candidats en nombre égal à celui des membres à désigner. Le sort déterminera lesquels des candidats ainsi présentés seront admis.

ARTICLE 10

La commission de conciliation sera saisie par voie de requête adressée au président par les deux parties agissant d'un commun accord, ou, à défaut, par l'une ou l'autre des parties.

La requête, après avoir exposé sommairement l'objet du litige, contiendra l'invitation à la commission de procéder à toutes mesures propres à conduire à une conciliation.

Si la requête émane d'une seule des parties, elle sera notifiée par celle-ci sans délai à l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 11

Dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la date où l'une des parties aura porté un différend devant la commission de conciliation, chacune des parties pourra, pour l'examen de ce différend, remplacer son commissaire par une personne possédant une compétence spéciale dans la matière. La partie qui usera de ce droit en fera immédiatement la notification à l'autre partie, celle-ci aura, dans ce cas, la faculté d'agir de même dans un délai de quinze jours à compter de la date où la notification lui sera parvenue.

ARTICLE 12

La commission de conciliation se réunira, sauf accord contraire des parties, au lieu désigné par son président.

ARTICLE 13

La commission de conciliation aura pour tâche d'élucider les questions en litige, de recueillir à ce fin toutes les informations utiles et de s'efforcer de concilier les parties.

Après examen de l'affaire elle formulera, dans un rapport, les propositions en vue du règlement du différend.

ARTICLE 14

La commission de conciliation réglera elle-même sa procédure, qui dans tous les cas devra être contradictoire, en tenant compte, si elle n'en décide autrement à l'unanimité, des dispositions du titre III de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

ARTICLE 15

Les travaux de la commission de conciliation ne seront publics qu'en vertu d'une décision prise par la commission avec l'assentiment des parties.

ARTICLE 16

Les parties seront représentées auprès de la commission de conciliation par des agents ayant mission de servir d'intermédiaires entre elles et la commission; elles pourront, en outre, se faire assister par des conseils et experts nommés par elles à cet effet et demander l'audition de toutes personnes dont le témoignage leur paraîtrait utile.

La commission aura, de son côté, la faculté de demander des explications orales aux agents, conseils et experts des deux parties ainsi qu'à toutes personnes qu'elle jugerait utile de faire comparaître avec l'assentiment de leur Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 17

Les parties s'engagent à faciliter les travaux de la commission de conciliation et, en particulier, à lui fournir, dans la plus large mesure possible, tous documents et informations utiles, ainsi qu'à user des moyens dont elles disposent pour lui permettre de procéder sur leur territoire et selon leur législation à la citation et à l'audition de témoins ou d'experts et à des transports sur les lieux.

ARTICLE 18.

La commission de conciliation présentera son rapport dans les quatre mois à partir du jour où elle aura été saisie du différend, à moins que les parties ne conviennent de proroger ce délai.

Un exemplaire du rapport sera remis à chacune des parties. Le rapport n'aura, ni quant à l'exposé des faits ni quant aux considérants juridiques et aux conclusions, le caractère d'une sentence arbitrale.

ARTICLE 19.

La commission de conciliation fixera le délai dans lequel les parties auront à se prononcer au sujet des propositions de règlement contenues dans son rapport. Ce délai ne dépassera pas trois mois.

ARTICLE 20.

Pendant la durée effective de la procédure, chacun des commissaires nommés de commun accord recevra une indemnité dont le montant sera arrêté par les parties et payé par elles dans une égale mesure. Chaque partie, par contre, fixera et payera l'indemnité du membre de la commission nommé par elle.

Les frais généraux occasionnés par le fonctionnement de la commission seront supportés également par les deux parties.

ARTICLE 21.

Si les recommandations de la commission ne sont pas acceptées par les deux parties, chacune d'elles aura la faculté de soumettre le différend à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, dans le délai fixé par le rapport de la commission.

Dans le cas où, de l'avis de la cour, le litige ne serait pas d'ordre juridique, les parties conviennent qu'elle pourra le trancher *ex æquo et bono*, si une règle du droit international ne peut pas lui être appliquée.

ARTICLE 22.

Les parties contractantes établiront, dans chaque cas particulier, un compromis spécial déterminant nettement l'objet du différend, les compétences particulières qui pourraient être dévolues à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, ainsi que toutes autres conditions arrêtées entre elles.

Le compromis sera établi par échange de notes entre les Gouvernements des parties contractantes et sera interprété en tous points par la cour de justice. Si le texte du compromis n'est pas arrêté dans les trois mois à compter du jour où l'une des parties a été saisie d'une demande aux fins de règlement judiciaire, chaque partie pourra saisir la cour de justice par voie de simple requête.

ARTICLE 23.

Si la Cour permanente de Justice internationale établissait qu'une décision d'une instance judiciaire ou de toute autre autorité relevant de l'une des parties contractantes se trouve entièrement ou partiellement en opposition avec le droit des gens et si le droit constitutionnel de cette partie ne permettait pas ou ne permettait qu'imparfaitement d'effacer les conséquences de la décision dont il s'agit, les parties conviennent qu'il devra être accordé par la sentence de la cour à la partie lésée une satisfaction équitable.

ARTICLE 24.

L'arrêt rendu par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale sera exécuté de bonne foi par les parties.

Les difficultés auxquelles son interprétation pourrait donner lieu seront tranchées par la cour de justice, que chacune des parties pourra saisir à cette fin par voie de simple requête.

ARTICLE 25.

Durant le cours de la procédure de conciliation ou de la procédure judiciaire, les parties contractantes s'abstiendront de toute mesure pouvant avoir une répercussion préjudiciable sur l'acceptation des propositions de la commission de conciliation ou sur l'exécution de l'arrêt de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

ARTICLE 26.

Si une procédure de conciliation ou une procédure judiciaire est pendante lors de l'expiration du présent traité, elle suivra son cours conformément aux dispositions du présent traité ou de toute autre convention que les parties seraient convenues de lui substituer.

ARTICLE 27.

Les contestations qui pourraient surgir soit dans l'interprétation, soit dans l'exécution du présent traité, y compris celles relatives à la qualification des litiges, seront soumises directement, par une simple demande, à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

ARTICLE 28.

Le présent traité sera ratifié dans le plus bref délai possible et entrera en vigueur immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications. Il est conclu pour la durée de cinq ans à compter de son entrée en vigueur. S'il n'est pas dénoncé six mois avant l'expiration de ce terme, il sera considéré comme renouvelé pour une seconde période de cinq ans et ainsi de suite.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité.

Fait à Ankara le 30 octobre 1930.

[C 9143/3519/62] No. 143.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 460.)

Sir, *Angora, December 8, 1930.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs returned to the capital this morning and was good enough to receive me this afternoon.

2. Our conversation, or rather Dr. Tevfik Rüstü's discourse, was chiefly devoted to Balkan Affairs, and I need not trouble you with his references to the Preliminary Disarmament Conference, except for his warm tribute to Lord Cecil's work and personality, and to his visit to Signor Mussolini, save in so far as they were connected with the Balkan problem.

3. His Majesty's Minister at Sofia has been good enough to send me copies of his despatch to you, No. 371 of the 4th instant, and of his letter to Mr. Sargent of the same date, and I am struck by the similarity of the impression made by Tevfik Rüstü on Mr. Waterlow and myself. An air of Geneva still hung round his Excellency, who spoke as an international statesman rather than as Foreign Minister of a small and impoverished Power, and, as he warmed to his theme, I found myself going back ten years and listening to Dr. Benes expounding his ideas for building up the Little *Entente*, which was to be the focal point of peace and order in an unstable Central Europe.

4. Tevfik Rüstü said that he had given his views very frankly to M. Massigli at Geneva. Whether they were as frank as the views he expressed to me I cannot say, for to me Tevfik Rüstü said that the root of uneasiness in Europe was the fear of French hegemony. He did not believe that there was any deliberate intention on the part of any one Power, even Italy, to create a *bloc* definitely intended as a counterpoise to the weight of France and the group of States in the French orbit, but French policy was making this a possibility. The elements were still in solution, but the continued development of French foreign policy in Europe on its present lines would be the precipitant that would crystallize the solution into a definite anti-French *bloc*. He had tried to impress this upon M. Massigli and to get him to see that what was now essential was a *détente*. France should, for a bit, sit still and let things develop of themselves. If this happened, Tevfik Rüstü was confident that the Balkan problem, difficult though it was, was not impossible.

5. His visit to Sofia was primarily designed to convince Bulgaria of Turkish goodwill, but he had also tried to convey to the Bulgarian Government his ideas of the lines on which Bulgaria could better her standing in the Balkan world. It was essential to improve her relations with her Balkan neighbours. As regards Turkey, that had already been achieved, and now the other three had to be tackled.

This, however, could only be done one at a time. Roumania was not yet ripe, as a rapprochement would involve, though indirectly, an understanding directed against Russia, and Bulgaria could not afford Russian hostility. Yugoslavia was even more impossible at the present moment, and therefore there remained only Greece. Here reconciliation was not easy, but it was not impossible and Tevfik Rüstü was convinced that it could, especially with M. Venizelos in power, be brought about. The moral effect of such a reconciliation would be far greater than just the betterment of Greco-Bulgarian relations. It would remove Bulgaria's inferiority complex, restore her confidence in herself, and enable her to feel that she was discussing her difficulties with Roumania and Yugoslavia on a footing of equality and could therefore negotiate in a freer and more generous spirit. His Excellency added that he had told the Bulgarians that they had two disinterested friends, Turkey and England, and he had urged them to attach the greatest importance to the counsels of His Majesty's Government.

6. The impression that Tevfik Rüstü made upon me was that, whether one considers his ideas as utopian and impracticable or not, he is himself genuinely anxious to promote Balkan unity and to avoid being forced into an anti-French *bloc*.

7. It must be admitted that recent outward manifestations of Turkey's foreign policy seem rather to lend colour to the view that there is a definite tendency in this country to align itself in a Russo-Italian grouping, completed by Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and, so far as she counts, Albania, but I believe this to be in a sense accidental and a combination that, while, as Tevfik Rüstü himself owns, possible, will only crystallise if French policy acts as the precipitating agent.

8. Turkish friendship with Russia, though close and indeed inevitable, for the alternative is definite estrangement, has well-marked limits; her relations with Hungary are more sentimental than anything else, two races springing from a common stock and so on, while her reconciliation with Greece is a tribute to wise statesmanship in both countries. But how explain the courting of Italy, which has been so marked of late? Not so very long ago the moving of a militia battalion from Taranto to Rhodes set the Turkish General Staff agog, and Italy still remains a country of superabundant population, with former outlets such as the United States and South America becoming more and more restricted, while South-Western Asia Minor remains unpopulated and crying for colonisation.

9. To-day all this is changed, superficially at least. Italy enjoys an excellent press and is made to play the part of Turkey's best friend in Europe (that is, outside the Soviet Union). But there is much reason to believe that this fulsome cordiality is to some extent a forced product, and that it springs in no small degree from the same uneasiness respecting Italy's intentions as openly determined Turkish policy some years back. Turkey feels that she cannot afford to remain indifferent to an Italy so set on playing a dominant part in eastern Europe and the Levant, and, as with Russia, she has preferred conciliating a friend to acquiescing in a state of tension and the latent perils involved therein. At the same time, I am inclined to see a further influence drawing Turkey into the Italian orbit, in the feeling that the Mussolini system of government and theory of national life is the best model for her to adopt. In spite of occasional waves of enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon ideas of individual freedom of thought and action, the conception is really alien to the Turkish genius. On the other hand, the Soviet Communist system is abhorrent to the Turk, but in fascism the modern Turkish ruler finds the exemplar of the national State. One of the weaknesses brought to light during the short life of Fethi Bey's opposition was the neglect of the Popular party to educate the youth of the country in its theories and ideals, and I am told that the Italian Embassy has been providing, "by request," full information on the bringing up of the young Fascist.

10. I may be entirely wrong and Tevfik Rüstü may be playing a deep game and deliberately hoodwinking the simple-minded, but I find it difficult to believe that Turkish foreign policy is other than as openly professed and, so far, practised by Turkey's Foreign Minister, and it seems to me that latent uneasiness as to Italy's ultimate intentions and desire to build on the Fascist model supply a reason for Tevfik Rüstü's open courtship of Il Duce.

11. I have sent copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Athens and Sofia.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

(E 6816/282/44) No. 144.

Mr Wyatt to Sir F. Butler.—(Received December 18.)

Ottoman Debt Council, Paris,
December 16, 1930.

Dear Butler,

I ENCLOSE, for your information, a copy of the president's letter of the 11th instant to the Turkish Minister of Finance, with enclosure.

Yours sincerely,
S. C. WYATT

Enclosure 1 in No. 144.

President of Ottoman Debt Council to Turkish Minister of Finance.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, le 11 décembre* 1930.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de son télégramme, en date du 30 novembre 1930, qui a été communiqué aux deux conseils dans leur séance commune du 4 courant.

Les conseils prennent acte de ce que le Gouvernement turc déclare qu'il n'a à aucun moment renié ses dettes ni essayé de faire table rase du passé.

Mais le Gouvernement déclare également que la Turquie, atteinte dans sa capacité de paiement, n'est plus en état d'exécuter le contrat du 13 juin 1928.

Dans ces conditions, les conseils regrettent de ne pouvoir répondre à l'invitation que le Gouvernement turc leur a faite d'envoyer des délégués à Ankara.

Afin qu'aucun malentendu ne puisse subsister sur ce point entre le Gouvernement et les conseils, ces derniers ont jugé nécessaire de lui exposer clairement la situation dans une note que j'ai l'honneur de remettre ci-jointe à votre Excellence.

Tout en confirmant les termes de leur télégramme du 24 novembre 1930, les conseils ne sont pas moins désireux que le Gouvernement de voir le rétablissement des relations normales entre lui et les porteurs.

Veuillez, &c
Le Président,
DES CLOSIÈRES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 144.

Note to the Turkish Government.

1. PAR son télégramme du 30 novembre 1930, adressé au Conseil de la Dette, le Gouvernement de la République turque déclare qu'il n'a jamais voulu renier ses dettes ni essayé de faire table rase du passé, mais que la capacité financière de la Turquie, qui serait plus sérieusement atteinte aujourd'hui qu'au moment où M. Rist a procédé à ses études, ne lui permettrait pas d'exécuter les clauses du contrat du 13 juin 1928.

C'est pourquoi il invite le conseil à entreprendre des négociations destinées à trouver à la question des dettes ottomanes une solution juste et équitable, à la suite de laquelle des relations normales, qu'il désire vivement, pourront être rétablies entre les porteurs et lui.

De cette communication il paraît résulter que les pourparlers envisagés par le Gouvernement auraient pour objet d'apporter des modifications à l'exécution du contrat du 13 juin 1928.

Si tels sont bien les intentions et le but du Gouvernement, il n'est pas possible aux conseils de répondre à son invitation.

2. En effet, les conseils, aux termes du contrat du 13 juin 1928, sont sans pouvoirs pour examiner une modification quelconque à ce contrat.

Ils doivent faire remarquer, à cet égard, qu'ils n'ont jamais admis, à la suite des conversations de mai 1930, de solution contraire aux termes du contrat, puisque, dans sa lettre du 6 mai, le Gouvernement se fondant sur l'article 16 pour demander des facilités temporaires et que les conditions posées par les conseils, et d'ailleurs non acceptées par le Gouvernement, avaient pour objet de maintenir ces facilités

dans le cadre de l'article 16, en assurant le paiement, au plus tard au 25 octobre 1930, des sommes nécessaires pour combler l'insuffisance des versements antérieurs.

Le fait que les conseils ne peuvent modifier le contrat de 1928 n'exclut, d'ailleurs, pas la possibilité de conversations avec le Gouvernement turc, mais celles-ci ne peuvent avoir pour base que les dispositions du contrat.

3. En ce qui concerne la situation financière de la Turquie, qui, selon le Gouvernement, ne lui permet pas de faire face aux engagements pris dans le contrat, les conseils ne peuvent que se référer aux constatations de M. Rist, sans méconnaître les difficultés de la situation, l'expert établit que le Gouvernement peut y porter remède en ne demandant aux porteurs que des allégements temporaires de transferts, destinés à préparer un assainissement financier, dans l'intérêt commun des créanciers et du Gouvernement.

4. Les porteurs de la dette ottomane, dont la créance a reçu un gage déterminé et suffisant, ne comprendraient, d'autre part, en aucune façon que le Gouvernement leur fît supporter à eux seuls les conséquences des difficultés financières actuelles de la Turquie, alors que tous les autres créanciers continueraient, dans le même temps, à recevoir le paiement intégral des sommes qui leur sont dues.

Au surplus, étant donné le faible pourcentage que représente l'annuité de la dette dans le budget turc, il paraît difficile de contester que le Gouvernement pourrait, par des mesures appropriées, faire face aux charges du contrat de 1928.

5. Les conseils, dans un esprit de loyauté et de bonne volonté, ont tenu à expliquer clairement leur position au Gouvernement.

Soucieux à la fois des légitimes intérêts des porteurs et du maintien du crédit du Gouvernement turc, ils veulent conserver la conviction que ce dernier ne manquera pas de tenir le compte le plus sérieux des considérations ci-dessus exposées.

Le 11 *décembre* 1930.

[E 6923/3476/44] No. 145

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(*Received December* 20.)

(No. 484.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 23, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report that Saraçoglu Sükru Bey, Minister of Finance, has handed in his resignation, which has been accepted.

2. Ismet Pasha has appointed in his place the present Minister of National Defence, Abdulhalik Bey.

3. In my despatch No. 369 of the 24th September, 1930, I referred to the fact that one of the chief objects of Fethi Bey's programme was to drive the Minister of Finance from office. Sükru Bey's resignation cannot, I think, now be attributed to the efforts of opponents, but is probably due, as announced in the press, to reasons of health, Sükru Bey having been for some weeks past seriously indisposed.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 6925/2085/44] No. 146.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(*Received December* 29.)

(No. 487.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 24, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to your despatch No. 722 of the 1st December, that the German press announcements relative to railway and public works undertakings in Turkey do not tally with the information in the possession of the commercial secretary to this Embassy.

2. The position regarding the Julius Berger A.G. contract is as follows:—

The Kutahya Tavsanli–Balikesir Line.—Tavsanli is situated between Kütahya and Balikesir, and is therefore not the terminus of this railway.

The Line from Ulukisla to Kayseri.—The Julius Berger A.G. undertook the construction of a line from Bogazkopru (a point on the Ankara–Kayseri Railway, approximately 20 kilom. west of the latter town) to Ulukisla. The German press

reports that this line is practically complete. This is hardly the case, for the construction of parts of it, amounting in all to 50 kilom., has only recently been taken over by Messrs. Fox Brothers, International Corporation, and when this work is completed the construction of another 23 kilom. will have to be undertaken before the line reaches Ulukisla.

3. The construction of the 50 kilom. of the Bogazköprü–Ulukisla line by Messrs. Fox Brothers was awarded in partial compensation for the cancellation of the railway workshop contract at Kayseri, which the American concern had previously undertaken. They were subsequently given the contract for the extension of the Angora railway station, with German material provided by the Ministry of Public Works.

The Swedish Railway Contracts.—As far as is known, work on the Fezzipasa–Ergani and the Irmak–Filyos lines, representing the remaining contracts undertaken by foreign groups, continues to progress, though at a slower rate than was originally intended.

The Contract for the Construction of Asphalt Roads around Angora.—At one time the Turkish Government contemplated the cancellation of this contract, but a modified scheme, representing a saving of £T. 2 million, was subsequently awarded to a Turkish firm.

The Cubuk Irrigation Barrage Scheme.—This scheme has been curtailed and retarded for technical reasons.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.